•  474
    Second-hand moral knowledge
    Journal of Philosophy 96 (2): 55-78. 1999.
    Trust enters into the making of a virtuous person in at least two ways. First, unless a child has a sufficiently trusting relationship with at least one adult, it is doubtful that she will be able to become the kind of person who can form ethically responsible relationships with others. Infant trust, as Annette Baier has reminded us, is the foundation on which future trust relationships will be built; and when such trust is irreparably shaken, the adult into whom the child grows may be forever c…Read more
  •  93
    Quick and Smart? Modularity and the pro-emotion consensus
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 32 3-27. 2006.
  •  1
    The Many Moral Rationalisms (edited book)
    Oxford Univerisity Press. 2018.
  • Trust and Personhood. Counting on One Another
    In Arne Grøn & Claudia Welz (eds.), Trust, Sociality, Selfhood, Mohr Siebeck. 2010.
  •  2
    Moral Expertise
    In Tristram McPherson & David Plunkett (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics, Routledge. pp. 459-471. 2017.
  •  187
    The Politics of Intellectual Self-trust
    Social Epistemology 26 (2): 237-251. 2012.
    Just as testimony is affected by unjust social relations, so too is intellectual self-trust. I defend an account of intellectual self-trust that explains both why it is properly thought of as trust and why it is directed at the self, and explore its relationship to social power. Intellectual self-trust is neither a matter of having dispositions to rely on one?s epistemic methods and mechanisms, nor having a set of beliefs about which ones are reliable. Instead, it is a stance that an agent takes…Read more
  •  73
    Gender and Rationality
    In Alfred R. Mele & Piers Rawling (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Rationality, Oxford University Press. 2004.
    Jones explores feminist stances toward gender and rationality. These divide into three broad camps: the “classical feminist” stance, according to which what needs to be challenged are not available norms and ideals of rationality, but rather the supposition that women are unable to meet them; the “different voice” stance, which challenges available norms of rationality as either incomplete or accorded an inflated importance; and the “strong critical” stance, which finds fault with the norms and …Read more
  •  172
    Trustworthiness
    Ethics 123 (1): 61-85. 2012.
    I present and defend an account of three-place trustworthiness according to which B is trustworthy with respect to A in domain of interaction D, if and only if she is competent with respect to that domain, and she would take the fact that A is counting on her, were A to do so in this domain, to be a compelling reason for acting as counted on. This is not the whole story of trustworthiness, however, for we want those we can count on to identify themselves so that we can place our trust wisely.
  •  48
    We defend the claim that there can be testimonial transfer of reasons against Steinig’s recent objections. In addition, we argue that the literature on testimony about moral reasons misunderstands what is at stake in the possibility of second-hand orientation towards moral reasons. A moral community faces two different but related tasks: one theoretical and one practical. In between, simultaneously theoretical and practical, lies the activity of co-deliberation. Virtuous participation in co-deli…Read more
  •  209
    Intersectionality and ameliorative analyses of race and gender
    Philosophical Studies 171 (1): 99-107. 2013.
    This discussion of Sally Haslanger’s recent book, Resisting Reality: Social Construction and Social Critique (Oxford 2012), investigates how her theory of race and gender handles the problem of intersectionality; that is, the problem of how to understand the ways in which one’s location in multiple socially constructed categories affects one’s lived experiences, social roles, and relative privilege or disadvantage. Haslanger defines race and gender as locations within hierarchical social structu…Read more
  •  277
    Trust and Terror
    In Peggy DesAutels & Margaret Urban Walker (eds.), Moral Psychology: Feminist Ethics and Social Theory, Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 3--18. 2004.
  •  232
    Metaethics and emotions research: A response to Prinz
    Philosophical Explorations 9 (1): 45-53. 2006.
    Prinz claims that empirical work on emotions and moral judgement can help us resolve longstanding metaethical disputes in favour of simple sentimentalism. I argue that the empirical evidence he marshals does not have the metaethical implications he claims: the studies purporting to show that having an emotion is sufficient for making a moral judgement are tendentiously described. We are entitled to ascribe competence with moral concepts to experimental subjects only if we suppose that they would…Read more
  •  4
    The Many Moral Rationalisms (edited book)
    Oxford University Press. forthcoming.
  •  232
    Emotion, Weakness of Will, and the Normative Conception of Agency
    In A. Hatzimoysis (ed.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, Cambridge University Press. pp. 181-200. 2003.
    Empirical work on and common observation of the emotions tells us that our emotions sometimes key us to the presence of real and important reason-giving considerations without necessarily presenting that information to us in a way susceptible of conscious articulation and, sometimes, even despite our consciously held and internally justified judgment that the situation contains no such reasons. In this paper, I want to explore the implications of the fact that emotions show varying degrees of in…Read more
  •  122
    Moral epistemology
    In Frank Jackson & Michael Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy, Oxford University Press. 2005.