Karolina Wisniewska

Policies designed to promote diversity have become increasingly widespread in recent years, but have also been subject to significant criticism and backlash. Determining whether and when these policies are appropriate requires clarity regarding the purported value of diversity. Unfortunately, much of the discourse about the value of diversity, in both scholarship and the public sphere, is confused. We argue that a major reason for this confusion is overreliance on the “business case” for diversity, the idea that diversity gets you better outcomes. The business case’s popularity stems not from its ability to justify diversity policies independently from other considerations—something it cannot do—but rather from legal endorsement of diversity rationales for policies such as affirmative action. We clarify what the business case can and cannot show, and suggest more promising routes forward for thinking about the value of diversity.

When selecting between applicants for a job, when and how should we take into account the reactions that they elicit from others? On one hand, applicants’ “reaction qualifications” often speak to their merit, in which case we seem required to consider them. On the other hand, others’ reactions are often rooted in prejudicial attitudes, in which case considering reaction qualifications can make the hiring process prejudicial. According to a popular view, we should refrain from considering reaction qualifications just in case there are weighty moral reasons against doing so. I argue that this morality-based approach fails. Instead, we should refrain from considering reaction qualifications just in case considering them would render a selection procedure non-transparent or discriminatory. If consideration of a reaction qualification would have either effect, the reaction qualification does not confer merit and so should not be considered by selectors.