-
12Naturalistic Theories of ReferenceIn Michael Devitt & Richard Hanley (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Language, Wiley-blackwell. 2006.This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction Original and Derived Meaning The Causal‐Historical Theory The Crude Causal Theory The Asymmetric Dependency Theory Teleosemantics Informational semantics.
-
Types of Traits: Function, structure, and homology in the classification of traitsIn André Ariew, Robert Cummins & Mark Perlman (eds.), Functions: New Essays in the Philosophy of Psychology and Biology, Oxford University Press. 2002.
-
77A Mark of the Mental: A Defence of Informational TeleosemanticsMIT Press. 2017.Drawing on insights from causal theories of reference, teleosemantics, and state space semantics, a theory of naturalized mental representation. In A Mark of the Mental, Karen Neander considers the representational power of mental states—described by the cognitive scientist Zenon Pylyshyn as the “second hardest puzzle” of philosophy of mind. The puzzle at the heart of the book is sometimes called “the problem of mental content,” “Brentano's problem,” or “the problem of intentionality.” Its motiv…Read more
-
100Minds without Meanings: An Essay on the Content of ConceptsPhilosophical Review 126 (3): 410-417. 2017.
-
14The division of phenomenal labor: A problem for representationalist theories of consciousnessPhilosophical Perspectives 12 411-34. 1998.
-
8Teleological Theories of Mental Content: Can Darwin Solve the Problem of Intentionality?In Michael Ruse (ed.), The Oxford handbook of philosophy of biology, Oxford University Press. 2008.
-
30Toward an Informational TeleosemanticsIn Dan Ryder, Justine Kingsbury & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Millikan and her critics, Wiley. pp. 21--40. 2013.This chapter contains section titles: Introduction Response Functions Information and Singular Causation The Functions of Sensory Representations The Contents of Sensory Representations: The Problem of Error The Contents of Sensory Representation: The Distality Problem.
-
30Functions as Selected Effects: The Conceptual Analyst’s DefensePhilosophy of Science 58 (2): 168-184. 1991.In this paper I defend an etiological theory of biological functions (according to which the proper function of a trait is the effect for which it was selected by natural selection) against three objections which have been influential. I argue, contrary to Millikan, that it is wrong to base our defense of the theory on a rejection of conceptual analysis, for conceptual analysis does have an important role in philosophy of science. I also argue that biology requires a normative notion of a "prope…Read more
-
2715. Types of Traits: The Importance of Functional HomologuesIn André Ariew, Robert Cummins & Mark Perlman (eds.), Functions: New Essays in the Philosophy of Psychology and Biology, Oxford University Press. pp. 390. 2002.
-
24Pruning the tree of lifeBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (1): 59-80. 1995.argue that natural selection does not explain the genotypic arid phenotypic properties of individuals. On this view, natural selection explains the adaptedness of individuals, not by explaining why the individuals that exist have the adaptations they do, but rather by explaining why the individuals that exist are the ones with those adaptations. This paper argues that this ‘Negative’ view of natural selection ignores the fact that natural selection is a cumulative selection process. So understoo…Read more
-
12What does natural selection explain? Correction to SoberPhilosophy of Science 55 (3): 422-426. 1988.In this paper I argue against Sober's claim that natural selection does not explain the traits of individuals. Sober argues that natural selection only explains the distribution of traits in a population. My point is that the explanation of an individual's traits involves us in a description of the individual's ancestry, and in an explanation of the distribution of traits in that ancestral population. Thus Sober is wrong, natural selection is part of the explanation of the traits of individuals
-
24Fitness and the Fate of UnicornsIn Valerie Gray Hardcastle (ed.), Where Biology Meets Psychology: Philosophical Essays, Mit Press. 1999.
-
4Biological Approaches to Mental RepresentationIn Christopher Stephens & Mohan Matthen (eds.), Elsevier Handbook in Philosophy of Biology, Elsevier. 2004.
-
Types of traits. Function, structure, and homology in the classification of traitsIn André Ariew, Robert Cummins & Mark Perlman (eds.), Functions: New Essays in the Philosophy of Psychology and Biology, Oxford University Press. pp. 402--422. 2002.
-
5Moths and metaphors. Review essay on organisms and artifacts: Design in nature and elsewhere by Tim Lewens (review)Biology and Philosophy 21 (4): 591-602. 2006.
-
15Explaining Complex Adaptations: A Reply to Sober’s ”Reply to Neander’British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (4): 583-587. 1995.
-
31Are homologies (selected effect or causal role) function free?Philosophy of Science 76 (3): 307-334. 2009.This article argues that at least very many judgments of homology rest on prior attributions of selected‐effect (SE) function, and that many of the “parts” of biological systems that are rightly classified as homologous are constituted by (are so classified in virtue of) their consequence etiologies. We claim that SE functions are often used in the prior identification of the parts deemed to be homologous and are often used to differentiate more restricted homologous kinds within less restricted…Read more
-
6The function of cognition: Godfrey-Smith's environmental complexity thesis (review)Biology and Philosophy 12 (4): 567-580. 1997.
-
1J. Haugeland: "Artificial Intelligence: The Very Idea" (review)Australasian Journal of Philosophy 66 (n/a): 269. 1988.
-
5. Content for Cognitive ScienceIn Graham Macdonald & David Papineau (eds.), Teleosemantics: New Philo-sophical Essays, Oxford: Clarendon Press. 2006.
-
43The teleological notion of 'function'Australasian Journal of Philosophy 69 (4). 1991.This Article does not have an abstract
-
17Solving the Circularity Problem for Functions: A Response to NanayJournal of Philosophy 109 (10): 613-622. 2012.
Durham, North Carolina, United States of America
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Biology |