Jurgis Viningas

Leibniz’s readers know that his a posteriori argument, which seeks to establish that force, measured by mv^2 rather than mv, is conserved in the universe, has direct bearing on his metaphysics of substance. Leibniz is not simply introducing a new physical quantity and an argument for its conservation. He takes this argument to play a corroborative role in his metaphysical project of resuscitating substantial forms. Leibniz also gave an a priori argument for the conservation of actio. The place of this argument in his metaphysical project is somewhat more complex. I argue that one way to understand the function of this argument is in terms of a metaphysical reduction – in the argument, Leibniz brackets the realm of sensible matter and empirical hypotheses, such as the law of uniform acceleration, and isolates a metaphysical element of activity constitutive of a singularity of a corporeal substance. Key to Leibniz’s strategy is his redeployment of the medieval notion of intensio as a degree of ontological perfection. Leibniz scholars have traced this notion to the medieval language of latitudo formarum. I contend that it denotes a degree of primitive activity constitutive of a singularity of substance, understood in a Scotist sense of the term.

The aim of this article is to revisit and disambiguate Deleuze's redeployment of the medieval language of intensities. Deleuze scholars usually discus this within the context of scholastic debates concerning the problem of the intensive variation of qualities. However, Deleuze's use of the notion of intensity should, I argue, primarily be understood in relation to a different medieval problem—the problem of individuation, especially as it was approached by Duns Scotus. This article reconstructs Scotus's concept of intensive quantity as an individuating difference and analyzes its appropriation by Deleuze. What is usually unrecognized by Deleuzian readers of Scotus is the distinction between the categorial and transcategorial senses of Scotus's concept of intensive quantity. My article will thereby (i) work through the details of this distinction, (ii) show how intensive quantity in a transcategorial sense is tacitly employed in Scotus's account of individuation, and (iii) analyze the way this notion of intensive quantity is adopted by Deleuze. It will then (iv) demonstrate how and why Deleuze argues, contra Scotus, that intensive, individuating difference must assume ontological primacy over specific and categorial differences, and why, in an affront to Scotus, individuating difference, for Deleuze, must become a sui generis transcendental.