Kailyn Smith

In this article, I explore some harms that emerge from the call for charity in academic philosophy. A charitability gap, I suggest, exists both between who we tend to read charitably and who we tend to expect charitability from. This gap shores up the disciplinary status quo and (re)produces epistemic oppression, which helps preserve philosophy's status as a discipline that is, to use Charles Mills's language, conceptually and demographically dominated by whiteness and maleness (Mills 1998, 2). I am particularly interested in calls for charity made in response to critiques of racist or sexist authors/texts. I suggest that in these cases, interpretive charity perpetuates epistemic violence by creating conditions for testimonial smothering (Dotson 2011); that it functions as an orientation device (Ahmed 2006) designed to bring “unruly” philosophers back in line with disciplinary practices and traditions; and that it requires resistant philosophers to remain in oppressive worlds (Lugones 2003a; Pohlhaus 2011). Although charitability is risky—and charity is disproportionately demanded from already marginalized philosophers—I am hesitant to abandon charity entirely. The outright rejection of charitable orientations toward texts or others commits philosophers to a purity politics that, following Alexis Shotwell, I suggest we resist (Shotwell 2016).

In this article, we explore how to engage with the work of ethicists facing public allegations of professional sexual misconduct. Rather than disengaging or proceeding as usual, we propose citing their work alongside impartial information about credible allegations. We choose to isolate the work of ethicists as the target of this proposal because ethicists are distinct on two fronts: they are distinct among philosophers because they have moral authority, and distinct among others with moral authority, such as religious leaders and civil rights activists, because their power is reproduced in part through citations. Our approach offers a nuanced perspective on the power conferred through citations. We argue that individual scholars have a moral and intellectual responsibility to cite using this practice, especially when institutional enforcement of justice is lacking.