Karolina Kudlek

The compatibility of nudges with moral action and reasoning has become a focal point in philosophical discourse. While some argue that nudges may inhibit genuine moral responsiveness, others advocate their use to promote morally desirable outcomes, particularly in other-regarding contexts. This paper assesses whether other-regarding nudges are compatible with, and could contribute to moral progress, as conceived by moral and political philosophers. We contend that other-regarding nudges can be compatible with moral progress when they facilitate and reinforce a morally desirable social norm or help overturn a morally undesirable social norm, specifically when they (1) induce improvements in moral behavior, while (2) not worsening the quality of our moral reasoning or our moral beliefs as they were prior to the intervention. For nudges to achieve this, they must be easy to resist, they should not obfuscate moral reasons for action, and they should help individuals in saving up limited cognitive bandwidth. Our account of the moral progressiveness of nudging has three key strengths: it aligns with less stringent views on moral worth, complements accounts of moral progress emphasizing the insufficiency of moral reasoning, and mitigates stability concerns by anchoring nudges in desirable social norms. By demonstrating how heuristics-triggering nudges can facilitate moral progress, we offer a framework that reconciles their practical effectiveness with the demands of moral philosophy.

Moral progress is often modeled as an increase in moral knowledge and understanding, with achievements in moral reasoning seen as key drivers of progressive moral change. Contemporary discussion recognizes two (rival) accounts: knowledge-based and understanding-based theories of moral progress, with the latter recently contended as superior (Severini 2021). In this article, we challenge the alleged superiority of understanding-based accounts by conducting a comparative analysis of the theoretical advantages and disadvantages of both approaches. We assess them based on their potential to meet the following criteria: (i) moral progress must be possible despite evolutionary and epistemic constraints on moral reasoning; (ii) it should be epistemically achievable to ordinary moral agents; and (iii) it should be explainable via doxastic change. Our analysis suggests that both accounts are roughly equally plausible, but knowledge-based accounts are slightly less demanding and more effective at explaining doxastic change. Therefore, contrary to the prevailing view, we find knowledge-based accounts of moral progress more promising.

Considering public moral attitudes is a hallmark of the anticipatory governance of emerging biotechnologies, such as heritable human genome editing. However, such anticipatory governance often overlooks that future morality is open to change and that future generations may perform different moral assessments on the very biotechnologies we are trying to govern in the present. In this article, we identify an ’anticipatory gap’ that has not been sufficiently addressed in the discussion on the public governance of heritable genome editing, namely, uncertainty about the moral visions of future generations about the emerging applications that we are currently attempting to govern now. This paper motivates the relevance of this anticipatory gap, identifying the challenges it generates and offering various recommendations so that moral uncertainty does not lead to governance paralysis with regard to human germline genome editing.

The discussion about human enhancement technologies has primarily focused on exchanging views about the dangers and benefits of these interventions. However, the debate could benefit from a systematic attempt to move beyond pro et contra exchange. Thus, in this paper, I analyze key issues in the human enhancement debate, and I outline a set of methodological guidelines that could help to progress future research. I propose that we should pay special attention to the following conditions: (i) whether a particular enhancement project is plausibly coherent, feasible, and effective; (ii) whether it conflicts with fundamental moral values and norms; and (iii) whether it is compatible with or promotes socio-political goals of equality and justice. This approach should help us minimize normative ambiguity and facilitate the moral assessment of different enhancements and their particular applications.

The ongoing debate about moral bioenhancement has been exceptionally stimulating, but it is defined by extreme polarization and lack of consensus about any relevant aspect of MBE. This article reviews the discussion on MBE, showing that a lack of consensus about enhancements’ desirable features and the constant development of the debate calls for a more rigorous ethical analysis. I identify a list of factors that may be of crucial importance for illuminating the matters of moral permissibility in the MBE debate and which could help us move beyond the current lack of consensus. More precisely, I propose three important theoretical and normative standards that MBE should satisfy if we wish to mitigate the concerns about its utter impermissibility. Systematically assessing MBE interventions across the presented categories should provide valuable conclusions about its theoretical soundness and feasibility, its compatibility with fundamental moral norms, and its compatibility with or facilitation of socio-political goals of equality and justice.

Moral bioenhancement (MBE) is often associated with a consequentialist, especially utilitarian, framework, owing to its capacity to prevent great harm and motivate acts in accordance with basic moral principles such us universal impartial altruism or benevolence. However, it remains unclear whether we could de facto justify MBE on utilitarian grounds. This article examines whether there is a plausible utilitarian case for MBE and what the obstacles for justifying MBE on utilitarian grounds could be. More specifically, it explores the relationship between MBE and basic utilitarian principles, as well as its effects on utilitarian moral judgment. It seems that MBE could modify moral agents in ways that would accord with the main utilitarian demands and facilitate the adoption and realization of utilitarian prescriptions. Although MBE would, in principle, create preconditions for achieving utilitarian ends, I argue that there are certain limits to this claim. I identify and elaborate several ways in which MBE could undermine utilitarian moral judgment.

A pertinent concern in the human enhancement debate is that human enhancement technologies (HET) are intrinsically bad and, hence, morally impermissible. This article evaluates the related claims about the intrinsic badness of HET by looking into philosophical theories of intrinsic value. It investigates how well-established conceptions of intrinsic value map onto typical bioconservative arguments about HET's intrinsic badness. Three predominant variants of these arguments are explored and found wanting: (i) HET are intrinsically bad owing to their unnaturalness; (ii) the pursuit of HET reveals intrinsically bad character (“the desire for mastery”); and (iii) HET will necessarily undermine intrinsically valuable things (e.g., human dignity). My analysis shows that the debate on intrinsic value places serious constraints on claims about the intrinsic badness of HET. More specifically, the analysis shows that bioconservative arguments are, for the most part, inconsistent, misconceived, and overly speculative. Enhancement interventions cannot be bearers of intrinsic value on any of its plausible understandings, and, even if we could grant such a possibility, there are no compelling reasons to presume that the intrinsic value of HET would be necessarily negative. As a result, claims regarding their moral impermissibility are unwarranted.

This paper aims to analyze technical and internal aspects of one particular type of human moral enhancement, i.e. enhancement of moral motivation via direct emotion modulation. More precisely, it challenges the assumption that modifying certain emotions will have the results desired by the advocates of this theory. It is argued that neuropsychological understanding of the role and function of emotions, as well as of underlying cognitive mechanisms, might be relevant for the discussion about biomedical enhancement of moral capacities. Moreover, typical claims about direct emotion modulation seem to be contradicted, or at least seriously challenged, by available neuroscientific data. Particular attention is paid to the theory that emotions are evolved and functionally specialized programs whose task is to coordinate other adaptive mechanisms of human psychology in order to promote one’s fitness. If this view of emotions is plausible, it can be argued that several difficulties for moral bioenhancement theory ensue. Neuroscientific and evolutionary-psychological perspective seem to indicate that emotions don’t fulfill necessary requirements to serve as the vehicles of moral enhancement and it should, therefore, take into account role and function of entire cognitive modules associated with moral decision-making.