Junsik Yoon

Lee’s feature article1 critically examines East Asian pronatalist policies from an ethical perspective, with a particular focus on South Korea. The article effectively argues that Korean pronatalist policies aggravate fundamental social injustices and reduce women to mere means. While I broadly agree with Lee’s argument, this commentary addresses a crucial oversight: the antinatalist intuition that ‘it would be better not to be born’. I will argue that establishing an ethics of pronatalism in South Korea (and beyond) requires respectful engagement with such moral judgements, even if we do not ultimately accept them. Some choose not to have children primarily due to economic constraints. For these individuals, whose decision is prudent, state financial incentives may be appropriate. However, a recent survey2 by the Presidential Committee on Ageing Society and Population Policy of South Korea reveals more complex motivations. According to a September 2024 survey of childless respondents, the main reasons for not having children were ‘Pregnancy, childbirth and child-rearing seem vaguely difficult’ (35.8%), ‘Society is too difficult for children to live happily and safely’ (19.5%), ‘Child-rearing costs are burdensome’ (14.4%) and ‘I/spouse is too old’ (11.3%). …

This study examines the ethical permissibility of biomedical moral enhancement (BME) for psychopaths, considering both coercive and voluntary approaches. To do so, I will first briefly explain what psychopaths are and some normative implications of these facts. I will then ethically examine three scenarios of BME for psychopaths: (1) coercive BME for non‐criminal psychopaths, (2) coercive BME for psychopathic offenders, and (3) voluntary BME for psychopathic offenders. I will argue that coercive BME for non‐criminal psychopaths is ethically problematic due to issues of cost, invasion of privacy, and stigmatic effects of compulsory diagnosis. Similarly, I will argue that coercive BME for criminals is impermissible due to violations of the rights to bodily and mental integrity. However, I will show that voluntary BME for offenders may be ethically permissible under certain conditions, challenging the critique that the consent of vulnerable prisoners cannot be considered fully voluntary. I argue that when an offender is provided with sufficient medical and legal information, incentives such as the possibility of parole review based on BME results do not preclude the voluntariness of consent. Ultimately, I aim to advance the debate on BME for psychopaths by delineating and defending conditions for the ethical permissibility of voluntary BME.