Kariel Giarolo

O objetivo principal do presente artigo consiste em reconstruir e analisar a interpretação que Herbert Paul Grice faz da concepção aristotélica de eudaimonia, especialmente no livro Aspects of Reason. Aristóteles, na Ethica Nicomachea, afirma que o fim último do homem é a eudaimonia, felicidade, vida plena. Na literatura sobre Aristóteles, entretanto, não há acordo acerca de que tipo de fim é propriamente a eudaimonia, se um fim inclusivo ou dominante. Grice, em sua análise da problemática aristotélica, sustenta que eudaimonia é uma espécie de agregador de finalidades, um conjunto de fins. A partir disso, Grice sugere a construção de um sistema de fins, com características formais e metodológicas, que auxiliariam os indivíduos na realização da sua própria eudaimonia.

My main goal in this paper is to argue that the concept of rationality is central in Grice’s philosophy. Grice does not affirm this explicitly, but on several occasions throughout his work he indicates that rationality is a key concept, which enables both conversational practice and the development of philosophical theses. In order to show the importance of rationality to Grice, I will analyze his work according to three aspects: (i) logical and teleological; (ii) ethical and metaethical; and (iii) linguistic and pragmatic. In my view, in all three rationality is fundamental. Actually, a proper characterization of some of his philosophical discussions is only possible through this concept. Furthermore, I intend to show the relationships between rationality and other basic concepts in Grice. Keywords: Grice, rationality, values, pragmatics, constructivism.

The main goal of this paper is to discuss whether the so called supererogatory acts exist and, if they do, how can they be part of an ethical theory. A supererogatory act is considered as an action that is not obligatory, i.e. it may or may not be performed by an agent without that entailing a moral error. Heroic and holy deeds, traditionally, have been taken as examples of acts of this kind. My proposal is to defend the existence of these acts, although that does not imply that they are central within an ethical theory. The practice of a supererogatory act does not change the ethical status of those who performs it, since the act is not characterized as a duty. Supererogatory acts would be peripheral with respect to an ethical theory.

This paper has as main objective present and discuss Gottlob Frege critic to the attempt to define the concept of truth, especially, the attempt to define of truth as correspondence. The correspondence theories of truth sustain that truth can be defined in terms of correspondence between sentences, propositions or true thoughts and facts. However, in his posthumous writing Logic (1897) and, after, in The Thought (1918), Frege presents a severe critic to this kind of approach. He holds that truth is a basic, simple and sui generis concept, which cannot be defined. My paper will be divided in three parts: in the first part, I will present the doctrine that sustains the correspondence theories of truth and his main theses. In the second part, I will expose the arguments used by Frege in his critic; and in the third, and lastly part, I will discuss the Fregean thesis of the indefinability of truth