Karol Milczarek

What does it tell us about the compatibility of freedom and determinism to recognize that, while acting freely, we typically have good reasons for whatever we are doing? More than it seems, I suppose. In this paper, it is argued that two well‐established accounts of human freedom—libertarianism and local miracle compatibilism—understate the connection between reasons and actions, leaving us only with the causal part of the explanation. This is so because on the basis of these views, a majority of alternate actions relevant for the ascription of the ability to do otherwise turn out to be either unreasonable or irrational. Hence, by denying that free agents possess an ability to do otherwise rationally, these accounts fail to provide an adequate characterization of free action. Then, it is shown that the necessary requirement of reasons‐responsiveness may be satisfied by the altered‐reasons analysis of the ability to do otherwise. This particular kind of multiple‐past compatibilism, while providing a plausible response to the incompatibilist argument, also corresponds to a version of conditional analysis that is resistant to the classical objections to desire‐, choice‐, or try‐based conditionalism.

What does it tell us about the compatibility of freedom and determinism to recognize that, while acting freely, we typically have good reasons for whatever we are doing? More than it seems, I suppose. In this paper, it is argued that two well‐established accounts of human freedom—libertarianism and local miracle compatibilism—understate the connection between reasons and actions, leaving us only with the causal part of the explanation. This is so because on the basis of these views, a majority of alternate actions relevant for the ascription of the ability to do otherwise turn out to be either unreasonable or irrational. Hence, by denying that free agents possess an ability to do otherwise rationally, these accounts fail to provide an adequate characterization of free action. Then, it is shown that the necessary requirement of reasons‐responsiveness may be satisfied by the altered‐reasons analysis of the ability to do otherwise. This particular kind of multiple‐past compatibilism, while providing a plausible response to the incompatibilist argument, also corresponds to a version of conditional analysis that is resistant to the classical objections to desire‐, choice‐, or try‐based conditionalism.

Artykuł stanowi omówienie dwóch ekwiwokacji istotnych dla analizy argumentacji Alfreda Melego w dyskusji o problemie słabości woli. Pierwsza, dotycząca pojęcia pragnienia (używanego albo w sensie ewaluacyjnym, albo motywacyjnym), pozwala amerykańskiemu filozofowi wykazać niepoprawność zarzutów wobec możliwości działania akratycznego. Druga, odnosząca się do pojęcia racjonalności (rozumianej albo jako opisywalność w kategoriach intencjonalnych, albo jako wewnętrzna spójność sprawcy), daje się zauważyć w samej argumentacji Melego. Ścisłe rozróżnienie obu dwuznaczności prowadzi do wniosku, że omawiana koncepcja nie jest podatna na zarzuty negujące możliwość działania ze słabej woli, ale też nie dostarcza wystarczających podstaw do uznania działań akratycznych za irracjonalne.