Kadir Filiz

This paper critically discusses Edmund Husserl’s conception of ‘Europe’ and the limitation it poses on the methodology of phenomenology. Husserl’s invention of the idea of Europe from Ancient Greek heritage as an ideal and spirit leads him to privilege a particular kind of rationality in the name of universal-scientific phenomenology. For him, non-European ‘philosophies’ are not philosophy in a genuine sense; rather he speaks of them as ‘practical’ or ‘world-knowledge’. The methodological basis for this claim and its Eurocentric supremacy is rooted in Husserl’s attribution of a fundamental role to epochē and transcendental reduction in phenomenology. I address the implications of Husserl’s problematic concept of Europe as a part of his transcendental phenomenology. First, I present how this idea of Europe is based on asserting superiority over others who remained outside of this spirit. Furthermore, I demonstrate how Husserl’s idea of Europe is linked to transcendentalism in phenomenology. This brings us closer to discussing Husserl’s conceptualization of epochē and reduction, and above all, what counts as ‘genuine philosophy’ for Husserl. My inquiry shows that epochē and reduction imply an unachievable characterization of phenomenology, and questioning them can be instrumental in contemplating a ‘provincialized’ Europe in the phenomenological movement.

This is a translation of an interview with Bernhard Waldenfels by Kadir Filiz and Muhammed Vural, originally published in German in _Sabah Ülkesi_, vol. 80 (2024). Topics of discussion include his project of a responsive phenomenology of the alien, his intellectual development and personal life, and the dynamics of home and alien. The interview provides a cohesive introduction to the thought of Waldenfels and its relevance to both contemporary receptions of Husserlian phenomenology and current events.

In this interview, Claude Romano discusses his phenomenological project of the event in relation to hermeneutics, reason, realism, and some other fundamental problems of phenomenology. He explains common themes in his phenomenological project and elucidates why he considers it important to leave behind the transcendental perspective in phenomenology. He distinguishes his descriptive realism from other realist movements in contemporary French philosophy. The interview also questions the Eurocentric orientation of many phenomenological authors and considers the possibility of going beyond such assumptions in phenomenology.