Julian Reiss

Computer simulations are an exciting tool that plays important roles in many scientific disciplines. This has attracted the attention of a number of philosophers of science. The main tenor in this literature is that computer simulations not only constitute interesting and powerful new science, but that they also raise a host of new philosophical issues. The protagonists in this debate claim no less than that simulations call into question our philosophical understanding of scientific ontology, the epistemology and semantics of models and theories, and the relation between experimentation and theorising, and submit that simulations demand a fundamentally new philosophy of science in many respects. The aim of this paper is to critically evaluate these claims. Our conclusion will be sober. We argue that these claims are overblown and that simulations, far from demanding a new metaphysics, epistemology, semantics and methodology, raise few if any new philosophical problems. The philosophical problems that do come up in connection with simulations are not specific to simulations and most of them are variants of problems that have been discussed in other contexts before.

In this book, Reiss argues in favor of a tight fit between evidence, concept and purpose in our causal investigations in the sciences. There is no doubt that the sciences employ a vast array of techniques to address causal questions such as controlled experiments, randomized trials, statistical and econometric tools, causal modeling and thought experiments. But how do these different methods relate to each other and to the causal inquiry at hand? Reiss argues that there is no "gold standard" in settling causal issues against which other methods can be measured. Rather, the various methods of inference tend to be good only relative to certain interpretations of the word "cause", and each interpretation, in turn, helps to address some salient purpose (prediction, explanation or policy analysis) but not others. The main objective of this book is to explore the metaphysical and methodological consequences of this view in the context of numerous cases studies from the natural and social sciences.

The ‘causal wars’ (Scriven 2008) are controversies currently plaguing a variety of fields of the applied social and life sciences including ageing studies, criminology, dentistry, development economics, education, medicine, psychology and social policy, among others. The main issue in these controversies is the role randomised controlled trials (RCTs) ought to play in the evaluation of treatment and policy options. Some, e.g., proponents of ‘evidence-based medicine’ argue that evidence from RCTs is the gold standard. Their opponents deny RCTs any special role in the evaluation of treatments. But whereas defenders of RCTs can be said to follow an epistemic paradigm (‘experimentalism’), their opponents make many detailed criticism, but have so far not developed a unified alternative. To present such an alternative is the aim of this paper.

En su artículo «¿Teorías de causación y explicación: necesariamente verdaderas o dominioespecíficas?», Paul Humphreys investiga el estatus modal de las teorías de la causación y laexplicación de Wesley Salmon e intenta mostrar que a pesar de que sus teorías ulterioresson, si verdaderas, apenas contingentemente verdaderas, una interpretación más fuerte esposible y (al menos así lo sugiere) deseable. En este artículo hago cuatro cosas. Primero mepregunto por posibles motivaciones para buscar una teoría de la causación y de la explicaciónque sea más fuerte que meramente contingente. Segundo, muestro contra-ejemplos bienconocidos que demuestran que la teoría de Salmon no es universalmente verdadera. Tercero,muestro que aunque es coherente sostener una teoría dominio-específica necesaria, argumentara favor de dicha teoría violaría el punto de vista empirista global de Salmon. Cuarto,trazo brevemente una interpretación alternativa de la teoría de Salmon que no vulnera sentimientosempiristas.

The most fundamental questions of economics are often philosophical in nature, and philosophers have, since the very beginning of Western philosophy, asked many questions that current observers would identify as economic. The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Economics is an outstanding reference source to the key topics, problems, and debates at the intersection of philosophical and economic inquiry.It captures this field of countless exciting interconnections, affinities, and opportunities for cross-fertilization. Comprising thirty-five chapters by a diverse team of contributors from all over the globe, the Handbook is divided into eight sections: I. Rationality II. Cooperation and Interaction III. Methodology IV. Values V. Causality and Explanation VI. Experimentation and Simulation VII. Evidence VIII. Policy The volume is essential reading for students and researchers in economics and philosophy who are interested in exploring the interconnections between the two disciplines. It is also a valuable resource for those in related fields like political science, sociology, and in the humanities.

Jeffrey Friedman’s Power Without Knowledge argues forcefully that there are inherent limitations to the predictability of human action, due to a circumstance he calls “ideational heterogeneity.” However, our resources for predicting human action somewhat reliably in the light of ideational heterogeneity have not been exhausted yet, and there are no in-principle barriers to progress in tackling the problem. There are, however, other strong reasons to think that disagreement among epistocrats is bound to persist, such that it will be difficult to decide who has “the right answer” to a given technocratic problem. These reasons have to do with competing visions of the good society, fact/value entanglement, and the fragility of the facts of the social sciences.

Acceding to the demand that public policy should be based on “the best available evidence” can come at significant moral cost. Important policy questions cannot be addressed using “the best available evidence” as defined by the evidence-based policy paradigm; the paradigm can change the meaning of questions so that they can be addressed using the preferred kind of evidence; and important evidence that does not meet the standard defined by the paradigm can get ignored. We illustrate these problems in three contexts of evidence-based policy.

This volume reflects the ‘philosophy of science in practice’ approach and takes a fresh look at traditional philosophical problems in the context of natural, social, and health research. Inspired by the work of Nancy Cartwright that shows how the practices and apparatuses of science help us to understand science and to build theories in the philosophy of science, this volume critically examines the philosophical concepts of evidence, laws, causation, and models and their roles in the process of scientific reasoning. Each chapter is an important one in the philosophy of science, while the volume as a whole deals with these philosophical concepts in a unified way in the context of actual scientific practice. This volume thus aims to contribute to this new direction in the philosophy of science.​