Justin Bruner

Pascal’s wager faces many challenges. Chief amongst them are the objection from mixed strategies (MS) and many gods (MG). One way of responding to these worries invokes unorthodox decision-theoretic frameworks such as surreal decision theory, lexicographic utility theory, or relative utility theory. All three of these approaches side-step the two objections cited above. Yet all three are vulnerable to a new worry we refer to as the parable of the penniless pilgrim. Namely, information informs decision-making and, as a result, information is of value. Yet in the context of Pascal’s wager, information pertaining to various religious hypotheses often has infinite value. Consequently, an individual will often be willing to give up any amount of material goods in order to perform an experiment.

Intersectionality theory explores the peculiar disadvantages that arise as the result of occupying multiple disadvantaged demographic categories. Addressing intersectionality theory through quantitative methods has proven difficult. Concerns have been raised about the sample size one would need in order to responsibly tease out evidence for the claims of intersectionality theorists. What is more, theorists have expressed concern about our ability to formulate novel intersectional hypotheses in a non-ad-hoc manner. We argue that simulation methods can help address these, and other, methodological problems, because they can generate novel hypotheses about causal dependencies in a relatively cheap way, and can thus guide future empirical work. We illustrate this point using models which show that intersectional oppression can arise under conditions where social groups are disadvantaged in the emergence of bargaining norms. As we show, intersectional disadvantage can arise even when actors from all social categories are completely identical in terms of preferences and abilities. And when actors behave in ways that reflect stronger intersectional identities, the potential for disadvantage increases. As we note, this exploration illustrates the usefulness of idealized models to real world inquiry.

This chapter explores the behavior of individuals placed in circumstances approximating the ‘veil of ignorance.’ Unlike previous experiments of Rawls’ veil, it considers Rawls’ fair equality of opportunity principle in addition to the so-called difference principle. The chapter author’s experimental design can register whether behavior is consistent with a lexicographic ranking of principles of justice. The chapter observes wide support for utilitarianism as well as fair equality of opportunity and, moreover, finds the former is lexically prior to the latter.

Collaboration is increasingly popular across academia. Collaborative work raises certain ethical questions, however. How will the fruits of collaboration be divided? How will academics divide collaborative labor? This chapter considers the following question in particular. Are there ways in which these divisions systematically disadvantage certain groups? The chapter uses evolutionary game theoretic models to address this question. First, it discusses results from O'Connor and Bruner (2015) showing that underrepresented groups in academia can be disadvantaged in collaboration and bargaining by dint of their small numbers. Second, it presents novel results exploring how the hierarchical structure of academia can lead to bargaining disadvantage. The chapter investigates models where one actor has a higher baseline of academic success, less to lose if collaboration goes south, or greater rewards for non-collaborative work. The chapter shows that in these situations, the less powerful partner can be disadvantaged in bargaining over collaboration.

Norms hold a central role in social philosophy, with Cristina Bicchieri's game‐theoretic approach being one of the most influential accounts. Bicchieri's framework has inspired numerous successful interventions, improving outcomes across diverse communities worldwide. However, certain aspects of Bicchieri's theory remain underdeveloped, limiting its ability to predict the best strategies for norm change. To address this, we present a simple formal model that clarifies the relationship between key components of her theory—schemas and behavioral rules—offering theorists and practitioners new tools for modeling and measuring social and behavioral change.

In this paper we use an experimental approach to investigate how linguistic conventions can emerge in a society without explicit agreement. As a starting point we consider the signaling game introduced by Lewis (Convention 1969). We find that in experimental settings, small groups can quickly develop conventions of signal meaning in these games. We also investigate versions of the game where the theoretical literature indicates that meaning will be less likely to arise—when there are more than two states for actors to transfer meaning about and when some states are more likely than others. In these cases, we find that actors are less likely to arrive at strategies where signals have clear conventional meaning. We conclude with a proposal for extending the use of the methodology of experimental economics in experimental philosophy.

When does evolution lead to efficient outcomes in a social dilemma such as the prisoner’s dilemma or stag hunt? There is a growing consensus in the literature that correlated interaction among behavioral strategies is key. Partner choice, reciprocity, kin selection, and local interactions all generate positive assortment and thus open up new evolutionary possibilities. In this brief note we contend that sometimes increasing the degree of assortment has negative consequences in social dilemmas. Namely, increased assortment can stabilize previously unobtainable inefficient outcomes.

According to one influential tradition, to assert that p is to express a belief that p. Yet how do assertions provide strong evidence for belief? Philosophers have recently drawn on evolutionary biology to help explain the stability of assertive communication. Mitchell Green suggests that assertions are akin to biological handicaps. Peter Graham argues against the handicap view and instead claims that the norms of assertion are deterrents. Contra Graham, I argue that both mechanisms may play a role in assertive communication, although assertions as deterrents will often fail to provide strong evidence for belief.

In their recent book, Oreskes and Conway ([ 2010 ]) describe the ‘tobacco strategy’, which was used by the tobacco industry to influence policymakers regarding the health risks of tobacco products. The strategy involved two parts, consisting of (i) promoting and sharing independent research supporting the industry’s preferred position and (ii) funding additional research, but selectively publishing the results. We introduce a model of the tobacco strategy, and use it to argue that both prongs of the strategy can be extremely effective—even when policymakers rationally update on all evidence available to them. As we elaborate, this model helps illustrate the conditions under which the tobacco strategy is particularly successful. In addition, we show how journalists engaged in ‘fair’ reporting can inadvertently mimic the effects of industry on public belief. 1Introduction 2Epistemic Network Models 3Selective Sharing 4Biased Production 5Journalists as Unwitting Propagandists 6Conclusion Appendix.

Evolutionary accounts of morality consider behavior in rather simple scenarios. Evolutionary work on fairness focuses on the division of a windfall and, importantly, assumes that the positions of those involved are entirely symmetric. I consider more complicated strategic settings and find that there is a strong tendency for evolution to produce divisions consistent with the so-called Nash bargaining solution. I also uncover the evolutionary importance of comprehensiveness, an often-overlooked feature of division problems.