The longstanding dispute over moral facts—dividing realists, anti-realists, and quasi-realists—has proven intractable and appears to exemplify a deep disagreement. We argue that the impasse is not a metaphysical stalemate but a product of grammatical illusions about the logical role of moral judgment. Building on Wittgenstein’s later philosophy and Murdoch’s notion of vision, we introduce a hinge–vision distinction that underwrites a new therapeutic approach to the Moral Facts Disagreement (MFD)…
Read moreThe longstanding dispute over moral facts—dividing realists, anti-realists, and quasi-realists—has proven intractable and appears to exemplify a deep disagreement. We argue that the impasse is not a metaphysical stalemate but a product of grammatical illusions about the logical role of moral judgment. Building on Wittgenstein’s later philosophy and Murdoch’s notion of vision, we introduce a hinge–vision distinction that underwrites a new therapeutic approach to the Moral Facts Disagreement (MFD). On this approach, moral hinges constitute the enabling conditions of moral evaluation, whereas visions determine the structure and salience of moral assessment. This framework shows that MFD can be dissolved rather than resolved and yields a unified account of moral normativity and deep disagreement. We offer a new account of deep (moral) disagreement, locating it in clashes of vision rather than hinge, thereby revising the current Wittgensteinian theories of deep disagreement.
