K. Lindsey Chambers

Procreative enhancement involves someone making a choice about what genetic trait(s) another person will have. Such control over the body (and mind) of another person, even if done for the recipient’s benefit, threatens to overstep the moral boundary between persons. The use of genetic interventions to “enhance” one’s offspring without their consent may violate that person’s future autonomy. Schaefer, Kahane, and Savulescu argue, however, that the value of autonomy supports at least one class of procreative enhancements: those aimed at enhancing a future person’s autonomy by improving their cognitive functioning. I argue that Schaefer et al.’s case for enhancing autonomy rests on a mistaken view about how autonomy bears on our moral obligations. They collapse the value of autonomy into the value of beneficence, or the value of promoting a person’s well-being. I will show that while so-called autonomy enhancements may promote a future person’s well-being, they cannot make a person more autonomous. Attempts to enhance a future person’s autonomy by way of genetic modification instead constitute a violation of that person’s autonomy.

In “The Universalizability of Moral Judgments,” Peter Winch argues against the universalizability of first‐person moral judgments. He does so by appealing to a moral dilemma faced by Captain Vere in Melville’s short story Billy Budd. In this paper, I motivate the possibility of the kind of moral dilemma Winch proposes and show what that possibility reveals about morality’s indeterminacy and our contribution as co‐authors of morality’s requirements. Some moral dilemmas arise because agents occupy multiple morally grounded roles—roles that, from the point of view of morality writ large, do not always have a clear priority. Even for a moral theory that rests on one central principle or value, a lot of an agent’s practical life is left underdetermined. Winch’s insight is that persons can discover something important about themselves that bears on what they should do when faced with such a dilemma. By making a judgment about what to do, an agent can create a new moral obligation, and in doing so, develop an aspect of their moral identity.

In “The Universalizability of Moral Judgments,” Peter Winch argues against the universalizability of first-person moral judgments. He does so by appealing to a moral dilemma faced by Captain Vere in Melville’s short story Billy Budd. In this paper, I motivate the possibility of the kind of moral dilemma Winch proposes and show what that possibility reveals about morality’s indeterminacy and our contribution as co-authors of morality’s requirements. Some moral dilemmas arise because agents occupy multiple morally grounded roles—roles that, from the point of view of morality writ large, do not always have a clear priority with respect to one another. Even on a moral theory that rests on one central principle or value, a lot of an agent’s practical life is left underdetermined. Winch’s insight is that persons can discover something important about themselves that bears on what they should do when faced with such a dilemma. By making a judgment about what to do in the face of a dilemma, an agent can create a new moral obligation, and in doing so, develop an aspect of their moral identity.

Underlying Derek Parfit’s non-identity problem is the idea that we can only wrong our offspring if our procreative actions harm them, or make them worse off. For Parfit, the surprising conclusion is that a person cannot be wronged by their own creation, because being created cannot make someone worse off. I appeal to Kant’s moral philosophy to develop a non-harm-based moral framework for procreation that allows us to explain how a person can be wronged by their creation even if they have not been harmed by it. I argue that Kant’s moral framework is uniquely suited to capture our moral obligations to future persons, because his framework locates moral obligations in the will of the actor rather than in the existence of the moral patient or recipient. The morality of procreative choices depends on how well the procreator wills, not on the outcome for their offspring’s wellbeing. My account does not solve the non- identity problem; rather, I argue that if we look at procreation as an imputable action of persons that puts them in a special relation of duty to their offspring, then the moral relevance of their future offspring’s indeterminate genetic identity falls away.

The procreative justice debate asks whether justice, and in particular, whether a principle of fair play, requires that non-parents share in the costs of procreation and child-rearing. The principle of fair play demands that persons who benefit from the cooperative labor of others share in the burdens of producing that benefit. Non-parents should share in the costs of procreation and child-rearing if reproductive and parental labor count as cooperative labor, but they are not obligated to share in those costs if parents incur them as part of a personal project. I argue that parental labor counts as cooperative labor because becoming a parent involves knowingly assuming a social role whereby one incurs new moral and legal obligations. Even if parents are ultimately motived by personal reasons, they nevertheless constrain their liberty in order to comply with the rules of a cooperative scheme, and, in doing so, their labor plausibly counts as cooperative. Parents have a claim of justice on others, then, to consider whether the benefits and burdens of procreating and child-rearing are fairly distributed.

At my university, many non-philosophy majors take our introductory ethics course to fulfill a core or general education requirement. I designed a course with these non-majors in mind called, "The Ethics of a Human Life." The course traces the arc of a human life by way of investigating a series of pessimistic ethical issues that arise: why it might be bad to be born, the challenges of being a child or an adolescent, the moral dangers of friendship, sex, love, marriage, and parenting, and whether we should worry about aging, dying, or the afterlife. The arguments we examine challenge students’ ordinary assumptions about what is good or right, not to dissuade them of their optimism, but to show them that philosophy has tools that can help them navigate the ordinary (and extraordinary!) moral problems they will face over the course of their lives.

Parents have an interest in sharing their values, beliefs and projects with their children. At the same time, children have an interest in being both capable of and free to develop their own values, beliefs, and projects. The interests of parents and children can conflict, and a great deal of attention has been given to how we ought to adjudicate this conflict with respect to child-rearing and education. This tension has been pushed further back in the parenting timeline by the advancement of reproductive technology. In this paper, I argue that parents, both prospective and actual, are obligated to facilitate their children's coming to be independent agents. The decisions they make for their children must be conditioned on that end. Parents may transmit their own beliefs and values to their children if and when doing so is a condition of the child's coming to be an independent agent. For example, parents are permitted to choose their child's education--even a religious education--because doing so is necessary to give the child a practical starting point, but they are not permitted to indoctrinate their child. On this view, selecting for a trait can be inappropriate not because the trait is itself bad for the child, but because the parents' selection is an attempt to control what their future child will come to believe and care about.

Many accounts of the morality of abortion assume that early fetuses must all have or lack moral status in virtue of developmental features that they share. Our actual attitudes toward early fetuses don’t reflect this all-or-nothing assumption: early fetuses can elicit feelings of joy, love, indifference, or distress. If we start with the assumption that our attitudes toward fetuses reflect a real difference in their moral status, then we need an account of fetal moral status that can explain that difference. I argue that we can have or lack relational obligations to early fetuses in light of our own activities or choices, independent of the fetus’s own features or properties. Those relational obligations make the early fetus morally considerable to the persons who stand in a moral relation to it. Pregnant persons (and other participants in the procreative process) can come to have relational obligations to an early fetus just in virtue of their own decision to create a person, either by intentionally getting pregnant or by deciding to continue a pregnancy. That decision not only makes it appropriate for them to care about the fetus, but it also generates obligations to the fetus that they didn’t have before that decision.

The dominant framework for addressing procreative ethics has revolved around the notion of harm, largely due to Derek Parfit’s famous non-identity problem. Focusing exclusively on the question of harm treats what procreators owe their offspring as akin to what they would owe strangers (if they owe them anything at all). Procreators, however, usually expect (and are expected) to parent the persons they create, so we cannot understand what procreators owe their offspring without also appealing to their role as prospective parents. I argue that prospective parents can wrong their future children just by failing to act well in their role as parents, whether or not their offspring are ultimately harmed or benefitted by their creation. Their obligations as prospective parents bear on the motivations behind their reproductive choices, including the choice to select for some genetic trait in their offspring. Even when procreators’ motivations aren’t malicious, or purely selfish, they can still fail to recognize and act for the end of the parental role. Procreators can wrong their offspring by selecting for some genetic trait, then, when doing so would violate their obligations as prospective parents, or when their motivation for doing so is antithetical to the end of the parental role.