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132A Note on a Cold Case: Wittgenstein’s Allusion to a Fairy TaleGramarye (24): 29-34. 2023.Karl Pfeifer revisits Wittgenstein’s parenthetical allusion in the _Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus_ to the Grimms’ fairytale “The Golden Lads”, confirming that it does not work well as an illustration of the notion of “internal identity” that figures in Wittgenstein’s picture theory. He then proposes alternative ways of understanding the relationship of identity apparent in “The Golden Lads”.
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144This is the commentary on Richard C. Richards, "Humor and Happiness”, read at the Lighthearted Philosophers' Society 5th Annual Conference, 14 October 2011, Treasure Island, Florida.
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18Events, individuation, and identityDissertation, University of Calgary. 1980.Bibliography: p. 199-206.
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306Orgasm and artAcademic Voices 2021 18-20. 2021.Karl Pfeifer argues against the view that an aesthetic experience must be a uniquely special kind of experience by means of an analogy with sexual experiences. Nonetheless, he leaves open the possibility that some aesthetic experiences might still be of a special kind.
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257Boring Philosophy Professors, Streetwalkers, and the Joy of SexIn Kishor Vaidya (ed.), Teach Philosophy with a Sense of Humor: Why (and How to) Be a Funnier and More Effective Philosophy Teacher and Laugh All the Way to Your Classroom, The Curious Academic Publishing. 2021.Karl Pfeifer distinguishes between humor used extraneously in the delivery of philosophical content and humor intrinsic to the content itself: “Enlivening the delivery isn’t the same as enlivening the content of the delivery.” Using examples from topics in philosophy of mind and moral philosophy he illustrates how humor can be used to make certain ideas more engaging and memorable for students. He also gives an example of what to avoid.
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206What did Hecker say about laughter? Funny you should askIsraeli Journal of Humor Research 9 (2): 44-48. 2020.The Darwin-Hecker hypothesis, viz. that laughter induced by tickling and humor share common underlying mechanisms, is so-called in part because of a quotation attributed to Ewald Hecker. However, a German counterpart of the quotation does not appear in the location cited. Some textual sleuthing is undertaken to find out what Hecker actually wrote and where he wrote it.
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216The Modern Idea of History and its Value: An Introduction, by Chiel van den AkkerInternational Network for Theory of History. 2021.
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163Humour again [letter]Cogito 4 (1): 210. 1990.Several counterexamples are adduced against the view that surprise is an essential ingredient of humor.
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2Laughter and pleasureHumor: International Journal of Humor Research 7 (2): 157-172. 1994.Karl Pfeifer counters the thesis that laughter and pleasure are intimately connected with one another, and addresses the thesis of John Morreall (1982) that a pleasant psyohological shift is a causally necessary condition for laughter. A variety of examples suggesting that laughter does not have to have pleasure as its causal antecedent are presented. Imitative, nervous, hysterical, physiogenic, and acerbic laughter suggest that it is neither incoherent nor implausible to consider laughter as be…Read more
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1Mothering wordsHumor: International Journal of Humor Research 6 (2): 223-225. 1993.This is a response to Mark Turner’s claim that Saddam Hussein’s use of the phrase “mother of all battles” provoked the widespread use of the “mother of” idiom as a metaphorical association of motherhood with efficiency and power. I suggest a cruder, less salutary, but more plausible interpretation of that use.
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2044The Normative Significance of Flatulence: Aesthetics, Etiquette, and EthicsIAFOR Journal of Arts and Humanities 7 (1): 17-25. 2020.Proceeding on the basis of reports of a proposal in 2011 to criminalize public flatulence in Malawi, the normative significance of flatulence is considered from the respective standpoints of aesthetics, etiquette, and ethics, and it is indicated how aesthetics and etiquette may themselves also have ethical significance. It is concluded that etiquette and ethics may both require that certain violations of etiquette and ethics should sometimes be ignored.
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292Naïve PanentheismIn Godehard Brüntrup, Benedikt Paul Göcke & Ludwig Jaskolla (eds.), Panentheism and Panpsychism: Philosophy of Religion Meets Philosophy of Mind, Mentis. pp. 123-138. 2020.Karl Pfeifer attempts to present a coherent view of panentheism that eschews Pickwickian senses of “in” and aligns itself with, and builds upon, familiar diagrammed portrayals of panentheism. The account is accordingly spatial-locative and moreover accepts the proposal of R.T. Mullins that absolute space and time be regarded as attributes of God. In addition, however, it argues that a substantive parthood relation between the world and God is required. Pfeifer’s preferred version of panpsychism,…Read more
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79Pantheism as PanpsychismIn Andrei A. Buckareff & Yujin Nagasawa (eds.), Alternative Concepts of God: Essays on the Metaphysics of the Divine, Oxford University Press. pp. 41-49. 2016.This chapter suggests how certain problematic claims of pantheism might be made more intelligible. It shows, first, that some pantheistic God-talk is comparable to talk involving mass terms; treating “God” as a mass term affords us a way of understanding, for example, how parts can seemingly be identified with the wholes of which they are the parts, as per the claim that “God is everything and everything is God”. This chapter then goes on to describe a contemporary variant of panpsychism, a vari…Read more
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215From Locus Neoclassicus to Locus Rattus: Notes on Laughter, Comprehensiveness, and TitillationRes Cogitans 3 (1). 2006.Abstract. This paper illustrates how philosophy and science may converge and inform one another. I begin with a brief rehearsal of John Morreall’s “formulaic” theory of laughter, that laughter results from a pleasant psychological shift, and of my previously published criticisms and counterproposal that laughter results from titillation (where “titillation” is a semitechnical term). I defend my own position against charges that it is trivial, circular, or vacuous (charges that, if correct, woul…Read more
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33Searle, Strong AI, and Two Ways of Sorting CucumbersJournal of Philosophical Research 17 347-350. 1992.This paper defends Searle against the misconstrual of a key claim of “Minds, Brains, and Programs” and goes on to explain why an attempt to turn the tables by using the Chinese Room to argue for intentionality in computers fails.
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232Review – Mathematical Doodlings (review)Metapsychology Online Reviews 21 (45). 2017.A review of Geoffrey Marnell, Mathematical Doodlings: Curiosities, conjectures, and challenges.
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176Review of R. Wells Imre, Knowing and Caring: Philosophical Issues in Social Work. (review)Canada's Mental Health 32 19-20. 1984.
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160Chisholm on Psychological AttributesIn Roberto Casati & Barry Smith (eds.), Philosophy and Cognitive Sciences: Proceedings of the 16th International Wittgenstein Symposium (Kirchberg Am Wechsel, Austria 1993), Wien: Hölder-pichler-tempsky. pp. 413-417. 1994.What is it for an attribute to be psychological? One clever and inventive, albeit somewhat Byzantine answer to this vexing philosophical question has lately been proposed by Roderick M. Chisholm. Chisholm’s approach is to take a small number of technical philosophical notions as given and then employ these in a series of definitions which together yield an account of the psychological. I examine Chisholm’s account and show that it doesn’t work.
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231The Sudden, the Sudded, and the SidesplittingIn Kjell S. Johannessen & Tore Nordenstam (eds.), Culture and Value: Philosophy and the Cultural Sciences (Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society, Vol. 3, 1995), Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. pp. 224-232. 1995.
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5Chisholm on expressions for intentional relationsPhilosophical Studies 53 (1). 1988.THE PAPER IS A FOOTNOTE TO C B MARTIN AND KARL PFEIFER, "INTENTIONALITY AND THE NON-PSYCHOLOGICAL," "PHIL PHENOMENOL RES" 46 (1986) 531-554. A CHARACTERIZATION OF INTENTIONALITY NOT CONSIDERED THEREIN IS SHOWN, NONETHELESS, ALSO TO FAIL TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN INTENTIONAL STATES AND MERELY PHYSICAL CAUSAL CAPACITIES.
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78A Short Vindication of Reichenbach's «Event-Splitting»Logique Et Analyse 31 (121-122): 143-152. 1988.In "The Logical Form of Action Sentences" Donald Davidson argues that Hans Reichenbach's analysis of action and event sentences is "radically defective." I show that Reichenbach can easily deflect Davidson's objections, thus leaving their respective accounts largely comparable.
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19Intentionality and the non-psychologicalPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 46 (4): 531-54. 1986.IT IS SHOWN IN DETAIL THAT RECENT ACCOUNTS FAIL TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN INTENTIONALITY AND MERELY CAUSALLY DISPOSITIONAL STATES OF INORGANIC PHYSICAL OBJECTS—A QUICK ROAD TO PANPSYCHISM. THE CLEAR NEED TO MAKE SUCH A DISTINCTION GIVES DIRECTION FOR FUTURE WORK. A BEGINNING IS MADE TOWARD PROVIDING SUCH AN ACCOUNT.
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166Philosophy outside the academy: The role of philosophy in people-oriented professions and the prospects for philosophical counselingInquiry: Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines 14 (2): 58-69. 1994.I suggest that the current interest in philosophical counseling is comparable to the situation in the Sixties when many philosophy graduates entertained false hopes of nonacademic philosophical employment. I describe my own experience as a welfare worker, in the course of which my philosophical training proved useful in various ways; I maintain, though, that there was nothing especially philosophical in this. I then consider some ways in which philosophical counseling might be distinctively phil…Read more
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3A Note on the v-Elimination RuleCogito 4 (1): 69-70. 1990.The paper reports that the explanations of the v-elimination rule in three commonly used introductory logic textbooks are misleading to students and can result in invalid inferences.
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15Thomson on events and the causal criterionPhilosophical Studies 39 (3). 1981.JUDITH THOMSON, IN "ACTS AND OTHER EVENTS", PURPORTS TO PROVIDE A COUNTER-EXAMPLE TO DONALD DAVIDSON'S CAUSAL CRITERION OF EVENT IDENTITY. IT IS SHOWN THAT ONCE A CERTAIN ASSUMPTION MADE BY THOMSON IS REPLACED BY A MORE PLAUSIBLE VARIANT, HER EXAMPLE IS NO LONGER A COUNTER-EXAMPLE TO DAVIDSON'S CRITERION.
Wantirna South, VIC, Australia
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Mind |
Aesthetics |
Areas of Interest
Aesthetics |
Logic and Philosophy of Logic |
20th Century Philosophy |