•  17
    On the Arithmetical Truth of Self‐Referential Sentences
    with Saeed Salehi
    Theoria 85 (1): 8-17. 2019.
    We take an argument of Gödel's from his ground‐breaking 1931 paper, generalize it, and examine its validity. The argument in question is this: "the sentence G says about itself that it is not provable, and G is indeed not provable; therefore, G is true".
  •  58
    I argue against Juliet Floyd and Hilary Putnam's (2000, 2004) reading of Wittgenstein's "notorious" paragraph on Gödel's first incompleteness theorem.
  •  410
    I aim at dissolving Kripke's dogmatism paradox by arguing that, with respect to any particular proposition p which is known by a subject A, it is not irrational for A to ignore all evidence against p. Along the way, I offer a definition of 'A is dogmatic with respect to p', and make a distinction between an objective and a subjective sense of 'should' in the statement 'A should ignore all the evidence against p'. For the most part, I deal with Kripke's original version of the paradox, wherein th…Read more
  •  201
    ABSTRACT: Appealing to the failure of counterfactual support is a standard device in refuting a Humean view on laws of nature: some true generalisations do not support relevant counterfactuals; therefore not every true general fact is a law of nature—so goes the refutation. I will argue that this strategy does not work, for our understanding of the truth-value of any counterfactual is grounded in our understanding of the lawhood of some statements related to it.