Jussi Backman

The chapter studies the main stages in the evolution of Heidegger’s readings of Parmenides B3, constituting perhaps the philosophically most pregnant facet of Heidegger’s Parmenides interpretations. B3, perhaps the best-known fragment of Parmenides’ Poem, consists of a single line: _to gar auto noein estin te kai einai_, literally, 'for the same is thinking (_noein_) as well as being (_einai_)'. From the Neoplatonists Plotinus and Proclus up to the nineteenth century, this fragment was read as asserting, in some sense, the identity of thinking and being. With the general reaction against German idealism, scholars such as Eduard Zeller and John Burnet tried to rid the fragment of its alleged 'identity idealism' by reading it in the sense of 'what can be thought and what can be are the same', but this revised reading is not entirely persuasive. Whether or not we need to suspect Parmenides of 'idealism' depends entirely on the sense in which the sameness of identity (_to auto_) in B3 is understood. Throughout his career, from his very earliest lectures to his final 1973 seminar, Heidegger kept returning to the sense of this identity. He constantly insisted that to auto in B3 does not mean 'empty' identity in the sense of equivalence or homogeneity, but rather a reciprocal belonging-together and interdependence of thinking and being. In his later thought, Heidegger takes to auto as the subject of the fragment, equating it with _Ereignis_, the dynamic event or 'taking place' of meaningful presence that ties together both givenness and receptivity, being and thinking. In the final stage of his engagement with Parmenides, Heidegger emphasises that this was a philologically untenable imposition of his own 'postmetaphysical' thinking of _Ereignis_ upon Parmenides’ 'protometaphysical' thinking of being as sheer meaningful presence/accessibility (_Anwesen_). Ultimately, Heidegger makes it clear that we need to distinguish between three different types of identity: (1) Parmenidean identity in which thinking (receptivity) is referred back to being (intelligible givenness); (2) modern, 'idealistic' identity in which being (as the object of thinking) is referred back to the cognitive activity of the thinking ego (as in Berkeley’s dictum _esse est percipi_); and (3) Heidegger’s own, postmetaphysical sense of identity in which both thinking and being are referred to a primal event of meaningful reciprocity.

_Dasein_ is the German term for concrete existence in general. In phenomenology, it is best known as the key term of Martin Heidegger’s _Being and Time_ (1927), where it specifically designates the existential, factical, and situated “being-there” of the concrete and individual human being, as opposed to the Husserlian understanding of transcendental subjectivity. In Heidegger’s fundamental ontology, the existential analytic of Dasein as dynamic and finite being-in-the-world and care aims to elaborate the fundamentally temporal structure of Dasein’s existence; this was to serve as a pathway to articulating the temporal structure of meaningful being in general. In Heidegger’s later thought, the focus is on the _Da_, the “there” of Dasein as the situated and singular locus, site, or place for the event (_Ereignis_) of being. The Heideggerian Dasein has been a particularly influential concept within existential philosophy and existential psychology, and has also had repercussions in political theory.

As Putin and Xi push for a “multipolar” world where liberal democracy is just one model among many, their challenge to Western Enlightenment ideals is gaining momentum – fueled by Trump’s second presidency and surging “radical conservativism” in Europe. Finnish philosopher Jussi Backman argues that an anti-liberal theory of reality is on the rise, providing a wide-ranging metaphysical underpinning for would-be geopolitical revolutionaries. Drawing on Heidegger, figures like Aleksandr Dugin – sometimes described as Putin’s philosopher – portray liberal metaphysics as inevitably leading to nihilism, posing a serious ideological challenge that liberals and the left need to take seriously.

This chapter is an overview of Giorgio Agamben's engagement, in the Homo Sacer series (1995–2014), with Aristotelian philosophy. It specifically studies Agamben's attempt to deconstruct two Aristotelian conceptual oppositions fundamental for the Western tradition of political thought: (1) that between the bare fact of being alive and "qualified" living (associated by Agamben with an alleged distinction between zōē and bios) and (2) that between potentiality (dynamis) and actuality (energeia). Agamben's concept of form-of-life (forma-di-vita), a life that is never "bare" but always in the process of qualifying itself, is designed to deactivate and overcome these distinctions. In the final volume of the series, The Use of Bodies (2014), this is done with the help of the Aristotelian concepts of use (chrēsis) and habit (hexis).

"If the previous chapters by Cabrera, Reid and Craig, and Cerbone all accentuate the paradox of existence, that our being-in-the-world is simultaneously beautiful and ugly, good and evil, joyous and painful, Jussi Backman's "Not One Power, But Two: Dark Grounds and Twilit Paradises in Malick" investigates this fundamental ambivalence in terms of Schelling's doctrine of evil, a view that assigns evil (and hence melancholy) a fundamental place as a basic principle of reality. Backman's suggestion at once deepens and complexifies the way in which Malick's films can be seen as exercises in "aesthetic theodicy," as Sinnerbrink has said." (Steven DeLay, Introduction)

Puhuttaessa Ukrainan sotaan kärjistyneen Venäjän geopoliittisen ja ideologisen ajattelun filosofis-teoreettisista taustavoimista nousee toistuvasti esiin ”putinismin pääideologiksi” ja ”maailman vaarallisimmaksi filosofiksi” maalaillun Aleksandr Duginin nimi. Kuka Dugin on, millaista on hänen vaarallinen ajattelunsa ja mikä on sen yhteys suurvallan aggressioon ja hyökkäyssotaan? Seuraavassa luodaan tiivis yleiskatsaus Duginin ajattelun kahteen keskeisimpään ideologiseen elementtiin: geopoliittiseen Euraasia-ideologiaan ja Duginin radikaalikonservatiiviseen ”neljänteen poliittiseen teoriaan”. Vaikka Duginin suora vaikutusvalta on rajallinen, hänen ajattelunsa heijastelee Venäjän poliittisen eliitin ajatusmaailmaa laajemminkin.

The paper studies the significance of Martin Heidegger's philosophy of history for two key thinkers of contemporary radical conservatism and the Identitarian movement, Alain de Benoist and Aleksandr Dugin. Heidegger's often-overlooked affinities with the German “conservative revolution” of the Weimar period have in recent years been emphasized by an emerging radical-conservative “right-Heideggerian” orientation. I first discuss the later Heidegger's “being-historical” narrative of the culmination and end of the metaphysical foundations of Western modernity in the contemporary Nietzschean era of nihilism and of an emerging postmodern “other beginning” of Western thinking, focused on historical and cultural relativism and particularism. In Heidegger's work of the 1930s and 1940s, we find attempts to apply this historical narrative to interpreting contemporary geopolitical and ideological phenomena in ways that connect Heidegger to certain central ideas and concerns of the conservative revolutionaries, especially Carl Schmitt's geopolitical particularism. De Benoist, the key name of the French Nouvelle Droite and a founding figure of contemporary Identitarianism, is particularly inspired by Heidegger's reading of Nietzsche as the culmination of the “metaphysics of subjectivity” dominating Western modernity. For de Benoist, this modern metaphysics is the root of the “ideology of the Same” underlying the liberal universalism and individualism that he opposes in the name of a cultural ethnopluralism. De Benoist's Russian disciple Dugin bases the pluralistic geopolitics of his radical-conservative “fourth political theory” on the legacy of the conservative revolution, the key intellectual model of which Dugin discovers in Heidegger's notion of the “other beginning”.

In the introduction to the volume, the editors explain the overarching aim of the volume and contextualize the main themes of its chapters. Even if the notions of biopolitics and biopower have played a crucial role in philosophy, the humanities, and the social sciences over the last decades, they have been used in various and at times diverging senses, which has also produced different narratives about the history of biopolitics. The main aim of the volume is to clarify whether and to what extent the concept of biopolitics is applicable to antiquity. To answer such questions, the chapters collected in the volume address three main topics, namely the possible presence of biopolitical discourse in ancient thought, the extent to which the application of a biopolitical approach to ancient thought requires qualifications, and some influential contemporary interpretations of the relation between biopolitics and antiquity.

This chapter approaches the question of biopolitics in ancient political thought looking not at specific political techniques but at notions of the final aim of the political community. It argues that the “happiness” (eudaimonia, beatitudo) that constitutes the greatest human good in the tradition from Aristotle to Thomas Aquinas is not a “biopolitical” ideal, but rather a metabiopolitical one, consisting in a contemplative activity situated above and beyond the biological and the political. It is only with Thomas Hobbes that civic happiness becomes “biopolitically” identified with simple survival; for modernity, as Hannah Arendt puts it, mere being alive becomes the greatest human good, and happiness is understood as a subjective “quality of life.” In both models, the political realm is a means to an end. Arendt draws our attention to a neglected third alternative to both the classical/metabiopolitical and the modern/biopolitical ideals: “public happiness” consisting in political participation itself.

The volume studies, from different perspectives, the relationship between ancient thought and biopolitics, that is, theories, discourses, and practices in which the biological life of human populations becomes the focal point of political government. It thus continues and deepens the critical examination, in recent literature, of Michel Foucault's claim concerning the essentially modern character of biopolitics. The nine contributions comprised in the volume explore and utilize the notions of biopolitics and biopower as conceptual tools for articulating the differences and continuities between antiquity and modernity and for narrating Western intellectual and political history in general. Without committing itself to any particular thesis or approach, the volume evaluates both the relevance of ancient thought for the concept and theory of biopolitics and the relevance of biopolitical theory and ideas for the study of ancient thought. The volume is divided into three main parts: part I studies instances of biopolitics in ancient thought; part II focuses on aspects of ancient thought that elude or transcend biopolitics; and part III discusses several modern interpretations of ancient thought in the context of biopolitical theory. PART I: BIOPOLITICS IN ANCIENT THOUGHT 1:Biopolitics and the "boundless people": An Iliadic model (Sara Brill) 2:Plato and the biopolitical purge of the city-state (Mika Ojakangas) 3:Sovereign power and social justice: Plato and Aristotle on justice and its biopolitical basis in heterosexual copulation, procreation, and upbringing (Kathy L. Gaca) PART II: ANCIENT THOUGHT BEYOND BIOPOLITICS 4:Otherwise than (bio)politics: Nature and the sacred in tragic life (Kalliopi Nikolopoulou) 5:Beyond biopolitics and juridico-institutional politics: Aristotle on the nature of politics (Adriel M. Trott) 6:_Bene vivere politice_: On the (meta)biopolitics of "happiness" (Jussi Backman) PART III: BIOPOLITICAL INTERPRETATIONS OF ANCIENT THOUGHT 7:Hannah Arendt's genealogy of biopolitics: From Greek materialism to modern human superfluity (Ville Suuronen) 8:From biopolitics to biopoetics and back again: On a counterintuitive continuity in Foucault's thought (Sergei Prozorov) 9:Agamben's Aristotelian biopolitics: Conceptual and methodological problems (Antonio Cimino)

Artikkeli toimii johdantona Martin Heideggerin suomennettuun teokseen Johdatus metafysiikkaan. Se avaa historiallisia tilanteita, joissa kyseiset luennot alun perin pidettiin (1935) ja julkaistiin (1953). Johdatus metafysiikkaan -luennoista voidaan löytää epäsuora kuvaus Heideggerin suhteesta kansallissosialismiin hänen rehtorikautensa (1933–1934) jälkeisinä vuosina ja ne dokumentoivat myös filosofian olosuhteita ja ehtoja kansallissosialismin aikana. Filosofisesti luennot kiteyttävät Heideggerin Olemisen ja ajan (1927) jälkeisen käänteen (Kehre) ja esittävät ohjelmallisen luonnoksen Heideggerin myöhäisajattelun tärkeimmistä suuntaviivoista.

Kirjoitus tarkastelee Martin Heideggerin myöhäisajattelussa esiin nousevaa olemisen ainutkertaisuuden (Einzigkeit, Einmaligkeit) teemaa ja sen edelleenkehittelyä Jean-Luc Nancyn ajattelussa. Teeman osoitetaan kytkeytyvän Heideggerin välienselvittelyyn filosofian esisokraattisen alun, erityisesti Parmenideen ajattelun kanssa. Parmenides ajattelee olemista kaikkia yksittäisiä ilmentymiään, "kuolevaisten" äärellisiä "näkemyksiä" (doksai) yhdistävänä absoluuttisen homogeenisena ja itseidenttisenä ilmeisyytenä (alētheia), todellisuuden puhtaana läsnäolona ajattelulle. Tätä vasten Heidegger ajattelee olemisen nimenomaan yksittäisten ilmentymiensä kontekstuaalisena ainutkertaisuutena, mielekkyystilanteiden ainutkertaistavana kontekstualisoitumisena. Nancy jatkaa ajatusta kuvailemalla olemista "ainutkertaiseksi-monikolliseksi" (singulier pluriel), mutta täydentää Heideggerin ajatteluun tunnetusti jäänyttä aukkoa soveltamalla ajatusta yhteisön ajattelemiseen ainutkertaisuuksien yhdessäolemisena ja keskinäisyytenä. Näin avautuva "ainutkertaisuuden politiikan" teema onkin viime vuosikymmeninä noussut mannermaisen poliittisen ajattelun keskiöön.

Artikkeli tarkastelee aluksi Hannah Arendtin analyysiä totalitarismin pohjimmiltaan ideologisesta luonteesta ja ideologisen ”idean” olemuksesta. Tätä analyysiä verrataan Alain Badioun yritykseen herättää henkiin ideologinen ”idean politiikka”. Artikkelin perusväitteen mukaan sekä Arendt että Badiou näkevät politiikan alueena, jolla uutuus ja ihmisen kyky ryhtyä maailmaa muuttaviin hankkeisiin voivat toteutua. He ymmärtävät kuitenkin poliittisen aktiviteetin muodon olennaisesti eri tavoin: Arendtille politiikka on perusluonteeltaan toimintaa, praksista, Badioulle se on pohjimmiltaan idean tuottamista, poiesista. Tällä on keskeisiä seurauksia heidän politiikkakäsityksilleen. Lopuksi osoitetaan, että Badioun ”ideologinen” ymmärrys politiikasta jää alttiiksi Arendtin peruskritiikille, jonka mukaan politiikan välineellinen ymmärtäminen keinojen ja päämäärien viitekehyksessä on viime kädessä kyvytön sulkemaan pois poliittisen terrorin mahdollisuutta.

Lähtökohtanaan Jean-Paul Vernantin ja Albrecht Dihlen historialliset teesit artikkeli tarkastelee tärkeimpien ”lakia ja järjestystä” ilmaisevien käsitteiden (nomos, dikē) roolia esisokraattisten filosofien, erityisesti Anaksimandroksen, Herakleitoksen ja Parmenideen, ajattelussa. Arkaaisessa kreikkalaisessa ajatusmaailmassa sekä luonnon että ihmisyhteisön sisäinen tasapaino ilmentää moninaisen jumalmaailman ja ihmisten välistä vuorovaikutusta. Esisokraatikot ajattelevat todellisuutta eriytyneenä ykseytenä, jonka moninaisuutta sitoo yhteen yhtenäinen perusrakenne; tämän mallin uusi filosofia jäsentää uudesta polis-ajattelusta lainattujen käsitteiden avulla. Tämä esisokraatikkojen ”poliittinen ontologia” ja toisaalta nomoksen, yhteisöllisen normiston, enenevä ymmärtäminen inhimillisenä konventiona, mahdollistaa fysiksen ja nomoksen, ”luonnon” ja ”kulttuurin” välisen myöhemmän vastakkainasettelun.

Artikkeli käy läpi Quentin Meillassoux’n Äärellisyyden jälkeen -teoksessa esittelemiä spekulatiivisen materialismin lähtökohtia: ajatuksen Kantin jälkeistä filosofiasta hallinneesta korrelationismista ja sen ”heikosta” ja ”vahvasta” muodosta sekä Meillassoux’n perusargumentin, jolla hän pyrkii osoittamaan vahvan korrelationismin pyrkimyksen absoluuttisista viitepiisteistä luopumiseen sisäisesti ristiriitaiseksi. Tarkastelun pääpaino on Meillassoux’n väitteessä, että ajattelun riisuminen kaikista absoluuttisista näkökohdista johtaa vahvan korrelationismin omaksumaan ”fideistisen”, uskon ja järjen erillisyyttä ja keskinäistä riippumattomuutta korostavan suhtautumisen uskonnolliseen uskoon. Tällainen fideismi voi Meillassoux’n mukaan suojella tai jopa palvella ”nykypäivän fanatismia”. Artikkeli esittää joukon kriittisiä huomioita Meillassoux’n fideismin ja uskon, uskonnollisten absoluuttien sekä fanatismin käsitteistä. Hänen klassiseen valistusmoderniin nojaava fideismikritiikkinsä osoittautuu toistaiseksi puutteellisesti perustelluksi ja ongelmallisesti muotoilluksi.

In this chapter, Jussi Backman approaches Hannah Arendt’s readings of ancient philosophy by setting out from her perspective on the intellectual, political, and moral crisis characterizing Western societies in the twentieth century, a crisis to which the rise of totalitarianism bears witness. To Arendt, the political catastrophes haunting the twentieth century have roots in a tradition of political philosophy reaching back to the Greek beginnings of philosophy. Two principal features of Arendt’s exchange with the ancients are highlighted. The first is her account, in The Human Condition (1958), of the profound transformation of the Greek perceptions of political life initiated by Plato, the founder of the Western tradition of political philosophy; this transformation, according to Arendt, leads to an instrumentalization of politics as a means toward a higher end. The second feature is Arendt’s distinction, in her unfinished Life of the Mind (1977–8), between three different points of departure for thinking discovered by ancient philosophy—wonder, fear, and conscience—and three different outcomes of thinking—contemplation, willing, and judging. Backman argues that what connects these two interpretations of ancient philosophy is an attempt to rethink and rearticulate the complex relationship between thinking and action, between the reflective vita contemplativa and the world-oriented vita activa.

This paper compares two influential but conflicting contemporary models of politics as an activity: those of Hannah Arendt and Alain Badiou. It discovers the fundamental difference between their approaches to politics in their opposing evaluations of the contemporary political significance of the legacy of Plato, Platonism, and the Platonic Idea. Karl Popper’s and Arendt’s analyses of the inherently ideological nature of totalitarianism are contrasted with Badiou’s vindication of an ideological “politics of the Idea.” Arendt and Badiou are shown to share an understanding of politics as a realm for the human deployment of novelty and world-transformation. Their key disagreement concerns the form of activity that accomplishes this deployment. For Arendt, political activity has the basic form of noninstrumental and nonteleological action (praxis), devalued by the Platonic tradition of political philosophy. Badiou, by contrast, follows Plato in regarding politics essentially as a process of production (poiēsis) oriented to an ideal end.

This article looks at the role of Hellenistic thought in the historical narratives of Martin Heidegger and Hannah Arendt. To a certain extent, both see—with G. W. F. Hegel, J. G. Droysen, and Eduard Zeller—Hellenistic and Roman philosophy as a “modernity in antiquity,” but with important differences. Heidegger is generally dismissive of Hellenistic thought and comes to see it as a decisive historical turning point at which a protomodern element of subjective willing and domination is injected into the classical heritage of Plato and Aristotle. Arendt, likewise, credits Stoic philosophy with the discovery of the will as an active faculty constituting a realm of subjective freedom and autonomy. While she considers Hellenistic philosophy as essentially apolitical and world-alienated—in contrast to the inherently political and practical Roman culture—it nonetheless holds for her an important but unexploited ethical and political potential.