K. Brad Wray

We first discuss Chang’s criticism of the correspondence theory of truth and of what he calls ‘correspondence realism’. We think that correspondence can be rescued if properly reshaped. We then take up Chang’s alternative to the correspondence theory of truth, his ‘truth-by-operational-coherence’, which we think does not fit many truths from social life. The topic of realism, implicitly present already in the previous topics, is subsequently explicitly treated. What Chang calls realism is, in effect, very close to what has customarily been called anti-realism. Finally, we discuss the tension that exists in Chang’s book between his vigorous defense of pluralism on the object-level and his apparently taken-forgranted monism on the metalevel, namely pragmatism.

Duncan Pritchard (2010) has developed a theory of extended knowledge based on the notion of extended cognition initially developed by Clark and Chalmers (1998). Pritchard’s account gives a central role to the notion of creditability, which requires the following two conditions to be met: (i) beliefs must be attributable to the cognitive ability of the agent; and (ii) the agent must take responsibility for her beliefs. This chapter argues that difficulties arise when this notion of creditability is applied to situations where one’s cognition is extended by a second knowing agent rather than by an artifact, like a notebook or telescope. The chapter illustrates this by applying Pritchard’s account of extended knowledge to collaborating scientists. The beliefs acquired through collaborative research cannot satisfy _both_ of Pritchard’s conditions of creditability. Further, there is evidence that scientists are not prepared to take _responsibility_ for the actions of the scientists with whom they collaborate.

This chapter examines a variety of contexts in which scientists evaluate their peers and the impact such evaluations have on science. Section 4.2 draws the distinction between implicit and explicit judgments of competence and give examples of each sort of judgment. Section 4.3 reviews a number of studies that suggest scientists are influenced by nonepistemic values when they make explicit judgments of competence. In particular, scientists are affected by sexism and nepotism. Section 4.4 examines the epistemic consequences of scientists' biased explicit judgments of competence and focus on the adverse effects of nepotism. Section 4.5 explains why scientists are not prone to the same problems when making implicit judgments of competence.

We first discuss Chang’s criticism of the correspondence theory of truth and of what he calls ‘correspondence realism’. We think that correspondence can be rescued if properly reshaped. We then take up Chang’s alternative to the correspondence theory of truth, his ‘truth-by-operational-coherence’, which we think does not fit many truths from social life. The topic of realism, implicitly present already in the previous topics, is subsequently explicitly treated. What Chang calls realism is, in effect, very close to what has customarily been called anti-realism. Finally, we discuss the tension that exists in Chang’s book between his vigorous defense of pluralism on the object-level and his apparently taken-for-granted monism on the metalevel, namely pragmatism.

Hoyningen-Huene (Systematicity: the nature of science, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013) develops an account of what science is, distinguishing it from common sense. According to Hoyningen-Huene, the key distinguishing feature is that science is more systematic. He identifies nine ways in which science is more systematic than common sense. I compare Hoyningen-Huene’s view to a view I refer to as the “Continuity Thesis.” The Continuity Thesis states that scientific knowledge is just an extension of common sense. This thesis is associated with Quine, Planck, and others. I argue that Hoyningen-Huene ultimately rejects the Continuity Thesis, and I present further evidence to show that the Continuity Thesis is false. I also argue that it is the systematicity of science that ultimately grounds the epistemic authority of science. Hoyningen-Huene thus draws attention to an important feature of science that explains the place of science in contemporary society.

I take another look at the history of science and offer some fresh insights into why the history of science is filled with discarded theories. I argue that the history of science is just as we should expect it to be, given the following two facts about science: (i) theories are always only partial representations of the world, and (ii) almost inevitably scientists will be led to investigate phenomena that the accepted theory is not fit to account for. Together these facts suggest that most scientific theories are apt to be discarded sometime, superseded by new theories that better serve scientists’ new research interests. Consequently, it is reasonable to expect that many of the theories we currently accept, despite their many impressive successes, will be discarded sometime in the future. But I also argue that discarded theories are not always aptly characterized as a sign of failure or as a sign of some sort of shortcoming with science. Theories are discarded because scientists are making advances in their pursuit of knowledge. Thus, discarded theories are often a sign of the good health of science. Scientists are responding to their changing research interests.

Many have criticized the peer-review system employed in scientific publication because of the apparent lack of inter-referee reliability. It is often remarked that if referees cannot agree about the quality of a scientific manuscript, then the selection of manuscripts for publication is arbitrary. Some critics have even called for abolishing pre-publication peer-review. I argue that too much emphasis has been put on inter-referee reliability. As such, a lack of inter-referee reliability in the current peer-review system is not damning for the system. I argue that peer review is effective at finding mistakes.

Rejectionists argue that collective belief ascriptions are best understood as instances of collective acceptance rather than belief. Margaret Gilbert objects to rejectionist accounts of collective belief statements. She argues that rejectionists rely on a questionable methodology when they inquire into the nature of collective belief ascriptions, and make an erroneous inference when they are led to believe that collectives do not really have beliefs. Consequently, Gilbert claims that collective belief statements are best understood as instances of belief. I critically examine Gilbert’s criticisms of rejectionism. I argue that rejectionism is still a viable account of collective belief ascriptions. I also argue that Gilbert’s most powerful criticism provides important insight into what really stands between her and the rejectionists. Gilbert and the rejectionists do not yet agree about what background assumptions can be made in developing an account of collective belief ascriptions.

We examine the sub-field of philosophy of science using a new method developed in information science, Referenced Publication Years Spectroscopy (RPYS). RPYS allows us to identify peak years in citations in a field, which promises to help scholars identify the key contributions to a field, and revolutionary discoveries in a field. We discovered that philosophy of science, a sub-field in the humanities, differs significantly from other fields examined with this method. Books play a more important role in philosophy of science than in the sciences. Further, Einstein’s famous 1905 papers created a citation peak in the philosophy of science literature. But rather than being a contribution to the philosophy of science, their importance lies in the fact that they are revolutionary contributions to physics with important implications for philosophy of science.

It is widely recognized that conceptual and theoretical innovations and the employment of new instruments and experimental techniques are important factors in explaining the growth of scientific knowledge in chemistry. This study examines another dimension of research in chemistry, collaboration and co-authorship. I focus specifically on Theodore Richards’ career and publications. During the period in which Richards worked, co-authorship was beginning to become more common than it had been previously. Richards was the first American chemist to be awarded a Nobel Prize and he was at the forefront in this new trend in chemistry. He collaborated more than was typical for his time, with many scientists, in different sized groups, and he often had persistent collaborative relationships, extending over a number of years. Further, it appears that these collaborations benefited Richards, his collaborators, and the field of chemistry as a whole.

The authorship policies of scientific journals often assume that in order to be able to properly place credit and responsibility for the content of a collaborative paper we should be able to distinguish the contributions of the various individuals involved. Hence, many journals have introduced a requirement for author contribution statements aimed at making it easier to place credit and responsibility on individual scientists. We argue that from a purely descriptive point of view the practices of collaborating scientists are at odds with the requirement for author contribution statements. We also argue that from a normative point of view the authorship policies may be unnecessary. Our arguments draw on an examination of 35 years of retraction notices in the journal Science.

Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions has been attacked for many reasons. Key analytic terms, most importantly “paradigm,” were widely regarded as poorly defined. To many readers Structure seemed to suggest that the process of theory change is irrational, or at least non-rational. And even his characterization of normal science seemed to some readers to paint a very unflattering picture of scientists as excessively dogmatic and uncritical. More recently, Lorraine Daston has argued that the notion of “structure” that figures in the title of the book, as well as in the analysis of the history of science discussed throughout the book, is “dusty and dated”. Historians of science tend to focus on the particular, in recognition that the sorts of events they study are unique. My aim in this paper is to defend Kuhn’s appeal to the notion of structure. First, I argue that Structure of Scientific Revolutions is not primarily a contribution to the history of science, despite the fact that it cites many historical sources and articles in the history of science. Consequently, it is a mistake to regard Kuhn’s appeal to the notion of structure as a case of badly written history of science. Second, I argue that insofar as the book is a contribution to philosophy, the sort of thing Kuhn means by “structure” is perfectly respectable, and is often presupposed in many philosophical studies, especially in general philosophy of science. Third, I defend Kuhn’s analysis of science, especially the enterprise of identifying the structure of scientific revolutions.

Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions has sold more than one million copies since its publication in 1962, is one of the most cited academic books of all time, and continues to be read and studied today. This volume of new essays evaluates the significance of Kuhn's classic book in its changing historical context, including its initial reception and its lasting effects. The essays explore the range of ideas which Kuhn made popular with his influential philosophy of science, including paradigms, normal science, paradigm changes, scientific revolutions, and incommensurability; and they also look at less-studied themes in his work, including scientific measurement, science education, and science textbooks. Drawing on the latest scholarship as well as unpublished material in the Thomas Kuhn Archives at MIT, this volume offers a comprehensive way into Kuhn's philosophy and demonstrates the continuing relevance of his ideas for our understanding of science.

Shech (2022) offers a critical assessment of my defense of anti-realism, developed in Resisting Scientific Realism. Induction and inductive inferences play a central role in Shech’s critical analysis of my defense of realism. I argue that Shech’s criticisms that relate to induction and inductive inference are problematic, and do not constitute a threat to my defense of anti-realism. Contrary to what Shech claims, the anti-realist does not need to explain why inductive inferences are successful. That is not part of contemporary realism/anti-realism debate. Further, such a demand fails to recognise that some anti-realists do not put much stock in induction.

I critically examine Miriam Solomon’s critique of individualist normative accounts of scientific rationality and her own “social” account of scientific rationality that takes communities to be the locus of rationality. I argue that scientists are not influenced in their decision making by nonepistemic factors to the extent that Solomon suggests and an individualist account can show how judgmental heuristics are conducive to scientific success. I also argue that Solomon’s account of rationality cannot guide us when we do not yet know what is most conducive to scientific success. Consequently, I offer a defense of internalist individualist accounts of rationality and suggest that what is social about rationality are the standards of epistemic responsibility.