Kasra Abdavi-Azar

Though largely a silent observer throughout his Vitae philosophorum, Diogenes Laertius comes to the fore in his proem to refute the popular belief in a barbarian origin of philosophy. This study examines his defencecum-critique in detail and offers some reflections on its sources and intended audience. It will be argued that Diogenes employs four distinct and partly incompatible arguments to counter sentiments that ultimately can be traced back to the Old Academy and early Peripatos but by Diogenes’ time had gained widespread circulation among Stoics and Platonists as well as Jews and Christians. The analysis thus reshapes our perception of Diogenes by showing that he consciously positioned himself within a controversial discourse, not only by relating the views of others but by advancing his own convictions with novel arguments.

In the proem to his Platonic Theology, Proclus appropriates the language of mystery rites to cast Plato as a divinely inspired hierophant to whom absolute epistemic authority should be accorded. He thus elevates Plato’s philosophical teachings to the status of revealed truth and legitimises his own exegetical endeavour as a divine concern. Proclus further extends such authority to a carefully curated network of like-minded Platonist exegetes, among whom he subtly positions himself and his teacher Syrianus. Through a detailed analysis of the proem, this study explores how Proclus construes the history of Platonic succession by embedding it within a broader account of both the history of theological truth and divine revelation.

This paper proposes a taxonomy to systematise the diverse ways in which Platonists appropriated foreign concepts and terminology. Through a case study, it demonstrates that Platonists did not merely replicate foreign notions but rather assimilated them into their own framework. It argues that such appropriations were justified from a Platonist perspective. Platonists accorded absolute epistemic authority to Plato, and they hence conceived of all truthful beliefs as inherently Platonic, whether in nature or origin.

According to the prevalent scholarly opinion, Eudorus of Alexandria supposes two interrelated levels within the same metaphysical hierarchy: one transcendent principle (to hen) at the highest level and two opposing principles (monas and aoristos dyas) at the subjacent level. This paper presents an alternative interpretation, arguing that Eudorus’ report, in fact, involves two different explanations regarding the first principle(s): one strictly monistic and the other dualistic. Eudorus holds the former approach (the so-called highest teaching, which is particularly influenced by Platonic henotheism) to represent the pinnacle of Pythagorean metaphysics according to which the latter, secondary teaching ought to be construed. In the final analysis, interpreting dualism through the lens of henology results in a somewhat idiosyncratic yet Pythagoreanising account of a Monad and Dyad that are, if understood as principle, identical to the One.

In the course of examining the origin of evil in the De malorum subsistentia, Proclus reproduces a position that considers the maleficent (world-)soul as cause of evil. The same entity is held to co-govern the material realm alongside the beneficent world-soul. While scholarship tends to associate the testimonium with Plutarch (and Atticus), this survey shows why Numenius of Apamea is a much more probable candidate. The discussion concludes with further proposals for a new edition of Numenius, including possible traces of Numenius in Iamblichus’ On Soul and Porphyry's On the Faculties of Soul.