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Kaija Mortensen

Randolph College
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  •  Publications
    6
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    4

 More details
  • Randolph College
    Assistant Professor
University of California, Santa Cruz
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 2011
Homepage
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology
Metaphilosophy
Philosophy of Mind
  • All publications (6)
  •  4424
    Armchair-Friendly Experimental Philosophy
    with Jennifer Nagel
    In Wesley Buckwalter & Justin Sytsma (eds.), Blackwell Companion to Experimental Philosophy, Blackwell. pp. 53-70. 2016.
    Once symbolized by a burning armchair, experimental philosophy has in recent years shifted away from its original hostility to traditional methods. Starting with a brief historical review of the experimentalist challenge to traditional philosophical practice, this chapter looks at research undercutting that challenge, and at ways in which experimental work has evolved to complement and strengthen traditional approaches to philosophical questions.
    Philosophical Methods, MiscThe Nature of IntuitionCritiques of Experimental Philosophy
  •  590
    Knowing how as a philosophical hybrid
    with Chad Gonnerman and Jacob Robbins
    Synthese 199 (3-4): 11323-11354. 2021.
    Our view is that the folk concept of knowing how is more complicated than many epistemologists assume. We present four studies that go some way towards supporting our view—that the folk concept of knowledge-how is a philosophical hybrid, comprising both intellectualist and anti-intellectualist features. One upshot is, if we are going to award a presumptive status to philosophical theories of know-how that best accord with the folk concept, it ought to go to those that combine intellectualist and…Read more
    Our view is that the folk concept of knowing how is more complicated than many epistemologists assume. We present four studies that go some way towards supporting our view—that the folk concept of knowledge-how is a philosophical hybrid, comprising both intellectualist and anti-intellectualist features. One upshot is, if we are going to award a presumptive status to philosophical theories of know-how that best accord with the folk concept, it ought to go to those that combine intellectualist and anti-intellectualist elements.
    Knowledge HowExperimental Philosophy: Epistemology, Misc
  •  710
    Appendices for "KNOWING HOW as a Philosophical Hybrid"
    with Chad Gonnerman and Jacob Robbins
    This document contains the appendices, which provides the stimulus materials, for the four studies reported in: Gonnerman, Mortensen, & Robbins (forthcoming). KNOWING HOW as a philosophical hybrid. Synthese.
    Metaphysics and Epistemology
  •  1
    The Ordinary Concept of Knowledge How
    with Chad Gonnerman and Jacob Robbins
    In Tania Lombrozo, Joshua Knobe & Shaun Nichols (eds.), Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy, Volume 2, Oxford University Press. pp. 104-115. 2018.
    We present experimental results that support the claim that the folk concept of knowledge how is an epistemological hybrid, encompassing both intellectualist and praxist elements.
    Experimental Philosophy: Epistemology, Misc
  •  70
    Alva Noë: Varieties of Presence: Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 2012, $35.00 hbk, xii + 165 pp + index (review)
    Human Studies 36 (3): 435-440. 2013.
    Perception and Action
  •  104
    A Review of "Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Mind" (review)
    Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews. forthcoming.
    Science of Consciousness, MiscExperimental Philosophy of Mind, Misc
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