Moderate revisionists about moral responsibility, such as Manuel Vargas, attempt to preserve the backward-looking norms that ordinarily guide praise and blame while arguing that these norms are justified because of their effects. However, some doubt that backward-looking norms are good at achieving these effects; this is the objection from inefficacy. In this paper, I introduce an alternative to Vargas’ view that holds that our responsibility practices are a game, as analyzed by Bernard Suits. I…
Read moreModerate revisionists about moral responsibility, such as Manuel Vargas, attempt to preserve the backward-looking norms that ordinarily guide praise and blame while arguing that these norms are justified because of their effects. However, some doubt that backward-looking norms are good at achieving these effects; this is the objection from inefficacy. In this paper, I introduce an alternative to Vargas’ view that holds that our responsibility practices are a game, as analyzed by Bernard Suits. I argue that this alternative avoids the objection from inefficacy while preserving attractive features of Vargas’ view. Further, I argue that the game view yields benefits over other revisionist views to position the view as a promising account for the justification of our responsibility practices. If our responsibility practices are a game, then it affords the game view a valuable conceptual distinction unavailable on other views and ensures that praise and blame are attributed wholeheartedly.
