Juri Viehoff

The AI Act advances a risk-based approach to the legal regulation of AI systems in the European Union. While we support this development, we argue that adequate AI governance requires paying attention to the broader implications of AI systems on the socio-technical landscape in which they are designed, developed, and used. In addition to risk-based impact assessments, this involves coming to terms with the socially disruptive implications of AI, which should be governed and guided in a dynamic ecosystem of regulation, law, ethics, and evolving human practice. In this paper, we outline a ‘social disruptiveness-based’ approach to AI governance aimed at addressing disruptions by AI that are not easily captured by legal regulation, but that are nonetheless of great societal and ethical concern. We argue that integrating the AI Act risk-based approach with a social disruptiveness-based approach can offer a more nuanced understanding of the dimensions of impact of AI systems on society at large, thus enhancing the governance of AI and other socially disruptive technologies.

This article reports three empirical studies regarding partially aggregative moral theories in distributive ethics (total N = 417). We begin by documenting the widespread occurrence of the intuitions that motivate partial aggregation views. Thereafter, we advance the literature along two dimensions: First, we extend experimental work by ascertaining which amongst existing versions of partial aggregation (localised vs. global) chimes more fully with moral common sense. Specifically, we document how judgments about ‘irrelevant goods’ (Kamm Citation1993) in tie-breaking cases are just as robust as the original aggregative/non-aggregative pair of judgments that constitute partial aggregation. Second, we conduct an experiment that pairs laypeople’s moral judgments in standard cases with their intuitions about the limits of permissible self-prioritisation. We investigate whether one prominent explanation of why irrelevant claims may not be aggregated (Voorhoeve’s ‘personal prerogative’ argument) can be said to underpin people’s intuitions about the (ir)relevance relation of claims in conflict cases. We close with a discussion of our findings’ import and highlight avenues for future research.

This article explores how the widespread adoption of AI in the workplace threatens the value of solidarity – an often overlooked but central feature of valuable work. It distinguishes between two forms of solidarity: productive solidarity, which arises from cooperation and shared creation, and labour solidarity, which emerges from collective resistance within wage labour systems and suggests that the replacement of human colleagues with AI agents erodes both forms. It does so by removing opportunities for mutual recognition and shared struggle, but also by fragmenting worker identity and amplifying managerial control. Despite these risks, I contend that solidarity can be preserved through ethically informed design choices and democratic governance of workplace technology. Strategies include embedding AI in human teams, enabling worker participation in technological decisions, and revitalizing labour institutions.

In response to activist movements like Black Lives Matter and global events such as the Covid-19 pandemic, philosophers have shown a renewed interest in the value and practice of solidarity. However, this surge of interest has also highlighted some notable disagreements in the literature. This article proposes a novel understanding of the practice of solidarity and its value. On this approach, solidarity is characterized functionally as the practice that offers a unique way of bringing into greater harmony our moral and our personal reasons. Under social conditions of pervasive injustice, we often face a conflict between pursuing a flourishing life—e.g., by investing time and energy in personal projects and relationships—and doing what is morally required. I suggest that through solidarity commitments, we align our need to advance morality-given causes with our need to pursue personal projects and relationships. Viewing solidarity through the lens of this ‘positive alignment’ idea allows us to better understand its unique characteristics. Moreover, the account can clarify (and potentially resolve) some disagreements that have besieged recent debates. Finally, this approach deepens our grasp of solidarity’s value and its deontic status, contributing to its recognition as a central ideal in moral and political theory.

Complex moral trade-offs are a basic feature of human life: for example, confronted with scarce medical resources, doctors must frequently choose who amongst equally deserving candidates receives medical treatment. But choosing what to do in moral trade-offs is no longer a ‘humans-only’ task, but often falls to AI agents. In this article, we report findings from a series of experiments (N=1029) intended to establish whether agent-type (Human vs. AI) matters for what should be done in moral trade-offs. We find that, relative to a human decision-maker, participants more often judge that AI agents should opt for fairness at the expense of maximizing utility. In our discussion, we explain how the reported differences (we call them agent-type ‘value forks’) matters for the study of moral value alignment, and we hypothesize what could explain these value forks. We close by reflecting on limits of our results and indicate avenues of further research.

Should we be worried that the concept of trust is increasingly used when we assess non-human agents and artefacts, say robots and AI systems? Whilst some authors have developed explanations of the concept of trust with a view to accounting for trust in AI systems and other non-agents, others have rejected the idea that we should extend trust in this way. The article advances this debate by bringing insights from conceptual engineering to bear on this issue. After setting up a target concept of trust in terms of four functional desiderata (trust-reliance distinction, explanatory strength, tracking affective responses, and accounting for distrust), I analyze how agential vs. non-agential accounts can satisfy these. A final section investigates how ‘non-ideal’ circumstances—that is, circumstances where the manifest and operative concept use diverge amongst concept users—affect our choice about which rendering of trust is to be preferred. I suggest that some prominent arguments against extending the language of trust to non-agents are not decisive and reflect on an important oversight in the current debate, namely a failure to address how narrower, agent-centred accounts curtail our ability to distrust non-agents.

This article reports three empirical studies regarding partially aggregative moral theories in distributive ethics (total N = 417). We begin by documenting the widespread occurrence of the intuitions that motivate partial aggregation views. Thereafter, we advance the literature along two dimensions: First, we extend experimental work by ascertaining which amongst existing versions of partial aggregation (localised vs. global) chimes more fully with moral common sense. Specifically, we document how judgments about ‘irrelevant goods’ (Kamm 1993) in tie-breaking cases are just as robust as the original aggregative/non-aggregative pair of judgments that constitute partial aggregation. Second, we conduct an experiment that pairs laypeople’s moral judgments in standard cases with their intuitions about the limits of permissible self-prioritisation. We investigate whether one prominent explanation of why irrelevant claims may not be aggregated (Voorhoeve’s ‘personal prerogative’ argument) can be said to underpin people’s intuitions about the (ir)relevance relation of claims in conflict cases. We close with a discussion of our findings’ import and highlight avenues for future research.

This article offers a functionalist account of trust. It argues that a particular form of trust—Communicated Interpersonal Trust—is paradigmatic and lays out how trust as a social practice in this form helps to satisfy fundamental practical, deliberative, and relational human needs in mutually reinforcing ways. We then argue that derivative (non-paradigmatic) forms of trust connect to the paradigm by generating a positive dynamic between trustor and trustee that is geared towards the realization of these functions. We call this trust’s proleptic potential. Our functionalist approach does not only provide important insights into the practice of trust and its place in the broader web of social life, but also illuminates existing philosophical debates. First, pointing out how opposing theoretical accounts of trust each capitalise on only one of its functions, our paradigm-based approach reveals why they each contain a kernel of truth but are also deficient: the optimal realization of each function is tied to the existence of the other functions as well. Second, we show how a functionalist re-orientation can illuminate two recent disputes regarding (i) the question whether trust is explanatorily two- or three-place and (ii) whether (and to what extent) we can decide to trust others.

Claims about coercion play a significant role in some of the most important questions in political philosophy: most ordinary citizens as well as philosophers think that the exercise of power by the state and other political institutions is coercive, and as such requires special justification. Political philosophy, it has been assumed, must assess both the truth of that claim and its relevance for whether or not states, in general, can be justified. Whether the state is always or necessarily coercive is a central question in the philosophy of law. Under what conditions a state exercising coercive power can be justified is the question that informs all major works in the social contract tradition since Thomas Hobbes's Leviathan.

There is widespread agreement that the European Union is presently suffering from a lack of social justice. Yet there is significant disagreement about what the relevant injustice consists in: Federalists believe the EU can only remedy its justice deficit through the introduction of direct interpersonal transfers between people living in separate states. Intergovernmentalists believe the justice-related purpose of the EU is to enable states to cooperate fairly, and to remain internally just and democratic in the face of increased global pressure on welfare states. I suggest that despite their fundamental differences, many of the most reasonable and prominent philosophical accounts of social justice in the EU nonetheless converge in their institutional prescriptions. In particular, they may each serve as a justificatory basis for introducing the European social minimum, an EU-wide income support scheme.