Justin Nnaemeka Onyeukaziri

This paper does not intend to discuss the concept of the beautiful as a metaphysical concept but as an aesthetic and artistic reality of the Chinese and African peoples. This paper is a discourse on “social edification” as the essence of beauty in Chinese and African philosophies. Thus, the aim is to concisely expose the concept of the beautiful by the Chinese and African peoples. That is, it aims to explore what constitutes beauty for the Chinese and African peoples. The focus is on Confucian and the Igbo aesthetical notions of the beautiful as representative of Chinese and African philosophies, respectively. This paper contends that “the beautiful” for both the Chinese and Africans is fundamentally and intrinsically moral and has a teleological motif that is social in nature—social edification. It posits the notions of art and beauty as social edification for a harmonious and cohesive human community.

This paper does not intend to discuss the concept of the beautiful as a metaphysical concept but as an aesthetic and artistic reality of the Chinese and African peoples. This paper is a discourse on “social edification” as the essence of beauty in Chinese and African philosophies. Thus, the aim is to concisely expose the concept of the beautiful by the Chinese and African peoples. That is, it aims to explore what constitutes beauty for the Chinese and African peoples. The focus is on Confucian and the Igbo aesthetical notions of the beautiful as representative of Chinese and African philosophies, respectively. This paper contends that “the beautiful” for both the Chinese and Africans is fundamentally and intrinsically moral and has a teleological motif that is social in nature—social edification. It posits the notions of art and beauty as social edification for a harmonious and cohesive human community.

The papacy of Pope Francis, like other previous papacies, addressed several contemporary global issues, of which the questions of climate change, global poverty, war, and artificial intelligence (AI) were given recurrent emphasis. There were four elaborate documents dedicated to the question of AI design and development with respect to their ethical, philosophical, theological, and socio-political implications. The aim of this study is to philosophically analyze the philosophical and theological intuitions that underpin the urgency and the cogency that inform the pontification over the subject matter, AI. Additionally, it aims to examine the exhaustiveness and cohesiveness of the scientific and technological epistemological foundations that ground the argumentations of the documents and theoretical unification that underpins Pope Francis’s ecclesiology of AI. This will help to evaluate its contribution to the ongoing discourse on AI ethics and governance and expound the humanistic imagination on the reality of the co-existence of humans and AI as cognitive systems.

The specific end of intelligence is understanding. The research on designing and developing artificial intelligence (AI) systems, otherwise known as artificial agents, aims to extend the act of understanding to artificial agents in order for them to make decisions and solve problems. Hence, this paper intends to expound the notion of understanding in artificial agents and posits a philosophical critique based on the inquiry into human understanding in Bernard Lonergan’s Philosophy. In other words, the philosophical problematic this paper intends to interrogate is: Can artificial agents have insight as expounded by Lonergan? It is hoped that by investigating insight in artificial agents, a greater light will be shed on human insight.

The main objective of this essay is to interrogate the principle of Natural law as the philosophical arbiter in Catholic ethics in the light of contemporary research in artificial intelligence (AI). There is a global apprehension due to the advancement in the science and technology of AI in particular and artificial systems in general. Ethics based on the Natural law has been challenged and contended by rival ethical theories and principles in the history of Western moral philosophy and Ethics. It is the submission of this essay that the research in AI, and the artificial in general, pose even more problematics to Catholic morality and ethics that are philosophically grounded on the principle of Natural law. This essay discusses these problematics and posit a need for reconstructive philosophical ethics, a moral philosophy that is conceptually personalistic while sustaining the principle of the Natural law.

This paper is a discourse on the question of ethical and moral algorithmic representation in artificial intelligence (AI) systems. It raises questions that border on moral metaphysics and ethical epistemology, such as free agency and ethical determinism on one hand and moral apprehension and ethical co- gnition on the other. It argues that considering the metaphysical nature of free agency in the intrinsic relations between reason and desire in moral cognitive operations, at the root of ethical and moral actions, the question of the algori- thmic representation of the human capacity for ethical and moral operations in AI systems is a possibility that cannot be automatized in AI systems.

The objective of this paper is to posit a critique of the contemporary critique of the notion of selfhood in the philosophy of mind and cognitive neuroscience. The research in artificial intelligence (AI) as the science of intelligence per se and/or of cognition, in general, has been considered and employed as a formidable theoretical tool in sustaining philosophical arguments for the denial of the existence of the Self or selfhood in the human person. It has revitalized the philosophical problematics of the existence or otherwise, of consciousness, intelligence, and autonomy not only in biological systems but also in non-biological systems and the deepening of the body-soul and/or brain-mind problem in the philosophy of mind. This paper will give an exposition of the critique of selfhood in the human person, especially as expounded by Daniel Dennett. It will also posit a counter-critique of the critique of selfhood based on John Eccles’s dualistic-interactionalist philosophy of neuroscience and Karol Wojtyła’s philosophical anthropology based on the notion of suppositum. Hence, it shall defend the philosophical anthropology of the human person as a metaphysical suppositum possessing ontological subjectivity.

It is the contention of this paper that ethics of work ought to be anthropological, and artificial intelligence (AI) research and development, which is the focus of work today, should be anthropological, that is, human-centered. This paper discusses the philosophical and theological implications of the development of AI research on the intrinsic nature of work and the nature of the human person. AI research and the implications of its development and advancement, being a relatively new phenomenon, have not been comprehensively interrogated in the social and ethical teachings of the Catholic Church. This paper, therefore, proposes a path for this interrogation by expounding a discourse which is believed to be epistemically helpful in the developing discourse of AI in the ethical and social teachings of the Church. The advancement in the research on AI is not only redefining the meaning of work, but, even more so, it is questioning the metaphysical notion of the human person and the theological notion of work as an intrinsic part in the selfhood and dignity of the human person.

此研究的目的是論述在悲劇發生時哲學具作為慰藉手段的作用。西方哲學的羅馬希臘化時期，跨越了不同的哲學流派，蓬勃發展了一種被稱為“慰藉”（consolatione）的特殊哲學著作的文體。因此，哲學家和哲學思想家撰寫了幾部名為“De consolatione”（On Consolation）的哲學著作，一直持續到中世紀，如波埃修斯（Boethius）的通俗著作“De Consolatione Philosophia”（On the Consolation of Philosophy）。在羅馬希臘化時期哲學家現存的著作中，塞內卡的著作可以說是最多且篇幅相當長，是寫給他所認識遭受悲劇的人的。因此，本文試圖在塞內卡的著作中探索這種特殊的哲學體裁—論慰藉。本文要探究他如何使用這種哲學體裁來幫助遭受悲劇的人，特別是遭受親人的死亡，而獲得心靈的平靜與安寧。其目的是利用塞內卡關於“De Consolatione”的著作來反思世界各地許多遭受Covid-19 疫情帶來悲劇的人。即是證明和探索哲學思考在悲劇時的作用。這表明，哲學或哲學家不是悲劇時的無助旁觀者，而是與人類境遇具有生存相關性的活動。更具體一點，此論文的目的就是回答下面這個問題：哲學可以對超過四百萬因爲疫情而直接死亡的人（不包括那些間接死亡的人）其遭受苦死的家人和朋友說些什麼？今天哲學家如何為因 Covid-19 疫情而遭受悲劇的人們帶來慰藉？此論文認為，哲學家塞內卡（Seneca）可以教今天的哲學家如何運用哲學作為處理當今悲劇的手段。因此，本文架構如下： 1. 塞內卡哲學的簡要闡述。 2. 論述慰藉之哲學文體。 3. 塞內卡《慰藉》著作的哲學論述。 4. 塞內卡思想對 Covid-19 疫情的反思。 5. 結論。

This paper has two main objectives. The first, which could be said to be the ultimate objective, is to gradually introduce the research project of African philosophy to the philosophical scholars in Taiwan (as a case study) and by extension to Asia in general. The second is to expose the crucial role of contemporary African philosophy in the mental liberation and emancipation of the African peoples. And by the means of this role of contemporary African philosophy introduce it to philosophical scholars and scholars in the humanities in Taiwan. It highlights the need and areas for a comparative or complementary research between African and Asia philosophies, with special focus on contemporary Taiwan philosophical scholarship. This work posits “mental liberation” as the end and motivation of African Philosophy. It maintains that, whereas the Western philosophical traditions, in most part, aim at mental liberation disinterestedly or strictly epistemologically, and the Eastern philosophical traditions, in most part, aim at mental liberation socio-ethically, the African philosophical traditions, in most part, aim at mental liberation socio-politically.

此研究的目的是論述在悲劇發生時哲學具作為慰藉手段的作用。西方哲學的羅馬希臘化時期，跨越了不同的哲學流派，蓬勃發展了一種被稱為“慰藉”（consolatione）的特殊哲學著作的文體。因此，哲學家和哲學思想家撰寫了幾部名為“De consolatione”（On Consolation）的哲學著作，一直持續到中世紀，如波埃修斯（Boethius）的通俗著作“De Consolatione Philosophia”（On the Consolation of Philosophy）。在羅馬希臘化時期哲學家現存的著作中，塞內卡的著作可以說是最多且篇幅相當長，是寫給他所認識遭受悲劇的人的。因此，本文試圖在塞內卡的著作中探索這種特殊的哲學體裁—論慰藉。本文要探究他如何使用這種哲學體裁來幫助遭受悲劇的人，特別是遭受親人的死亡，而獲得心靈的平靜與安寧。其目的是利用塞內卡關於“De Consolatione”的著作來反思世界各地許多遭受Covid-19 疫情帶來悲劇的人。即是證明和探索哲學思考在悲劇時的作用。這表明，哲學或哲學家不是悲劇時的無助旁觀者，而是與人類境遇具有生存相關性的活動。更具體一點，此論文的目的就是回答下面這個問題：哲學可以對超過四百萬因爲疫情而直接死亡的人（不包括那些間接死亡的人）其遭受苦死的家人和朋友說些什麼？今天哲學家如何為因 Covid-19 疫情而遭受悲劇的人們帶來慰藉？此論文認為，哲學家塞內卡（Seneca）可以教今天的哲學家如何運用哲學作為處理當今悲劇的手段。因此，本文架構如下： 1. 塞內卡哲學的簡要闡述。 2. 論述慰藉之哲學文體。 3. 塞內卡《慰藉》著作的哲學論述。 4. 塞內卡思想對 Covid-19 疫情的反思。 5. 結論。

This paper explores the theological and philosophical implications of artificial intelligence (AI) and Neuroscience research on the Christian’s notion of the human person. The paschal mystery of Christ is the intuitive foundation of Christian anthropology. In the intellectual history of the Christianity, Platonism and Aristotelianism have been employed to articulate the Christian philosophical anthropology. The Aristotelian systematization has endured to this era. Since the modern period of the Western intellectual history, Aristotelianism has been supplanted by the positive sciences as the standard scientific and philosophical interpretative framework for many. This paper argues that there is need for a new Christian anthropology based on the interpretation of the paschal mystery of Christ that is consistent with contemporary science and philosophy, especially as informed by research in AI and neuroscience. Christian anthropology today ought to be fully aware of the theological and philosophical implications of AI and neuroscience research. This paper denotes this new Christian anthropology as neuro-theological Christian anthropology.

This work contends that the metaphysical understanding of the human person, simply as a rational and free being is incomprehensive, and for a comprehensive understanding of the human person, there is a need to understand the human person as a conscious being in action and in relationship within and without itself due to the shared consciousness of 「仁。」To guide this philosophical investigation, the writer posits the research question: How can the philosophy of Karol Wojtyła on the human person help to deepen the understanding of the Confucian philosophy of person as 「仁者」? Thus, in this research the writer has three main tasks. The first task is to substantially investigate and expound the philosophical anthropology of Karol Wojtyła. The second task is to investigate and expose the Confucian concept of 「仁。」The third task is to discourse the human person by the means of a re-interpretation of the concept of 「仁者」as the Wojtyłian concept of “Person-revealed-in-Action.” So, the entire Part One of this work, is aimed at achieving the first task, and the entire Part Two, is aimed at achieving the second and the third tasks of the investigation. The Philosophical anthropology of Karol Wojtyła, is substantially influenced by the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas, and the Philosophy of Max Scheler. Hence, the writer creates the background for the exposition of Karol Wojtyła’s philosophical anthropology by presenting a discourse on Thomas Aquinas and Max Scheler. And to understand the concept of persona in Thomas Aquinas there is a need to discuss the philosophical anthropology of Socrates-Plato, Aristotle and Boethius. On the other hand, to understand the phenomenology of Max Scheler, which Karol Wojtyła employed in his analysis of human experience and action, the writer briefly exposes the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl the founder of phenomenological movement and the phenomenology of Heidegger the student of Husserl and the contemporary of Max Scheler. Hence, the writer considers an exposition of the concept of 「仁，」from the perspective of textual analysis of the meaning of 仁 as it is found in three classical text: 《 論語》, 《中庸 》and《孟子》. These three Confucian classics all consider 「仁」as not just an important concept in Confucianism, but as the concept that defines the human person, as the quiddity of the human person. The writer therefore, synthesizes Wojtyła’s concept of “person-revealed-in-action”, and the Confucian concept of 「仁者，」to affirm a philosophy of person that is indeed wholistic and comprehensive. This philosophy of person, the writer gives the name: “Jenism.” “Jenism” then, is the concept of the human person (人) understood from a synthesis of the Wojtyłian concept of human action and the Confucian understanding of 「仁。」This understanding of the human person, does not only explain the metaphysical quiddity of the human person, but also explains the specific difference of the human life. The writer, therefore, is persuaded to think that a philosophy of person has been developed that is capable of responding to the philosophical anthropological problematics of our contemporary times. Especially, with problematics that are related to Ethics, Bioethics, Human Dignity and Artificial Intelligence.

This paper attempts to demonstrate that the logical problematic of signification, has a very dangerous socio-political effect due to the ontological implication that is connected to the signification of terms in logic. It expounds the notion of signification in Formal Logic as exposed by William of Ockham. It thus, employs this notion of signification of terms, to discuss the term “Fulani”, to show the danger potent in distorting the signification of the term “Fulani” as in every conventional and connotative terms. This work claims that as a result of the connection between logic and ontology, conceptualization and perception, names and reality, the distortion of terms, which are the building blocks of propositions in logic could lead to a dangerous cognition and perception of ontological realities. To this end, it posits a critique on the dangerous change in the signification of the term “Fulani”, in the conceptualization and perception of present day Nigeria people, of West Africa. A dangerous change, as this paper claims, if not speedily reconstructed and re-conceptualized, could lead to a disastrous situation in the socio-political reality of the Nigerian State.

This paper argues that to negate the ontological difference between the natural and the artificial, is not plausible; nor is the reduction of the natural to the artificial or vice versa possible. Except if one intends to empty the semantic content of the terms and notions: “natural” and “artificial.” Most philosophical discussions on Artificial Intelligence (AI) have always been in relation to the human person, especially as it relates to human intelligence, consciousness and/or mind in general. This paper, intends to broaden the conversation, by discussing AI in relation to the notions of “nature” and the “artificial.” This intention is to more critically understand the artificiality in and of artificial intelligence. To achieve this, the notion of “nature” in Aristotle’s Philosophy of Nature, has been employed as an epistemological tool in interrogating the notion of the artificial and the objectives of the science and technology of Artificial Intelligence.

The objective of this work is to explore the notion of “action” and “agency” in artificial intelligence (AI). It employs a metaphysical notion of action and agency as an epistemological tool in the critique of the notion of “action” and “agency” in artificial intelligence. Hence, both a metaphysical and cognitive analysis is employed in the investigation of the quiddity and nature of action and agency per se, and how they are, by extension employed in the language and science of artificial intelligence. The advent of the science of artificial intelligence and cognitive science, and the technological applications of artificial intelligence in the production of agents such as driverless cars and expert systems, have raised the question of moral, ethical and/or legal responsibility in AI agents. This has re-emphasized the importance of the philosophical discourse on the notions of action and agency, which in contemporary intellectual discourse are now perceived to be phenomena within the epistemic competence of the natural sciences. This paper argues that AI systems do not and cannot possess free agency and autonomy, thus cannot be morally and ethically responsible, hence, it recommends a socio-political response to the question of responsibility in AI. It is then the duty of individual nations, or the global community to define and enact policies on who shoulders the responsibility of actions executed by AIs.

This paper is a critique of the culture, method and end of education today. It claims that education today does not aim at the integral formation and cultivation of a person. Put differently, it claims that philosophy of education critically speaking ought to be a kind of eudaimonism. Education ought to be fundamentally about the Ultimate good of the human person, and the task of philosophy of education is to critically establish and direct education towards the ultimate good of the human person. Philosophy of Education in a very simple but fundamental sense, is a critical attempt to understand the foundation of education, that is to say, the nature and the end of education. What kind of education ought to be given to children in a city or nation-state, has been an ancient question in different civilizations. This work, is not only a critique of contemporary educational systems, but also a call for a philosophy of education that fundamentally connects education with the Good or Happy life. Hence, this research is an investigation on a philosophical education that is based on the eudaimonistic principle initiated by Plato and Aristotle and sustained by the philosophers of antiquity, such as the Epicureans and the Stoics. It also expounds ancient Chinese philosophy, to sustain the argument that an eudaimonistic philosophy of education has a universal effect and application.

This paper attempts to bring the traditional theodicy on the question of evil and the Divine Providence, to its logical conclusion, in such a way that a believer is challenged to totally accept the implication of his or her faith in God. To have faith is to completely surrender to Divine Providence. It is to completely surrender ones free will to the rational conclusions or consequences of faith in the Divine Providence. Hence, this paper is for those who are perplexed due to the Pandemic. Especially for Christians whose faith in God is perplexed because of their existential experience of the COVID 19 pandemic as evil. The existential reality of dread and misery caused by this pandemic is globally and more subjectively experienced due to the digitalization of this age. This shows how disastrously powerful the digitalization of our world can be in the proliferation of dread, misery and hopelessness.

This work raises the philosophical implications of the contemporary Taiwanese as a Chinese cultural people that socio-philosophically defined herself as a moral or ethical person. The political history of Taiwan has been marked by her struggle for self-determination. Self-determination based and reflected on a self-affirmation and self-identification that is internationally recognized and legitimized. This, no doubt, beyond the generalized bent by all nations towards globalization and multi-culturalism, there has been a more and more openness to the western nations. As she looks towards the West, she ipso facto looks away from the Main Land China. This work is neither an investigation in political science nor a historical critique and reconstruction. It is rather a philosophical critique on the philosophical anthropology of a people that is fundamentally ethical, that is now facing and open to climes of which their philosophical anthropology is not in essence ethical. Put differently, it is an evaluation on the notion of “the Taiwanese person”. An evaluation on how “the Taiwanese person” from the standpoint of philosophical anthropology could still be claimed to be a Confucian. The question is: could the Taiwanese person today be said to be「仁者」, if Confucian philosophical anthropology asserts, 「仁者人也」? Hence, this work will attempt to respond to this question by a philosophical analysis of the notion of 「仁者」as an ethical person based on Karol Wojtyłian notion of the ethical person. To understand the notion of the “ethical” or “moral” person, the concept of “ethics” or “moral” and “person” ought to be exposed. Therefore, in this work Wojtyłian philosophy shall be employed as the epistemological foundation for the definition and explication of the concepts: ethics, moral and person. The writer considers the philosophy of Karol Wojtyłian as a plausible paradigm amongst the western philosophies in the exposition of Confucian ethics and philosophical anthropology. The conception of person as “Person-revealed-in-action” or as it is popularly known, the “Acting Person”, underpins properties of the human person that are very fundamental in the Confucian conception of the person. This “person- revealed-in-action”, is an ethical person, as 「仁者」is 「人」in the Confucian Philosophy. This is as a result of the similarity in the fundamental claims maintained both in the Confucian ethics and philosophical anthropology and in that of Karol Wojtyła. Thus, this work is executed as follows: 1. Exposition of the Problematic. 2. Exposition of Confucian Philosophical Anthropology. 3. Exposition of Karol Wojtyła Ethical Person. 4. A Wojtyłain Reconstruction of 「仁者」and the Notion of Ethical Person. 5. Critique of the Taiwanese Person as「仁者」and Conclusion.

For the philosopher, the most critical and fundamental question in the project of Artificial Intelligence is the question of intelligence or cognition in general. From the beginning of the research in “thinking Machining”, or Artificial Intelligence as it later became known, the key question is: What makes a thing intelligent or what constitutes intelligence? Since, intelligence, is a fundamental activity of the mind, the question, has been: Whether the mind is a computer or is the computer a mind? Many philosophers who have and are engaging and interrogating these problematics, do it from the perspective of modern and contemporary philosophy of mind, consciousness and language. The objective of this work is to interrogate the question of “intelligence” in Artificial Intelligence from the perspective of the Scholastics’ notion of Intellectus.

This paper, aims at focusing on Plotinus’ concept of beauty, from the perspective of the human person. That is to say, what does beauty do to the human person and how beauty affects and transforms the human person, and by extension how the beautiful soul could transform the world. Attention has been given to Plotinus’ aesthetics mostly within the general scope of Platonism, focusing on the notion of beauty as form (intellectual beauty) and on the question whether or not beauty is conceived as symmetry both in Plato and Plotinus. This paper claims, that the notion of beauty for Plotinus is an ecstatic experience of the soul. Thus for Plotinus, beauty is not just aesthetical, it is more so a spiritual experience in the soul. This focus on Plotinus’ notion of beauty is considered important because the philosophical focus on beauty has largely been on the object out there. And even when a subjective focus is given on the concept of beauty, it is not largely focused on the spiritual transformation of the human person. Hence, this paper, is an analytical exposition of Plotinus’ works on beauty.

The objective of this work is to investigate the philosophical anthropology that underpins the anthropology of the Early Christians. It is curious to know why Christian anthropology is intellectually and practically inclined towards the philosophical anthropology of the Platonic tradition rather than the theological-philosophical tradition of the biblical Hebrew people in the Old Testament. Today the emphasis on Christian anthropology is that the human person is an integration of body and soul. Contrary to this position, the writer maintains that the Christian anthropology, especially during the period of the early Christians (here understood as the period within the first five centuries C.E.), fundamentally conceives the human person as a composite of soul and body, which is a conscious employment of Platonic anthropology. This article observes that, as regards the doctrine of the resurrection of the dead, there is a dichotomy between theological coherency and the actual Christian practice on the Christian conception of the human person. Hence, this work argues that the Platonic influence on the philosophical anthropology of the Early Christian was a deliberate act to give a more rational foundation to the theological problematic on the resurrection of the dead and on the resurrected body. It explains why Aquinas’s theological cum philosophical thinking, though overwhelmingly an Aristotelian ground, could not “Aristotelize” his philosophical anthropology.

The objective of this work is to investigate Karol Wojtyła’s meta-ethics. Following the Aristotelian and Thomistic tradition, he maintains that ethics is a science. Contrary to the Aristotelian tradition, which conceives ethics as a practical science, Wojtyła sustains that ethics is also a science with theoretical objectivity. He posits the human “experience of morality,” in a specific sense, the moral experience of “I ought to do x”, as the ground for the objectivity of ethics as science. He also critiques the understanding of experience as merely a sense-perception and appearance/phenomenon in empiricism and phenomenalism. However, it maintains the phenomenological understanding of experience as “lived-experience.” Thus, this work is an attempt to flesh out Karol Wojtyla's meta-ethics by investigating the following: 1. Karol Wojtyła’s Philosophy of Person as an Efficacious Moral Person. 2. Wojtyła’s Objectivity of Experience as Subjective Fact. 3. Exposition of his Understanding of Ethics. 4. Discussion of the experience of “I ought to do x”: As the Moral Ground in Karol Wojtyła’s Meta-Ethics. 5. A critical Evaluation and Conclusion.