Justin Winzenrieth

Book 2 of Aristotle’s De anima is transmitted in two versions: a vulgate version, attested in the overwhelming majority of extant manuscripts, and a non-standard version, hitherto known primarily by the few subsisting remains of the original recension of manuscript Parisinus graecus 1853, the oldest extant direct witness. After identifying additional witnesses to the non-standard version, the article argues that it derives from the vulgate version and that some of its innovations originate in the ancient commentaries to the treatise.

Whereas several zoological Aristotelian works have been preserved, Aristotle is reported to have written only one short botanical treatise. Such reports seem to conflict with his self-described ambition to study plants as well as animals. Even though this treatise is now lost, the available evidence suggests that Aristotle had valid reasons to find the subject-matter of plants much less interesting, as their activities amount to a subset of what animals do. When studying attributes common to both plants and animals in the transmitted corpus, Aristotle systematically focuses on the case of the most complex animals and, once an explanatory model has been found, proceeds to apply it to the remaining cases with less details. I argue that this procedure, although it runs counters to the intuition that one ought to start with the most simple case, corresponds to a general scientific method. Consequently, most of Aristotle’s botany is found to be already encapsulated in the main results of his study of animals.

I argue that Aristotle’s concept of φάντασμα should neither be equated with the notion of “mental image” nor understood as referring primarily to physiological processes. What Aristotle means by φάντασμα should be understood in the light of a pre-philosophical linguistic background in which the term refers to apparitions of objects that are suspected of not being real, such as ghosts. A φάντασμα in Aristotle is a content of which one is aware by a process that, although quasi-perceptual in nature, is known by the subject or by a third party to differ from perception.

Whereas several zoological Aristotelian works have been preserved, Aristotle is reported to have written only one short botanical treatise. Such reports seem to conflict with his self-described ambition to study plants as well as animals. Even though this treatise is now lost, the available evidence suggests that Aristotle had valid reasons to find the subject-matter of plants much less interesting, as their activities amount to a subset of what animals do. When studying attributes common to both plants and animals in the transmitted corpus, Aristotle systematically focuses on the case of the most complex animals and, once an explanatory model has been found, proceeds to apply it to the remaining cases with less details. I argue that this procedure, although it runs counters to the intuition that one ought to start with the most simple case, corresponds to a general scientific method. Consequently, most of Aristotle’s botany is found to be already encapsulated in the main results of his study of animals.

Aristote mentionne à plusieurs reprises au cours de sa Métaphysique une doctrine platonicienne des grandeurs, qui s’inscrit dans la continuité directe de la célèbre instauration des nombres idéaux. Les interprétations les plus couramment retenues, celles de Léon Robin et de W. D. Ross, y voient l’avènement parallèle de « grandeurs idéales », lesquelles seraient à la géométrie ce que les nombres idéaux sont à l’arithmétique. Or Platon, loin de vouloir idéaliser le domaine des grandeurs au même titre que celui des nombres, soutient régulièrement la primauté essentielle de l’arithmétique par rapport à la géométrie, thèse dont l’importance se trouve confirmée par l’analyse des polémiques au sein de l’Académie qu’Aristote rapporte et auxquelles il lui arrive de prendre part. On se propose donc d’esquisser les grandes lignes d’une interprétation du statut des grandeurs en tant qu’entités « après les nombres » au sein de l’ontologie du dernier platonisme, en se fondant sur les renouvellements que la considération de l’histoire des mathématiques a pu apporter à la compréhension des dialogues de Platon.