Kabir S. Bakshi

I build on Elizabeth Anderson’s account of local knowledge by defending a stronger relation between mētis and technē (Dependency). According to Dependency, the production of technē depends essentially on mētis. I argue for the stronger relation by appealing to the circulatory model of knowledge production from the history and philosophy of science. The refined account of local knowledge — based on Dependency — offers two key benefits: it strengthens the case for integrating indigenous knowledge in science education by demonstrating the foundational role of local knowledge in knowledge creation and it provides a more robust counter-argument to the superiority position advocated by Daniel Kahneman.

The meta-inductive approach to induction justifies induction by proving its optimality. The argument for the optimality of induction proceeds in two steps. The first “a priori” step intends to show that meta-induction is optimal and the second “a posteriori” step intends to show that meta-induction selects object-induction in our world. I critically evaluate the second step and raise two problems: the identification problem and the indetermination problem. In light of these problems, I assess the prospects of any meta-inductive approach to induction.

In recent decades, history of science has gone global. But what about philosophy of science? Taking cue from the global turn in history of science, I put forward an account of what a global turn in philosophy of science can look like. My account draws upon the hermeneutical approaches to integrated history and philosophy of science, championed by Jutta Schickore and Hasok Chang. On the way, I demonstrate – by examining the case of the Great Trigonometrical Survey of India – that much is to be gained, by both sides, from a closer integration of global history of science and philosophy of science.

A central question in philosophy of science and epistemology of science concerns the characterization of the progress of science. Many philosophers of science and epistemologists have developed accounts of scientific progress, laying down desiderata for and providing success criteria of any account of scientific progress. Extant accounts of scientific progress are surveyed and critically assessed and it is shown that all face the same problem. The constitution-promotion distinction – a commitment shared by all the accounts – is identified as the root of the problem for the extant accounts. In their place, a novel way of understanding scientific progress – inspired by pragmatic philosophy of science and zetetic epistemology – which rejects the problematic constitution-promotion distinction, and importantly, which provides a vision of scientific progress without depending on the aim of science is developed.

Proponents of a recent interpretation of Ernst Mach's views on thought experiments argue that for Mach thought experiments must be continuous with and return to cached experiences. These criteria, the proponents hold, explain the tension which has been noted in Mach's views on thought experiments: on the one hand, Mach reprimands Newton in “extending principles beyond the boundaries of experience” when critiquing Newton's bucket argument, while on the other, Mach himself engages in speculative reasoning when presenting ‘Mach's principle’. Against this interpretation, I argue that Mach's critique of Newton's argument does not turn on Newton’s illegitimate use of thought experiments, but instead turns on Newton's illegitimate use of thoughts in thought experiments. Recognizing this leads to a simple and more compelling interpretation of Mach's views. I close the paper by gesturing towards such an interpretation and noting that taking Mach's views on thought experiments seriously implies that Mach is much less of a strict empiricist than he is usually understood to be.

In this paper, I critically evaluate John Broome’s recent arguments against individual denialism, the thesis that current humans (in some sense) do no wrong by not refraining from performing acts that emit insignificant amounts of greenhouse gases. After isolating and clarifying Broome’s position, I argue that Broome’s argument overgenerates; is in tension with his defence of carbon offsetting; and uses problematic assumptions. I close by noting the upshot of my critical evaluation on other issues in applied ethics.