Justin P. Holt

Jeppe von Platz’s article “Democratic Equality and the Justification of Welfare-State Capitalism” develops a conception of justice called social democracy. Von Platz’s social democratic conception is to be a unique alternative to John Rawls’s theory of justice as fairness. Social democracy is conceived of as a robust welfare-state that runs at full-employment and prosperity is sought for all of its members. Von Platz has developed an interesting and useful conception of justice. But there are some problems with his criticism of justice as fairness. Von Platz’s argument that the difference principle is not a unique principle of reciprocity is based on a mistaken understanding of reciprocity as defined by Rawls. If von Platz’s critique of the difference principle does not work, then his social democratic conception of justice in comparison with justice as fairness is not distinctive. Additionally, this paper argues that the usefulness of von Platz’s conception of social democracy is as a non-ideal transition model towards a more just society.

Sovereign states have the power to regulate their economies by issuing a fiat currency. The use of a sovereign fiat currency allows states to regulate the price level, activate real resources, and create new wealth. Even though the state has the ability to produce large social and economic effects through its fiscal position, this state power has been neglected in the literature on just economic regimes. This paper combines ideas from a neo-chartalist theory of money and contemporary political philosophy to present a conception of state finance relevant to the discussion of just economic regimes.

The purpose of this chapter is to present and discuss a distributive justice standard that exceeds the minimal standard of Chap. 4. This new standard will be based on an adaptation of John Rawls’s work. The focus of this adaptation will be a consideration of what is a democratic society and what constitutes full participation in a democratic society. Also, it is shown that the use of modern money theory provides a framework for mediating distributive conflicts. In order to show this, the following conjecture is developed: the use of the policies of demand management and suitable full employment to meet the minimal standard may make it more likely to realize Rawls’s conception of justice. This conjecture is based on two assumptions. One, these policies may help mediate social conflict over material goods. Two, these policies may encourage the acceptance of kinds of social organization that foster support for the democratic aspiration of social and political equality.

The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the main theoretical claims of modern money theory. The following questions will be answered to achieve this purpose. What is the nature of a state-issued currency? What is the role of taxation? What is the role of state bonds? What are demand shortfalls? What is full employment? What is a job guarantee? What kind of work would be performed by job guarantee workers? Are there alternatives to a job guarantee? Why does modern money theory focus on real resources? And what are some potential criticisms of modern money theory? This chapter will end with a brief review of these topics.

This chapter discusses the goals of this book. The first goal is to show the importance of a recently developed framework of macroeconomics called modern money theory for the political philosophic discipline of distributive justice. The second goal is to develop two conceptions of distributive justice to argue the following. One, a minimal standard of distributive justice can be attained through the use of state spending to achieve a form of full employment to meet the minimal needs of persons and increase their minimal opportunities. Two, a more demanding conception of distributive justice, based on the work of John Rawls, is necessary in order for the democratic aspiration of social and political equality to be achieved. This chapter also contains a brief overview of this book’s chapters.

The purpose of this chapter is to show that the conjectures of modern money theory provide unique innovations for use in distributive justice analysis. In this chapter, first an argument is developed for a minimal distributive justice standard based on meeting minimal needs and providing minimal opportunities for persons. Second, it will be shown that one of the profound results of modern money theory’s analysis of demand gaps and state spending is that people can be employed to increase their well-being. Third, it will be shown how the insights from modern money theory are distinctive from several standard theories, but not all, within the contemporary distributive justice literature.

This dissertation explains Karl Marx’s understanding of nature, human action, and a materialist standard of practical action. Marx’s understands natural processes as not identical with human action. There are two types of human action for Marx: material action and social action. Material action can use natural processes. Social action does not directly use natural processes, but social action can promote how material action uses natural processes. The difference between natural processes, material action, and social action is important for Marx since it: maintains the independent reality of nature, maintains the development of material accomplishments as separate from social forms, and demonstrates the transitory status of social forms. This difference between material action and social action allows Marx to criticize certain social forms while praising the productive possibilities of the current level of technical development. A practical standard is developed using Marx’s understanding of nature and human action. This practical standard is based on humans’ necessary relationship to natural processes. Beneficial outcomes according to humans’ material abilities and their existence as natural beings is established by application of the practical standard. The materialist standard of practical action can be understood as an ethical theory that is not based on traditional ethical criteria.

Decommodification is an important support for the development of our excellences and the pursuit of our freedom of conscience. In order to show this, the paper will be structured as follows. First, it will be argued that a decommodified social threshold of goods and services is a necessary part of a free-standing politically liberal conception of justice. The authors to be reviewed in this section are R.H. Tawney and John Rawls. The second section will discuss a compendium of possible decommodified goods and services. Finally, an alternative of partial decommodification and a brief comment on basic income grants will be presented in the last sections.

Modern Monetary Theory and Distributive Justice shows how the macroeconomic framework called modern money theory (MMT) is relevant to the field of political philosophy called distributive justice. Many of the macroeconomic assumptions of distributive justice are unstated and unexamined. The framework of MMT illuminates these assumptions and provides an alternative vision of distributive justice analysis and prescriptions. In particular, MMT holds that modern money is a nominal state issued token (fiat), there is a distinction between nominal assets and real assets, that state money as a nominal token can cause changes in real terms, and that the macroeconomy has historically not operated at capacity. The upshot of these assumptions held by MMT is that state spending can bring about changes in persons’ well-being without traditional redistributive measures via taxation. This is in contradistinction to standard assumptions in the distributive justice literature, which holds that the macroeconomy is at capacity and, thus, redistribution is the necessary mechanism for enacting improvements in well-being. This is a fundamental shift in how distributive justice can be conceived.

In his Republic, Plato argues that self-rulership cannot be widespread enough in a populace due to structural failures of education. This means that rulership by the few with the use of manipulative mythological devices is inevitable. That is, if a populace cannot rule themselves through the use of their reason, then they will be ruled by others through the use of myth, at best, and at worst, violence. Even given this rather grim conclusion, if we closely examine what Plato has to say about politics, we can see that there is no natural impossibility for generalized rule by the many. That is, there is no aristocracy of birth, but there is an aristocracy of the educated. As I will show below, we can develop a more democratic politics out of Plato if we consider the possibility of a democratic education. Before I do that, I will briefly consider Rawls’ comments on the education of citizens for democracy. This will allow for a clearer consideration of the democratic potential of Plato’s political philosophy in his Republic.

This paper will show that Mary Wollstonecraft developed a modern feminist version of virtue ethics. Virtue ethics is an all-encompassing moral theory which holds that the best life for individuals is commensurate with a good society. Simply, self-interest and our public duties are argued as identical and not at odds when we realize what is truly good for ourselves and for others. In the Western philosophic cannon, the most common version of virtue ethics is Aristotle’s, with the Nicomachean Ethics as the definitive presentation. Wollstonecraft’s argument for the political, social, economic, and personal equality of women utilizes ideas that are reminiscent of classical virtue ethics. Her novel and effective addition is to show that the explicit inclusion of women requires a reconsideration of the duties needed for happy lives to be led and for a good society, and good families, to exist.

Hun Chung’s recent article “Rawls’s Self-Defeat: A Formal Analysis” argues that the selection of results equivalent to justice as fairness can be derived by utilitarianism. Chung argues that these results can be achieved through the use of Rawls’s constructed utility function from his work Justice as Fairness. Although Chung’s article is finely argued and presented in great detail, this paper will show that Chung made three mistakes in the fundamentals of his argument. First, Chung mistakes Rawls’s constructed utility function as actually utilitarian. Second, Chung confuses the motivations and the assumptions of those held by agents in the original position and those held by utilitarian agents. Last, Chung’s previous mistakes result in the incorrect conclusion that an equal distribution of resources will be selected by representative agents instead of the unequal distribution prescribed by the difference principle.

Rawls’s consideration not to include the choice of economic systems as part of a theory of justice is inconsistent with his comments on redistribution and the political effects of economic inequality. When Rawls’s discussion of economic systems and his discussion of economic inequalities is examined, it is apparent that the selection of economic systems is a pertinent topic for a theory of justice. The propensity for the primary social good of self-respect to be satisfied can be affected by the selection of economic systems. Rawls has incorrectly determined the selection of economic systems to be unimportant if different economic systems can be more advantageous to the satisfaction of self-respect than others. When socialism and Rawls’s version of regulated capitalism are compared, socialism is a maximin solution, and accordingly will be selected by people within the original position under the veil of ignorance.

G.A. Cohen attempts to provide a case for socialism that takes into consideration the reasons why socialism is desirable and some of the problems for its feasibility. He finds that the kind of community sentiment that socialism requires is possible, but the devices of social organization that can facilitate the growth of socialist sentiment along with the effective transmission of information are not currently known. In short, Cohen thinks social scientists and philosophers need to find out how to harness the information transmission capacity of market exchange without the motivational encouragement of rapacious self-interest that market exchange fosters. This paper argues that Cohen’s appraisal of the ineffectiveness of informational transmission in socialist planned economies in incorrect. A democratically planned socialist economy can serve as the basis for the fostering of the socialist community sentiment that Cohen advocates along with the required transmission of economic information.

This paper will examine the three distributive problems of inequality, social scarcity, and environmental decay. All three of these problems are the result of economic growth that is not properly structured by institutions. It will be argued that each one of these distributive problems exacerbates the other two. Any solution to one of these problems must address the other two as well. This paper will show that these three distributive problems can be minimized through a combination of tax measures, institutional changes, public employment creation, public service provision, and the nationalization of certain industries.

Abstract: This paper restates the thesis of 'The Requirements of Justice and Liberal Socialism" where it was argued that liberal socialism best meets Rawlsian requirements of justice. The recent responses to this paper by Jan Narveson, Jeppe von Platz, and Alan Thomas merit examination and comment. This paper shows that if Rawlsian justice is to be met, then non-personal property must be subject to public control. If just outcomes merit the public control of non-personal property and this control is not utilized, then justice has been subordinated to the objectively less important institution of private property.

This work analyses Marx's philosophy of nature and shows how it is the basis for his practical philosophy. Previous analysis of Marx's philosophy of nature has considered humans as only natural beings and social beings. But, Marx analyzed humans' relationship to the natural world and to themselves as natural, social, and material. This material feature of human action can server as a basis for social critique and as the foundation for a practical analysis. The first chapter of this book analyzes Marx's philosophy of nature from his early to late works and argues that humans are natural begins that use nature to develop new capacities. This consideration is central in Marx's critiques of Hegel and Feuerbach. The second chapter discusses Marx's material critique of social forms and discusses why the distinction between material action and social action is a key component of Marx critique of capitalism. This chapter also discusses industrial history, ideology, wages, justice, and valorization. The third and final chapter builds on Marx's materialist analysis to develop a standard of practical action that takes human's material activity as its basis. This chapter also discusses classical historical materialist claims, liberal ethical theories, and a practical philosophic consideration of socialism.

G.A. Cohen’s critique of the Rawlsian difference principle points out an inconsistency in its presentation. The initial equality decided by the participants in the original position under the veil of ignorance is not preserved by the inequality sanctioned by the difference principle. Cohen shows how the breakdown of the initial equality of the original position prevents the desired results of the Rawlsian system from being realized. Cohen argues that an egalitarian ethos is required within a society for equality preserving economic distributions and Pareto superior outcomes to occur. Nonetheless, Cohen’s analysis of Rawls misses the ultimate cause of inequality, which is the dynamics of capital accumulation. An egalitarian ethos is only possible if there is a socialist mode of production to facilitate its development. Additionally, Cohen’s critique of Rawlsian constructivism through an argument for intuitionism does not address the natural-material existence of human beings. This existence must be considered for any advantageous social formation.

Modern money theory is a conjecture concerning fiscal spending and the nature of money. I show that modern money theory provides two interesting insights into distributive justice that have not been addressed in the recent Anglo-American distributive justice literature: (i) that the nature of a sovereign fiat currency allows for some distributive conflicts to be avoided; and (ii) that recent Anglo- American distributive justice theories assume that the economy is at capacity. Based on this, I consider if the policy results of modern money theory can help foster a sense of justice.

The Social Thought of Karl Marx is an introductory work for students in the social sciences and the humanities. It can be used by undergraduate students, graduate students, scholars, and general readers. The book is written for people who have no previous knowledge of Karl Marx's work. Nonetheless, readers with some knowledge of Marx will also find the presentation to be helpful. The Social Thought of Karl Marx contains ten chapters organized to assist readers learn the general themes, categories, and applications of Marx's ideas. Topics covered in the chapters include the intellectual climate of his time, alienation, class, historical materialism, exploitation, ideology, economic crises, communism, and environmental decay. Marx's thought was focused on analyzing the structure, development, and problems of capitalist economies. Accordingly, The Social Thought of Karl Marx takes Marx's research on capitalism as its center-point. An outline of the basic features of capitalism is presented in the first chapter along with common defenses and criticisms of its outcomes. Marx's categories and ideas are individually discussed in light of his critique of capitalism. A chapter is devoted to Marx's statements concerning capitalism's impact on the environment. This addition is timely due to the recent resurgence of the field of Ecological Marxism. Each chapter concludes with a set of questions to assist in developing applications based on Marx's thought and to consider their cogency. A glossary has been added to help readers in learning Marx's terminology. The final chapter contains a set of additional readings to provide people a starting point for their future studies. Contents: 1. The World of Karl Marx 2. Marx's Materialism 3. Alienation 4. Class 5. Historical Materialism 6. Economis 7. Ideology 8. Communism 9. Capitalism and the Environment 10. Further Readings"

Recent scholarship has considered the requirements of justice and economic regimes in the work of John Rawls. This work has not delved into the requirements of justice and liberal socialism as deeply as the work that has been done on property-owning democracy. A thorough treatment of liberal socialism and the requirements of justice is needed. This paper seeks to begin to fill this gap. In particular, it needs to be shown if liberal socialism fully answers the requirements of justice better than property-owning democracy. It will be argued that liberal socialism does significantly better in realizing the two principles. This paper has the following structure, first, an overview of Rawls' position on economic regimes, capitalism, and the requirements of justice will be presented. In particular, how the two principles work in tandem to meet the demands of distributive justice will be considered. Second, a review of property-owning democracy will be conducted. Finally, liberal socialism will be examined and discussed as an economic regime that answers the requirements of justice more fully.