Julian Perilla

To yearn for freedom is to want to be seen by others as someone. Rousseau, I believe, held such a conception of freedom, alongside his intricate theory of human passions. This essay examines how freedom relates to such passions, and in particular, to the Rousseauian notion of amour‐propre. Importantly, the aim here is both interpretive and positive. The essay seeks to locate Rousseau within the old republican tradition in a manner that parts ways with most contemporary readings of Rousseau. But, in doing so, it argues that republican freedom essentially involves a particular status and the recognition of such status by others. On this Rousseauian view, one is free to the extent that others see one as a limit to their arbitrary interference and as entitled to interfere with them non‐arbitrarily. Finally, republican freedom, so understood, is shown to be essential to meeting the demands of healthy amour‐propre, thereby bringing Rousseau's political and psychological theories closer together.

This article attempts a reconstruction of Nietzsche’s metaethics through a constitutivist lens. It examines the relationship between life’s meaningfulness and our distinctive way of valuing to offer a value-based version of constitutivism—a value constitutivism, as it were. For Nietzsche, valuing has a characteristic function or aim, namely, to give life meaning; good values are simply those that perform that function well. This version of Nietzschean constitutivism has both interpretive and substantive upshots. Mainly, it clarifies the general normative structure of Nietzsche’s axiological theory and helps vindicate the kind of revaluation of values he envisioned—with power playing a central normative role. In sum, constitutivism remains a promising approach to Nietzsche, and Nietzsche’s writings continue to offer rich insights into the source and nature of normativity.