Kai Horsthemke

Vegan education positions itself as a non-violent alternative to education that supports direct action and that is, in principle, committed to the use of violence as a means towards liberatory ends. Vegan education is not limited to opposing the use of animals for food but targets all abuse by humans of non-humans, which it seeks to remedy by non-violent, pacifist education. The critique of vegan education problematises its fundamental pacifism and absolutist rejection of violence. Critics emphasise, further, its elitist and prescriptive stance that is out of touch with the plight of the poor in the global south. A final, related criticism highlights the logical and practical separation of vegan education from other radical and liberatory social movements.

Learning about animals has been an integral feature of education. Voluntarily or involuntarily, directly or indirectly, animals contribute to education, which means that humans have been the prime beneficiaries of studying animals, in terms of learning about animal anatomy and behaviour. But human–animal relations have the potential of being educationally significant in other ways, too, in that interactions can be mutually beneficial. Pedagogical and educational encounters between humans and animals also have the potential of benefiting animals. Human beings can learn to interact and engage with other animals in morally defensible ways, to appreciate their abilities and respect their needs and interests, to coexist with them in a caring, non-invasive fashion.

Animals, at least mammals, birds, reptiles, amphibians and even certain invertebrates like octopuses, qualify as “moral subjects” and as deserving of respect and consideration equal, albeit not necessarily identical, to that of human moral subjects. A review non-anthropocentric accounts that—in principle—accommodate animals in the requisite fashion indicates why reverence for life, sympathy, and the principle of utility fail either as compelling moral theories or as efficient action guides, or both.

A discussion of the rationality of prohibitions and restrictions introduces a right-based ethic, as opposed to goal- or duty-based theories. Rights can be taken to exist not only in law but are also correctly seen as binding moral precepts that do not depend on legal institution for their validity. An interest model of rights (as opposed to a choice conception) advocates protection of all those who have interests and a welfare, and guarantees the pursuit of unthreatening interests, by means of (equal) rights. At the level of basic moral rights, all right-holders (human and non-human) have the same rights, for example subsistence-rights, liberty-rights, and welfare-rights. Non-basic moral rights are not necessarily shared by moral agents and moral recipients—indeed, not even by all agents.

Relevant theories that, in principle, provide arguments in support of the utilisation of animals for human ends and benefits are so-called “indirect duty” views and contractarianism, with its idea of “justice-as-reciprocity”. These views, which grant animals at best moral object status, are loosely subsumable under the label of (moral or ethical) anthropocentrism, or “human-centred ethics”. They prove to be vulnerable either to the argument from non-paradigmatic cases or to the argument from speciesism, or both. The former states that any account designed to exclude animals from the realm of (directly) morally considerable beings will also exclude certain human beings. The latter holds that so excluding animals simply on the basis of their not being human, is an irrational prejudice not unlike that involved in sexism and racism.

Some doubts have been expressed about the notion of rights with regard to the possibility of structural change and within the discourse around liberation and emancipation, notably by feminist writers. Apart from a response to these concerns, the chapter also includes a few practical suggestions for theriocentric education. The recognition of animals’ rights and “animal emancipation”—as it is envisaged by ethical individualism, and to which animal rights education can make a distinctive contribution—can be seen to imply “human liberation”, the act of humans freeing themselves from the role of subjugators, from the dominant relationship they have with the rest of animate nature and from dependence on animals at the expense of the latter’s lives, freedom and well-being.

“Critical animal studies” emerged in higher education as a result of mainstream animal studies being perceived as having sold out, as having been domesticated, colonised by organisations and individuals without any real or practical commitment to animal rights and liberation, to a vegan and generally anti-speciesist lifestyle, etc. Animal standpoint theory stands alongside other standpoint theories, in their commitment to represent the perspectives and viewpoints of those who have historically been marginalised, oppressed and exploited. Like critical pedagogy and ecopedagogy, however, these candidates for revolutionary education are characterised both by a questionable rejection of individualism and by a logically problematic and practically incoherent adherence to perspectivalism and relativism.

Philosophical posthumanism and its affiliates examine the ethical implications of expanding the circle of moral concern and acknowledging subjectivities beyond the human species. Perhaps the most plausible understanding of posthumanism resides in imagining a world is imagined in the absence of its most disruptive, aggressive and destructive species. In a sense, of course, acknowledging that “the world does not need humans, and is likely to thrive ignorant of human existence”, would imply that the world is also likely to thrive ignorant of human education. As long as homo sapiens is around, however, education arguably continues to be a significant component of the struggle against disruption, aggression and destruction. Although not without promise, both critical pedagogy and ecopedagogy tend to be marred by questionable epistemological commitments.

Environmental education and education for sustainability have tended to be largely anthropocentric and to focus on collective or communal interests, rather than on individuals, whether human or non-human. The communitarianism and holism that characterise most manifestations of environmental concern in society and education also pertain to biophilia and ecophilia, which have both been defined as “nature-friendliness or love of nature”. In a more differentiated understanding “biophilia” would pertain only to animate nature, whereas “ecophilia” could be taken to cover both animate and inanimate nature. They share with sustainability a holistic orientation, and therefore have little to say about individual natural existents, like animals.

Ethical individualism, the view defended here, gains its inspiration from the theory of evolution, which undermines belief in the special status of human beings. Differences between humans and other-than-human animals are differences in degree, not in kind. Other animals, too, are conscious individuals, many possessing even conative and cognitive abilities. They are sentient, which means they can be caused pain and made to suffer. Like humans, they have biological as well as conative interests and a life that can be better or worse for them, and they deserve to be treated and given consideration in accordance with their particular characteristics.

Although rights confer prohibitions and restrictions, with regard to agency, they are not absolute. It is permissible to override them in situations where right-holders are either already significantly threatened or cannot reasonably be called ‘unthreatening’ or ‘innocent’. On the other hand, the obligation to provide assistance and duties of beneficence obtain only if such assistance and beneficence do not themselves involve violation of rights. Although plants and simpler animal organisms cannot reasonably be said to possess moral subject status or individual moral rights, and although ecosystems and the atmosphere are only indirectly morally considerable, ethical individualism and deep ecology, or radical environmentalism, are united in their rejection of anthropocentrism. Notwithstanding the significance of moral rights, human identity, individually and as a species, is to a large extent a matter of humankind’s place in the greater biosphere.

The perceived role of humane educators is to engage the interest and natural attraction of children towards animals by providing learners with accurate information about animals and animal care, encouraging a sense of empathy and compassion towards all creatures and empowering learners to use their knowledge and enthusiasm to act on behalf of the animals within their community—and not only those who are non-human. The idea is that teaching children to treat animals with kindness and respect would encourage them to treat humanity in the same way, once they grew older and stronger. The problem with appeals to kindness and love for animals is that how one feels about what one does is logically distinct from the moral assessment of what one does.

The biggest challenges facing science education have possibly been accessibility and relevance to its target audiences—challenges that have become more pronounced with the increasingly multicultural nature of teaching and learning environments. How does one render accessible a field of inquiry that has often been viewed as unnatural, difficult, or the intellectual playground of a select few? How does one instil in students a sense of relevance of science to their own lives and experiences, especially as science has its own culture with a special language, traditions, conventions, beliefs, and values; and if teaching and learning take place in a language and culture other than their home language and culture; and if it does not seem to engage, respect, and honour their prior knowledge, past experiences, and cultural perspectives? Recent decades have seen various approaches to multicultural education, the transformation of science education, and the learning of scientific knowledge, concepts, and practices in non-Western or indigenous societies. Chief among these approaches are the drives toward indigenisation, on the one hand and toward internationalisation, on the other. After reflecting on lessons from Africa regarding the debates around Africanisation and globalisation, we examine the idea of Transkulturalität[transculturality]—as contrasted with multiculturality and interculturality.

“I am because we are, and since we are, therefore I am”, generally regarded as the guiding principle of African humanism, expresses the view that a person is a person through other persons and is closely associated but not identical with African communitarianism, or communalism. Against Ifeanyi Menkiti’s “unrestricted or radical or excessive communitarianism” Kwame Gyekye has proposed a “restricted or moderate communitarianism”. Whereas personhood, for Menkiti, is acquired over time, with increasing moral maturation, seniority and agency, Gyekye considers it to arise automatically with being born human. The problem with Menkiti’s account of personhood is that it is at once too wide and too narrow. On the other hand, it remains unclear to what extent Gyekye’s is a communitarian view – and to what extent it is distinctly ‘African’. I conclude with a critical reflection on the implications of African communalism and personhood for non-human animals. Keywords: Ifeanyi Menkiti, Kwame Gyekye, African Communitarianism, Non-Human Animals, Personhood

‘Critical animal historiography’ arguably emanates from ‘critical animal studies’, which evolved from ‘animal studies’. After briefly tracing these connections and developments, this chapter considers the question to what extent, if any, it is meaningful to regard other-than-human animals as subjects of and as both agents and recipients in history, as individual subjects of experience who impact and who are impacted by historical processes. The notion, especially, of animals being considered subjects of history gives rise to two additional issues. The first concerns the possible conflict between experiential perspectives (or subjective experiences) and history. The second concerns animals’ standpoints. Do animals have standpoints at all? If they do, is it possible to represent these in non-anthropocentric ways and without erroneously anthropomorphising other-than-human animals? This chapter constitutes a critical contribution to the work done by Steven Best, Richard Kahn, Anthony Nocella II, and others. Rejecting relativism, it is critical of some of the epistemological commitments of critical animal studies while endorsing the normative conclusions drawn by these authors.

African philosophy has, in recent decades, emerged from the academic margins to assume occupation of its rightful place in the scholarly mainstream, having garnered long-overdue acknowledgement and recognition. Within African philosophy, the question of the animal, which has for a long time been ignored or deemed comparatively unimportant, is now beginning to get the kind of attention it deserves, acknowledgement that has, similarly, been long overdue. This chapter examines the status of “the animal” in African ontology and metaphysics; epistemology; social, political, and moral philosophy; aesthetics; and philosophy of education. The argument is that while African philosophical treatment of other-than-human animals has tended to be anthropocentric, or human-centered, African philosophy is equipped with the requisite conceptual resources for the systematic development of a comprehensive non-anthropocentric stance. What this requires on the part of African philosophers, however, is nothing less than intellectual, ethical, and practical honesty and consistency.

Abstract‘Africanisation’ has, during the last few decades, been a buzzword that has enjoyed special currency in South Africa. Africanisation is generally seen to signal a (renewed) focus on Africa, on reclamation of what has been taken from Africa, and, as such, it forms part of post-colonialist, anti-racist discourse. With regard to knowledge, it comprises a focus on indigenous African knowledge and concerns simultaneously ‘legitimation’ and ‘protection from exploitation’ of this knowledge. With regard to education, the focus is on Africanisation of institutions, curricula, syllabi and criteria for excellence (in research, performance, etc.). This paper, while sympathetic to the basic concerns that inform the call/s for Africanisation, spells out the problems and limits of this project. For one thing, the idea of Africanisation may evoke a false or at least a superficial sense of ‘belonging’. For another, it may entail further marginalisation and derogation. Lastly, while it may emphasise relevance, it is hazardously close to a comprehensive relativism. In the light of these points, this paper suggests a more promising alternative: a framework of basic human rights appears to be a more appropriate locus for the pertinent concerns and demands.

In 2005 and 2008, respectively, two books by well-established and -respected analytical philosophers caused some controversy, not only because of their provocative and eye-catching titles but also because of the sheer brevity of the essays they contained. Harry Frankfurt’s book, which analysed the prevalence of ‘bullshit’ in contemporary society, was generally lauded for elevating a slang term to a new epistemological category, despite some people’s understandable unease with the author’s opportunist focus on a popular obscenity. Critics were generally less kind with regard to Colin McGinn’s book, pointing out that his analysis adds little, if anything, to the general understanding of mental manipulation, and that he has little to say about the factors that influence the frequency with which mindfucking occurs in contemporary society. After arguing that mindfucking is a special kind of psychological manipulation , the present paper investigates the possible educational significance and application of these two notions. It pays special attention to the factors affecting the frequency and magnitude with which bullshit and mindfucking occur in contemporary society, not only in our culture but in other cultures too

Does the imperative that we ought to try to understand one another make any sense? Presumably not – if it is correct that there are indeed different truths, and that the quest for objectivity is appropriate only in certain cultural contexts. After carefully mapping out the epistemological and ethical terrain, with special reference to the notions of ‘outsider understanding’, ‘other ways of knowing’ and epistemic injustice, this article presents a case for outsider critique. Education for belief and commitment necessarily includes education for understanding. Given our shared humanity, with many overlapping facets that make up our identities, and considering that the standard arguments against outsider understanding fail to stand up to critical scrutiny, this arguably also paves the way for the possibility of critical interrogation ‘from the outside’. Such interrogation should display virtues such as sensitivity, patience, perseverance, imagination, empathy and open-mindedness – and should be guided by an honest attempt at understanding.

Barrierefreiheit is a key term in the German inclusion movement, in education and more generally. Sometimes translated as ‘accessibility’, it refers not just to absence of barriers but to freedom from barriers, which in turn indicates a significant social and ethical component. It signals an active, conscious intervention by agents, a consequence of agentic commitment towards crossing borders and overcoming boundaries. In this regard, this article seeks to provide an epistemological analysis and illustration of what ‘inclusive’, ‘barrier-free’ education means, by examining three ideas within social epistemology: epistemological access, epistemic paternalism and epistemic justice. In so doing, it articulates a position that might be called ‘context-sensitive realism’, which cautions against not only constructivist theoretical leanings but also the anti-individualism that characterises a substantial portion of the inclusive education literature.

In a recent journal article, as well as in a recent book chapter, in which she critiques my position on ‘indigenous knowledge’, Lesley Green of the Department of Social Anthropology at the University of Cape Town argues that ‘diverse epistemologies ought to be evaluated not on their capacity to express a strict realism but on their ability to advance understanding’. In order to examine the implications of Green’s arguments, and of Nelson Goodman and Catherine Elgin’s work in this regard, I apply them to a well-known controversy between Native American (or First Nations) creationism and archaeology. I argue that issues in social justice should be distinguished from issues in epistemology. Moreover, in tightening in this paper the link between knowledge and truth, I attempt to defend science as a ‘privileged way of seeing the world’. The analysis of truth, and of related concepts like reality and ‘the way the world is’, will assume a central role here. I contend that, ultimately, the only coherent and consistent position is a realist view of the pertinent issues and ideas

African ethics is primarily concerned with community and harmonious communal relationships. The claim is frequently made on behalf of African moral beliefs and customs that, in stark contrast with Western moral attitudes and practices, there is no comparable objectification and exploitation of other-than-human animals and nature. This article investigates whether this claim is correct by examining the status of animals in religious and philosophical thought, as well as traditional cultural practices, in Africa. I argue that moral perceptions and attitudes on the African continent remain resolutely anthropocentric. Although values like ubuntu or ukama have been expanded to include nonhuman nature, animals are characteristically not seen to have any rights, and human duties to them are almost exclusively “indirect.” I conclude by asking whether those who, following their own liberation, continue to exploit and oppress other creatures—simply because they can—are not thereby contributing to their own dehumanization.

The approbation, in the last few decades, of 'African ways of knowing' and, more recently, the critical emphasis on 'knowledge in the blood'—which refers to 'deeply entrenched' and 'received knowledge', notably of Afrikaners—give rise to all kinds of questions and concerns. What makes certain ways of knowing and kinds of knowledge 'African' and 'Afrikaner', respectively? What do these ideas cover and include, and what falls outside their respective ambits? What functions are served by appealing to these notions? Amongst other things, the idea of 'African ways of knowing' constitutes part of a challenge to occidental belief systems, science, education and ethics. Theorists who single out certain ways of knowing as distinctly and uniquely 'African' or characteristically 'Afrikaner', respectively, not only emphasise their significance in post-colonialist and antiracist discourse but also maintain that the study of these is of profound relevance to educational and socio-political transformation. In this paper, I examine the notions in question, by seeking to understand how those who employ them might see them as plausible, before referring them to a particular epistemological framework. Problems that need to be addressed include relativism about knowledge and truth, as well as elevation of all kinds of beliefs—notably superstitions and racial prejudices—to the status of knowledge, for any real and sustainable transformation to occur.

In recent years, the ‘Western tradition’ has increasingly come under attack in anti-colonialist and postmodernist discourses. It is not difficult to sympathise with the concerns that underlie advocacy of historically marginalised traditions, and the West undoubtedly has a lot to answer for. Nonetheless, while arguing a qualified yes to the central question posed for this special issue, we question the assumption that the West can be neatly distinguished from alternative traditions of thought. We argue that there is fundamental implicit and explicit agreement across traditions about the most difficult of issues and on standards about how to reason about them and that the ‘West’ has demonstrably learned from within and without itself. But, we question the very viability under conditions of heightened globalisation and neo-colonialism of distinguishing between thought of the ‘West’ and thought outside the West. It is time to move beyond the reified assumptions that underlie the idea of ‘Western thought’, cast as an agent with a collective purpose.