Kaj Zeller

The apparent vagueness of normative terms, such as “permissible,” “ought,” and “is better than”, raises a number of intriguing questions and has prompted a growing body of philosophical literature. This article specifically examines decision‐theoretical questions of the following kind: What ought we do when it is borderline what we ought to do? What option is best when it is indeterminate which option is best? I survey the most elaborate accounts that attempt to answer such questions that have so far been presented. My discussion suggests that the debate about action‐guidance under normative vagueness presses on general issues concerning what types of credence it is rational to hold, the nature of indeterminacy, and how to explain cases where the classic value relations seemingly fail to hold.

The apparent vagueness of normative predicates such as “permissible,” “wrong,” and “responsible” raises a number of intriguing questions and has prompted a growing body of philosophical literature. In this article, I review recent metaethical discussions on normative vagueness. Specifically, I examine how well different metaethical views can handle moral vagueness. I focus on reviewing recent arguments against the compatibility of robust realism and particular theories of vagueness. Although these arguments turn out not to be decisive, they highlight areas warranting further exploration: The phenomenon of moral vagueness puts pressure on answering important questions about the semantics of moral terms, the “fairness” of morality, supervenience in ethics, and the nature of moral properties. This article also suggests that considerable work remains to be done to assess the compatibility between moral vagueness and antirealist theories, such as noncognitivism, expressivism, and error theory.

Ruth Chang believes that one can intrinsically resolve the question of whether a vague predicate F applies to its borderline case a through arbitrary stipulation—one can resolve it by fiat. First, I clarify what it is to intrinsically resolve a question by arbitrary stipulation. Next, I argue that Chang’s view is wrong. Cases that involve vagueness are cases of (what I’ll call) competing similarity. For this reason, for any borderline case 'a' of a vague predicate 'F', we have intrinsic reason to classify 'a' as 'F' and intrinsic reason to classify 'a' as 'not-F'. If we have such reasons, then we cannot intrinsically resolve the question of whether 'a' is 'F' by arbitrary stipulation. My conclusion has significant upshots: it undermines Chang’s case for parity as a fourth relation of comparability, and it suggests that supervaluationists ought to distance their view from Chang’s. Moreover, this paper makes progress on the so-called characterization problem of vagueness.

This article addresses the ‘Indirection Problem’ in Sartrean ethics of authenticity and compares it to the problem of the same name in virtue ethics. Both ethical frameworks encounter a disharmony between core concepts and proper motivation. The article reviews the indirection problem in virtue ethics, highlighting Swanton's solution of defining virtues as promoting specific values. It then explores how Sartrean ethics faces a more profound indirection problem due to the elusive nature of its core concept—authenticity. The motivation for authenticity cannot be its rationale (salvation). Freedom seems to be a more direct value, but the desire for freedom itself risks falling into being yet another pursuit of being. The article advocates a radically negative motivation for authenticity—a resignation from futile, inauthentic projects.