K. Brian Soderquist

This essay aims to outline in what ways Kierkegaard’s thinking of existence not only brings into view a concept of existence, but, more fundamentally, enables one to locate an opening to questioning anew the relation of thinking and existence. This thinking of existence does not seek to dissolve existence into knowledge but aims at intensifying the question of a thinking grounded not in the conclusion made in “an external relation between a knower and a non-knower” of which non-knowledge is the negative determination of knowledge, but rather of a thinking grounded in existence.

Recently there has been a growing interest not only in existentialism, but also in existential questions, as well as key figures in existential thinking. Yet despite this renewed interest, a systematic reconsideration of Kierkegaard's existential approach is missing. This anthology is the first in a series of three that will attempt to fill this lacuna. The 13 chapters of the first anthology deal with various aspects of Kierkegaard's existential approach. Its reception will be examined in the works of influential philsophers such as Heidegger, Gadamer, and Habermas, as well as in lesser known philosophers from the interwar period, such as Jean Wahl, Lev Shestov, and Benjamin Fondane. Other chapters reconsider central notions, such as "anxiety", "existence", "imagination", and "despair". Finally, some chapters deal with Kierkegaard's relevance for central issues in contemporary philosophy, including "naturalism", "self-constitution", and "bioethics". This book is of relevance not only to researchers working in Kierkegaard Studies, but to anyone with an interest in existentialism and existential thinking.

This study asks how Sartre’s version of the dialectic of recognition is present in Kierkegaard’s works. For Sartre, the dialectic begins with an awareness that the other sees me and judges me. I experience this as a threat to my autonomy, and I fight back with a variety of strategies designed to mitigate the effects. Inter-subjective relationships are grounded in conflict from which there is no exit. Similarly, Kierkegaard characterizes the natural, self-centered way of seeing the other as inherently self-centered and contentious. And yet some of Kierkegaard’s texts lay the ground for a way out. Unlike Sartre, he is sensitive to modifications to the structure of the dialectic of recognition that depend on a change in the basic mode of looking. That is, how I see, evaluate, and judge the other can alter the foundation of the interaction from something mutually contentious to something mutually edifying.

This study shows that, for Kierkegaard, the crisis of faith plays an essential role in the life of faith. To demonstrate this, it compares pseudonym Johannes de silentio’s portrayals of religious crisis in Fear and Trembling with similar sketches in Strengthening in the Inner Being, an edifying discourse published on the same day as Fear and Trembling. Kierkegaard agrees with de silentio that the life of faith is tethered to struggle, but unlike his pseudonym, who is baffled by the source of Abraham’s bold trust, Kierkegaard is more confident about identifying that which gives him strength: an inner, divine affirmation.

This chapter examines Soren Kierkegaard's thoughts about the concept of irony. It provides an overview of the different forms of irony in Kierkegaard's work and evaluates how the pervasive negativity of irony plays different roles in different contexts. The chapter analyses how Kierkegaard understood irony as a rhetorical tool and how he used it throughout his authorship, suggesting that most of his discourses about irony can be found in On the Concept of Irony and Concluding Unscientific Postscript.

The notion that Søren Kierkegaard is the “father of existentialism” is so widespread in popular culture that it requires little introduction. Less obvious, perhaps, is what this tagline might mean. This study focuses on five central themes in the existential tradition, comparing and contrasting Kierkegaard's treatment of them with those thinkers who inherit his thought: the self as a synthesis, despair as an imbalanced self‐interpretation, freedom and anxiety, the dialectic of recognition, and the autonomous choice of values.

This study asks how Sartre’s version of the dialectic of recognition is present in Kierkegaard’s works. For Sartre, the dialectic begins with an awareness that the other sees me and judges me. I experience this as a threat to my autonomy, and I fight back with a variety of strategies designed to mitigate the effects. Inter-subjective relationships are grounded in conflict from which there is no exit. Similarly, Kierkegaard characterizes the natural, self-centered way of seeing the other as inherently self-centered and contentious. And yet some of Kierkegaard’s texts lay the ground for a way out. Unlike Sartre, he is sensitive to modifications to the structure of the dialectic of recognition that depend on a change in the basic mode of looking. That is, how I see, evaluate, and judge the other can alter the foundation of the interaction from something mutually contentious to something mutually edifying.

Often overlooked by Kierkegaard scholars, _On the Concept of Irony_—Kierkegaard’s dissertation—is in fact a foundational text that established some of Kierkegaard’s most important ideas on the self. In _The Isolated Self_, K. Brian Soderquist restores this important work to its proper place, offering a rare full-length study of the text that shows how and why Kierkegaard would return to the ideas he developed there throughout his entire career. Thoroughly examining _On the Concept of Irony_, Soderquist uncovers the most comprehensive account of the “double movement” that is so important in Kierkegaard’s later works. Hinging on irony, the double movement describes the way existence pushes us to move from an immediate, unreflective life toward a self-developed worldview. Soderquist bores into this notion of irony, reconstructing the way it was conceived in Kierkegaard’s time by analyzing its use by related thinkers such as Hegel, Friedrich Schlegel, Johan Ludvig Heiberg, Hans Lassen Martensen, and Poul Martin Møller. Altogether Soderquist shows how Kierkegaard’s concept of irony, as demonstrated in this very early work, is crucial to understanding his pivotal thoughts on selfhood.

This study asks how Sartre’s version of the dialectic of recognition is present in Kierkegaard’s works. For Sartre, the dialectic begins with an awareness that the other sees me and judges me. I experience this as a threat to my autonomy, and I fight back with a variety of strategies designed to mitigate the effects. Inter-subjective relationships are grounded in conflict from which there is no exit. Similarly, Kierkegaard characterizes the natural, self-centered way of seeing the other as inherently self-centered and contentious. And yet some of Kierkegaard’s texts lay the ground for a way out. Unlike Sartre, he is sensitive to modifications to the structure of the dialectic of recognition that depend on a change in the basic mode of looking. That is, how I see, evaluate, and judge the other can alter the foundation of the interaction from something mutually contentious to something mutually edifying.