Julie C Van Camp

Help your students discover the ethical issues and implications surrounding today's most compelling social dilemmas--from genetic engineering and cloning to terrorism and the use of torture--with APPLYING ETHICS: A TEXT WITH READINGS, 11th Edition. Framed by the authors' helpful introductions and supported by a variety of readings and cases that reflect both sides of the topics being explored, this best-selling book offers a balanced introduction to ethics today. Important Notice: Media content referenced within the product description or the product text may not be available in the ebook version.

Several philosophical problems concerning the object of criticism in dance are identified and analyzed as preliminary to an eventual theory of evaluation of dance. Basic to philosophical adequacy is understanding the artform as it is actually practiced and appreciated, recognizing its complexity as a performing artform using unique human bodies as instruments. ;Definitions of "dance" proposed by philosophers, dance historians, and others are inadequate to specify necessary and sufficient conditions of dance, to distinguish dance from other human non-art phenomena, and to distinguish dance from other artforms. Definitions can be adequate for a specific purpose, using descriptive characteristics and standards for evaluation and appreciation by an audience. ;The ontological status of dance is best understood as consisting of the primary media of movement by human bodies and music and secondary media of the visual dimensions of costumes, scenery, and lighting. Improved understanding of the artform is possible with this more comprehenive recognition of its complex multi-media status, as shown in an analysis of "appropriateness" of the various media, a typical criterion for evaluation. ;The identity of a work of art in dance can be established using a notational system in conjunction with a standard for acceptable compliance with that notation. "Substantial similarity," as determined by lay observers, the test for copyright infringement, provides a useful standard for dance. Other theories have required too much of an identity standard; its purpose is to identify a particular performance as one of a certain work, not to teach dancers to perform the work, nor to enable directors to produce it, nor to provide standards for a good performance of the work. ;A necessary condition of the proper object of criticism is perceivability. The considerable interest in the dance world in production and other factors not perceivable on stage during performance is best understood as a interest in the on-going skills of artists, as opposed to the evaluation of an aesthetic object

En posant avec clarté des questions de philosophie de l’esprit, d’ontologie et d’épistémologie, ce livre témoigne à la fois de l’intérêt réel de la danse comme objet philosophique et du rôle unique que peut jouer la philosophie dans une meilleure compréhension de cet art. Qu’est-ce que danser ? Que nous apprend le mouvement dansé sur la nature humaine et la relation entre le corps et l’esprit ? À quelles conditions une œuvre est-elle correctement interprétée par les danseurs et bien identifiée par les spectateurs ?

I wonder why women philosophers, once recognized, too often seem to drop from the intellectual radar screen or, at least, to drop mainly to the land of footnotes and bibliographies. I consider one distinguished moral philosopher, Elizabeth Lane Beardsley, both to highlight her philosophical contributions and as a case study that suggests more widespread problems in recognizing t5he work of female philosophers and ensuring their rightful place in our professional dialogue. I consider sociological and professional factors which might partially explain why work by women philosophers has not always received the attention in the professional dialogue it seems to deserve. I conclude with some modest suggestions about the efforts that we can make to address these problems, including the organization of readings for our own courses, the sources consulted for our own research and writing, and the preservation of rec rods of meetings and other public gatherings that recognize women philosophers.

An innovative examination of the ways in which dance and philosophy inform each other, Dance and Philosophy brings together authorities from a variety of disciplines to expand our understanding of dance and dance scholarship. Featuring an eclectic mix of materials from exposes to dance therapy sessions to demonstrations, Dance and Philosophy addresses centuries of scholarship, dance practice, the impacts of technological and social change, politics, cultural diversity and performance. Structured thematically to draw out the connection between different perspectives, this books covers: - Philosophy practice and how it corresponds to dance - Movement, embodiment and temporality - Philosophy and dance traditions in everyday life - The intersection between dance and technology - Critical reflections on dance Offering important contributions to our understanding of dance as well as expanding the study of philosophy, this book is key to sparking new conversations concerning the philosophy of dance.

Reno v. ACLU, the 1997 landmark decision by the United States Supreme Court providing sweeping protection to speech on the Internet, is usually discussed in terms of familiar First Amendment issues. Little noticed in the decision is the significance of the ontological assumptions of the justices in their first visit to cyberspace. I analyze the apparent awareness of the Supreme Court of ontological issues and problems with their approaches. I also argue that their current ontological assumptions have left open the door to future suppression of free speech as the technology progresses. Ontology is significant because zoning in the physical world has long been recognized as a way to segregate "adult" entertainment from minors. So far, at least, the justices seem to agree that such zoning is not possible in cyberspace, and therefore that adult zones for certain forms of expression are not possible. But this conclusion is far from settled. The degree of free speech on the Internet in the future will depend on whether or not our ontological understanding of cyberspace supports such zoning or renders it incoherent or impossible.

/p. 14 The humanities, as defined by Congress, include the history, theory, and criticism of the arts. While the National Endowment for the Arts funds the creation, performance, and display of art, the National Endowment for the Humanities funds the theoretical dimensions that place the arts within a broader cultural context. Admittedly, the line is sometimes difficult to draw precisely, but generally, the humanities center on verbal analysis of the phenomenon of art, using the methodology and content of various humanities disciplines, such as history and philosophy.

The U.S. Supreme Court recently held that a parody by the rap group 2 Live Crew of Ray Orbison's song "Oh, Pretty Woman" was "fair use" and thus did not infringe the copyright. Although the court insisted that it was not evaluating the quality of the parody, I argue that it does in fact make several aesthetic evaluations and sometimes even seems to praise the content of the parody. I first consider the stated reasons for the claimed refusal of the court to evaluate aesthetic quality. Second, I examine the evaluations which the court in fact does make, at least some of which are clearly aesthetic evaluations. I then argue that aesthetic value judgments are both necessary and possible for determinations of "fair use" for such works as the "Pretty Woman" parody.

Reno v. ACLU , the 1997 landmark decision by the United States Supreme Court providing sweeping protection to speech on the Internet, is usually discussed in terms of familiar First Amendment issues. Little noticed in the decision is the significance of the ontological assumptions of the justices in their first visit to cyberspace. I analyze the apparent awareness of the Supreme Court of ontological issues and problems with their approaches. I also argue that their current ontological assumptions have left open the door to future suppression of free speech as the technology progresses. Ontology is significant because zoning in the physical world has long been recognized as a way to segregate "adult" entertainment from minors. So far, at least, the justices seem to agree that such zoning is not possible in cyberspace, and therefore that adult zones for certain forms of expression are not possible. But this conclusion is far from settled. The degree of free speech on the Internet in the future will depend on whether or not our ontological understanding of cyberspace supports such zoning or renders it incoherent or impossible.