Kanit (Mitinunwong) Sirichan

Wittgenstein’s rule-following argument captures the underlying problem concerning how meaning gets attached to what we do. Besides the debate on rules as normative constraints of meaning in the philosophy of language, the illustration of the problem is also evident in how regularities and necessity play a role in understanding social practice in the philosophy of social science. The contested views on the notion of practice are between a thin view (Humean regularist view) and a thick view (e.g., presumably, Wittgensteinian view). While the thin view is represented as the view that there are mere regularities in behaviour, the thick view takes it that necessities (in the sense of normativities) are inhered in regularities. According to Haslanger (2013), the thickest view can fall into the trap of an intentionally overloaded thick view, namely, the view that there is no gap between the regularities in what we do and the normativity of what we do. Examples of the intentionally overloaded thick view discussed in this paper include the ideas of Winch and Diamond. Based on McDowell’s reading of Wittgenstein’s rule-following argument, this paper argues for the non-intentionally overloaded thick view where rules are engaged within practices but are objectively characterizable. Arguing for the non-intentionally overloaded thick view, the paper exploits Haslanger’s project of doing philosophy, namely, the ameliorative aim. This sort of thick view entails realism about social structure, which may lead to the circularity problem. That is, behaviour regularities are assumed to be the effect of some causal properties of a social structure before it is known whether such properties exist. However, the paper argues that the regularities in question should be taken as phenomenal regularities, which can be stated as counterfactual conditions.

A thought, taken as a propositional attitude or the content of psychological predicates such as believe, wish, desire, hope, is ascribed to an entity with mental states. A thought is not only allegedly ascribed to particular non-mental things like computer, book, it is also ascribed to non-material things, linguistically in plural terms, e.g. plural pronouns (e.g. we, they), collective names or singular proper names (e.g. the United States), proper names in plural form or general terms (e.g. the Microsoft, feminists). Plural terms are terms referring to groups of entities. The question is - what is it for a group to have a thought? Two main views are currently on centered stage – the literal view and the metaphorical view. This paper argues that the main argument supporting the literal view, in particular Pettit’s view, faces three main problems, namely, the problem of rule-following in propositional coawareness, the problem of an independent verifiability for group beliefs and the problem of the indexical ‘we’- thought. Keywords: thoughts, collective intentionality, social ontology, group agency, group consciousness

The paper argues that logical reasoning is what constitutes critical thinking because reasoning is normative, and logic provides a norm for reasoning. If a logical way of thinking is simply the same thing as reasoning, then the only limit or constraint of reasoning is the nature of the (logical) “rule” the kind of which is engaged with the practice of reasoning; rather than with either a component of social context or a com- ponent of a purely non-inferential or “immediate” perception of a situation which is called sensitivity toward an object alone. However, such components are built into my analysis of what “reasoning” is. An approach to critical thinking being employed here is “an agent-based approach”. This paper also aims to pave the way for a further discussion on the limit of reasoning in a way that is relevant to the question of how critical thinking or reasoning should be taught in higher education.

Practice has been considered as a notion challenging an idea of truth which is neutral to the role of agency or an epistemic role of the subject in accounting for content of thought. Such an idea of truth is a realist notion. However, challenging such a notion does not necessarily mean to reject an idea of normativity of content, i.e. the idea that for content of thought to be possible, it requires both constraints of the world and the subject of thought on content. In order to gain such an account of thought content, a notion of practice is required in the sense that provides an understanding of how the world is made intelligible by having thought which is object-involving. The paper investigates an ontology of practice, the nature of which is characterized in terms of object-engagement. That is to say, an account of the notion of practice requires an account of how norms originating from the interweaving of the world and mind are immanent in practice. On this account, practice provides content because a subject engages with objects in the world.

The use of language in hate speech is understandably offensive. Though words do not kill, they convey an alarming message that can harm the victim. To understand how words can harm, it is necessary to understand the nature of the meaning of pejoratives or slurs that are used in hate speech. Pejoratives are undeniably offensive. However, they are puzzling as they can be used in two directions, namely, the offensive power preservation and the offensive power destruction. This paper proposes that the direct reference theory of pejoratives can solve the puzzle. A characterization of pejoratives is that it has the property of immediacy. They refer directly to the object of speech. Grounding on a shared context, any descriptions are unnecessary for understanding the offensive message of pejoratives. In this sense, pejoratives have indexical content as it is context-sensitive. The kind of indexical content that pertains to pejoratives is action-oriented. However, its object of reference is empty. In discussing pejoratives that are used in hate speech, some examples of Thai slurs are shown.

In introducing a course on critical thinking or reasoning, many emphasize the philosophical background of the idea of critical thinking, that is, the Socratic motto: “life without examination is not worth living”. It is actually right to do so, because critical thinking is basically the activity of doing philosophy. However, in manyuniversities, the course on critical thinking is taught mainly as a basic course for first year undergraduates who may not go on to major in philosophy. Beside the fact that critical thinking as an activity of doing philosophy provides a good tool for arguing about any subjects, there is a political agenda in making the course a requisite one for non-philosophy students, that is, the ability to think critically is a desirable property for being a “good citizen” in a democratic society. Underlying this idea is the model of rational man in the age of Enlightenment. Putting aside the controversy over the notion of rationality, my question is what exactly is the activity called critical thinking or reasoning, and then on such understanding, what should be the right direction in teaching critical thinking. My answer is that critical thinking is an examination of thoughts because reasoning is rule-governed. However, grasping a thought requires the idea of an agency. Hence, the main aim of teaching critical thinking is not to get just a technician game kids, rather it is to reveal the possibility of being a philosophical mindfulness person. Thepaper consists of three main parts. The first part concerns the idea that critical thinking is an examination of thoughts. Thoughts are inferentially structured and are constrained by truth. This means that thought content are conceptual – reasoning is inherently logical or rule-governed. The second part considers the connection of content of thoughts, truth and thinkers. An individuation of thought content is by object of thoughts. The idea of object of thoughts involves the idea of truth which is perspectival. Therefore, to understand what truth is requires an idea of agency, the one who grasps thoughts. In the last part, I then propose that the rightdirection in teaching critical thinking is to accommodate an independent ability to see the world aright.