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15Incorrigible Science and Doctrinal PseudoscienceInternational Studies in the Philosophy of Science 35 (3-4): 269-278. 2022.I respond to Sven Ove Hansson’s [2020. "Disciplines, Doctrines, and Deviant Science." International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 33 (1): 43-52. doi:10.1080/02698595.2020.1831258] discussion note on my (Letrud 2019) critique of his (2013) pseudoscience definition. My critique addressed what I considered to be issues with his choice of definiendum, the efficiency of the definition for debunking pseudoscience, and a problematic extensional overlap with bad science. I attempted to solve thes…Read more
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38Do we Know it When we See it? A Review of ‘Pseudoscience’ Patterns of UsageEpisteme 20 (2): 479-496. 2023.Definitions of ‘pseudoscience’ are required to heed the established usage of the definiendum by subsuming those cases that are generally considered to be pseudoscientific, and by excluding those that are considered sciences. In this paper I sample the published record to assess the consensus on pseudoscience case classifications. The review finds inconclusive evidence for an overall agreement. However, the frequent usage of a small number of pseudoscience-cases indicates that these are considere…Read more
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21Acquiesced and unrefuted : The growth of scientific mythsDissertation, University of Bergen. 2020.This thesis explores the phenomenon of scientific myths distributed in academic discourses. Drawing on a set of myth-examples, I explicate a definition of the term ‘scientific myth’, arguing that it ought primarily to be characterised by the tension between a lack of epistemic warrant on the one hand, and an extensive proliferation in formal academic channels of publications on the other. I then delineate scientific myths from the closely associated pseudosciences: The sciences, although distrib…Read more
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22The diffusion of the learning pyramid myths in academia: an exploratory studyJournal of Curriculum Studies 48 (3): 291-302. 2016.This article examines the diffusion and present day status of a family of unsubstantiated learning-retention myths, some of which are referred to as ‘the learning pyramid’. We demonstrate through an extensive search in academic journals and field-specific encyclopaedias that these myths are indeed widely publicised in academia and that they have gained a considerable level of authority. We also argue that the academic publishing of these myths is potentially harmful to both professional as well …Read more
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21Excavating the origins of the learning pyramid mythsCogent 1 (5). 2018.The family of cognitive models sometimes referred to as the “Learning Pyramid” enjoys a considerable level of authority within several areas of educational studies, despite that nobody knows how they originated or whether they were supported by any empirical evidence. This article investigates the early history of these models. Through comprehensive searches in digital libraries, we have found that versions of the Learning Pyramids have been part of educational debates and practices for more tha…Read more
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30Affirmative citation bias in scientific myth debunking: A three-in-one case studyPLoS ONE 9 (14). 2019.Several uncorroborated, false, or misinterpreted conceptions have for years been widely distributed in academic publications, thus becoming scientific myths. How can such misconceptions persist and proliferate within the inimical environment of academic criticism? Examining 613 articles we demonstrate that the reception of three myth-exposing publications is skewed by an ‘affirmative citation bias’: The vast majority of articles citing the critical article will affirm the idea criticized. 468 af…Read more
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74The Gordian Knot of Demarcation: Tying Up Some Loose EndsInternational Studies in the Philosophy of Science 32 (1): 3-11. 2019.In this article, I seek to improve upon a definition of pseudoscience put forward by Sven Ove Hansson. I argue that not only does its use of ‘pseudoscientific statement’ as definiendum inadequately address the theoretical issue of demarcation, it also makes the definition inapt for practical demarcation. Moreover, I argue that Hanson’s definition subsumes statements and associated practices that are forms of bad science, resulting in an unfavourably wide concept. I try to save the definition fro…Read more
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Inland Norway University of Applied SciencesDepartment of Law, Philosophy and International Studies (Lillehammer)Associate Professor
Lillehammer, Oppland, Norway
Areas of Specialization
Scientific Practice, Misc |
Areas of Interest
Scientific Practice, Misc |
History of Western Philosophy, Misc |
Teaching Philosophy |