Kamil Mamak

In the ethical literature on robot design, considerable attention has been devoted to the risks that human-like robots pose to humans. In particular, the resemblance of robots to humans has been associated with concerns about social disruption, deception, and potential harm, leading some authors to argue for restrictions or bans in certain contexts. However, while the ethical significance of human-like form has been widely recognized for humans, significantly less attention has been paid to the implications of animal-like robots from the perspective of nonhuman animals and human–animal relations. This paper addresses that gap by examining how the design and deployment of animal-like robots may affect animals both directly and indirectly. We argue that the use of animal form in robotics is not ethically neutral, as it can shape human perceptions of animals, influence patterns of interaction, and potentially contribute to harms such as mislearning, objectification, and alienation. By shifting the focus from human-centered concerns to the impact on animals, we identify a set of ethically relevant risks associated with animal-like robots and analyze their broader implications for human–animal relations. On this basis, we propose preliminary guidelines aimed at supporting the responsible design and use of such technologies.

Despite years of efforts to combat disinformation, we remain far from a satisfactory set of solutions. The rise of generative AI, which enables the creation of highly credible fake content at scale, suggests that the problem is likely to grow even more severe. Lessons from the recent pandemic also call for a reconsideration of how disinformation should be addressed. This paper proposes a new approach that focuses not only on regulating everyone who spreads false information, but also on those who hold epistemic power – individuals with the capacity to shape what others know or believe. Such a strategy has the potential to move the debate forward, as it avoids the most common objection to disinformation regulation: the fear of widespread censorship. The paper argues that an individual’s epistemic position can justifiably differentiate their legal duties, and that those who possess epistemic power should bear corresponding legal – specifically, criminal – responsibility for the abuse of that power in spreading disinformation.

The ability to suffer, in the case of artificial entities, is often viewed as a moral turning point—once detected, there is no going back, and the moral landscape is irreversibly altered. The presence of entities capable of suffering imposes moral and legal obligations on humans. It is therefore unsurprising that many have urged caution in pursuing artificial suffering, with some even proposing a moratorium. In this paper, however, I argue that the emergence of artificial suffering need not entail moral disaster. On the contrary, I defend its development and contend that it may be a necessary feature of superintelligent robots. I suggest that artificial suffering could be essential for enabling human-like ethics in machines, bridging the retribution gap, and functioning as a control mechanism to mitigate existential risks. Rather than constraining research in this area, I maintain that work on artificial suffering should be actively intensified.

Communication between humans and animals is improving due to advancements in Artificial Intelligence. Numerous potential positive and negative ethical implications are associated with such tools. This paper explores AI communication with animals as a potential catalyst for a moral revolution. How humans treat animals could be transformed through improved mutual communication. Two mechanisms that support this thesis have been identified. The first is the neutralization of epistemological limitations; we might treat animals better because we understand them better. The second is amplification of anthropomorphism; we might treat animals better because they appear more human-like. These two mechanisms could change the moral status of animals. Changes in moral norms regarding animals may be complex, as some animals might be included in the moral circle, others might receive stronger confirmation of their place within it, and some might gain higher status than before. This paper also discusses potential risks related to moral status regarding AI communication.

The recent developments in applications of artificial intelligence bring back discussion about risks posed by AI. Among immediate risks that need to be tackled here and now, there is also a possible problem of existential threats related to Artificial General Intelligence (AGI). There is a discussion on how to mitigate those risks by appropriate regulations. It seems that one commonly accepted assumption is that the problem is global, and thus, it needs to be tackled first of all on an international level. In this paper, I argue that national criminal laws should also be considered one of the possible regulatory tools for mitigating threats posed by AGI. I propose to enact AGI crimes that complement the varieties of legal responses to existential risks that might motivate and speed up further regulatory changes.

The debate on alternative punishments appears to be stagnating. The impasse may be overcome if we consider humans from a different philosophical perspective. If we answer differently the question of who we are punishing, we open new possibilities regarding the question of how we punish. In particular, by applying the extended mind thesis we can arrive at interesting outcomes and reopen the debate on alternative punishments. According to this theory, external artifacts—such as smartphones—can be considered part of our minds. In this article, I defend the thesis that restricting access to personal technologies that are a part of one's self should be considered a form of punishment. Thus, a human who is considered from an extended perspective can be punished in a new way.

The recent developments in applications of artificial intelligence bring back discussion about risks posed by AI. Among immediate risks that need to be tackled here and now, there is also a possible problem of existential threats related to Artificial General Intelligence (AGI). There is a discussion on how to mitigate those risks by appropriate regulations. It seems that one commonly accepted assumption is that the problem is global, and thus, it needs to be tackled first of all on an international level. In this paper, I argue that national criminal laws should also be considered one of the possible regulatory tools for mitigating threats posed by AGI. I propose to enact AGI crimes that complement the varieties of legal responses to existential risks that might motivate and speed up further regulatory changes.

Robots are becoming more visible parts of our life, a situation which prompts questions about their place in our society. One group of issues that is widely discussed is connected with robots’ moral and legal status as well as their potential rights. The question of granting robots rights is polarizing. Some positions accept the possibility of granting them human rights whereas others reject the notion that robots can be considered potential rights holders. In this paper, I claim that robots will never have all human rights, even if we accept that they are morally equal to humans. I focus on the role of embodiment in the content of the law. I claim that even relatively small differences in the ontologies of entities could lead to the need to create new sets of rights. I use the example of Neanderthals to illustrate that entities similar to us might have required different legal statuses. Then, I discuss the potential legal status of human-like robots.

Uncontrolled access to information on the Internet has many advantages, but it also leads to the phenomenon of fake news. Fake news is dangerous in many spheres, including that of health. For example, we are facing an increase in the amount of vaccine hesitancy. This has been w considered by the World Health Organization in 2019 as one of the greatest threats to public health. This specific phenomenon is linked with the spread of information on the Internet around that issue. In this paper, I discuss a proposition of new crime, which has the aim of fighting medical fake news by stopping its spread. This proposition should be considered only if other non-criminal measures are inefficient. The proposal is “Whoever publicly disseminates information evidently discrepant with medical knowledge is subject to a penalty.”

Using robots in the military contexts is problematic at many levels. There are social, legal, and ethical issues that should be discussed first before their wider deployment. In this paper, we focus on an additional problem: their human likeness. We claim that military robots should not look like humans. That design choice may bring additional risks that endanger human lives and by that contradicts the very justification for deploying robots at war, which is decreasing human deaths and injuries. We discuss two threats—epistemological and patient. Epistemological one is connected with the risk of mistaking robots for humans due to the limited ways of getting information about the external world, which may be amplified by the rush and need to fight with robots in distance. The patient threat is related to the developing attachment to robots, that in military contexts may cause additional deaths by the hesitance to sacrifice robots in order to save humans in peril or risking human life to save robots.

Whether or not we call a love-like relationship with robots true love, some people may feel and claim that, for them, it is a sufficient substitute for love relationship. The love relationship between humans has a special place in our social life. On the grounds of both morality and law, our significant other can expect special treatment. It is understandable that, precisely because of this kind of relationship, we save our significant other instead of others or will not testify against her/him. How as a society should we treat love-like relationships humans with robots? Based on the assumption that robots do not have an inner life and are not moral patients, I defend the thesis that this kind of relationship should be protected by criminal law.