Julian Newman

Epistemic opacity vis a vis human agents has been presented as an essential, ineliminable characteristic of computer simulation models resulting from the characteristics of the human cognitive agent. This paper argues, on the contrary, that such epistemic opacity as does occur in computer simulations is not a consequence of human limitations but of a failure on the part of model developers to adopt good software engineering practice for managing human error and ensuring the software artefact is maintainable. One consequence of such failures is to create a “technical debt” which manifests itself in the so-called novel confirmation holism confronted by complex systems models. The argument from the supposed essential epistemic opacity of computational science to a non-anthropocentric epistemology runs counter to best practice in software engineering and overlooks empirical results of software engineering science.

Scientific findings based on computer simulation evoke sceptical responses because their output does not appear to have an objective status comparable to data captured by observation or experiment. However the simulationists have been defended on grounds that their practices, like those of experimenters, carry with them their own credentials. It has been further argued that epistemic opacity is essential to the nature of computational science and that epistemology of science must cease to be anthropocentric. Such philosophical faith in software runs counter to both established practice in software engineering, and the underlying software engineering science. In computational science as elsewhere data quality can only be assured through the exercise of human critical judgment.