•  49
    Extended mental features
    In Matteo Colombo, Elizabeth Irvine & Mog Stapleton (eds.), Andy Clark and his Critics, Oxford University Press. pp. 44-55. 2019.
    The focus of the original argument for the Extended Mind thesis was the case of beliefs. It may be asked what other types of mental features can be extended. Andy Clark has always held that consciousness cannot be extended. This paper revisits the question of extending consciousness.
  •  123
    Know-how and non-propositional intentionality
    In Alex Grzankowski & Michelle Montague (eds.), Non-Propositional Intentionality. pp. 95-113. forthcoming.
    This paper investigates the question of whether know-how can be regarded as a form of non-propositional intentionality.
  • Tőzsér János könyvéről (review)
    Magyar Filozofiai Szemle 3. 2001.
  •  291
    Constructing a World for the Senses
    In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Phenomenal Intentionality, Oxford University Press. pp. 99-115. 2013.
    It is an integral part of the phenomenology of mature perceptual experience that it seems to present to us an experience-independent world. I shall call this feature 'perceptual intentionality'. In this paper, I argue that perceptual intentionality is constructed by the structure of more basic sensory features, features that are not intentional themselves. This theory can explain why the same sensory feature can figure both in presentational and non-presentational experiences. There is a fundame…Read more
  •  671
    Know-wh does not reduce to know that
    American Philosophical Quarterly 53 (2): 109-122. 2016.
    Know -wh ascriptions are ubiquitous in many languages. One standard analysis of know -wh is this: someone knows-wh just in case she knows that p, where p is an answer to the question included in the wh-clause. Additional conditions have also been proposed, but virtually all analyses assume that propositional knowledge of an answer is at least a necessary condition for knowledge-wh. This paper challenges this assumption, by arguing that there are cases where we have knowledge-wh without knowledge…Read more
  •  217
    Indiscriminability and the sameness of appearance
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 106 (2): 39-59. 2006.
    Abstract: How exactly should the relation between a veridical perception and a corresponding hallucination be understood? I argue that the epistemic notion of ‘indiscriminability’, understood as lacking evidence for the distinctness of things, is not suitable for defining this relation. Instead, we should say that a hallucination and a veridical perception involve the same phenomenal properties. This has further consequences for attempts to give necessary and sufficient conditions for the identi…Read more
  •  1498
    A sense of reality
    In Fiona MacPherson & Dimitris Platchias (eds.), Hallucinations, Mit Press. pp. 399-417. 2014.
    Hallucinations occur in a wide range of organic and psychological disorders, as well as in a small percentage of the normal population According to usual definitions in psychology and psychiatry, hallucinations are sensory experiences which present things that are not there, but are nonetheless accompanied by a powerful sense of reality. As Richard Bentall puts it, “the illusion of reality ... is the sine qua non of all hallucinatory experiences” (Bentall 1990: 82). The aim of this paper is to f…Read more
  •  1308
    Two Versions of the Extended Mind Thesis
    Philosophia 40 (3): 435-447. 2012.
    According to the Extended Mind thesis, the mind extends beyond the skull or the skin: mental processes can constitutively include external devices, like a computer or a notebook. The Extended Mind thesis has drawn both support and criticism. However, most discussions—including those by its original defenders, Andy Clark and David Chalmers—fail to distinguish between two very different interpretations of this thesis. The first version claims that the physical basis of mental features can be locat…Read more
  •  203
    Does twin earth rest on a mistake?
    Croatian Journal of Philosophy 3 (8): 155-169. 2003.
    In this paper I argue against Twin-Earth externalism. The mistake that Twin Earth arguments rest on is the failure to appreciate the force of the following dilemma. Some features of things around us do matter for the purposes of conceptual classification, and others do not. The most plausible way to draw this distinction is to see whether a certain feature enters the cognitive perspective of the experiencing subject in relation to the kind in question or not. If it does, we can trace conceptual …Read more
  •  324
    Practical Know‐Wh
    Noûs 51 (4): 855-870. 2017.
    The central and paradigmatic cases of knowledge discussed in philosophy involve the possession of truth. Is there in addition a distinct type of practical knowledge, which does not aim at the truth? This question is often approached through asking whether states attributed by “know-how” locutions are distinct from states attributed by “know-that”. This paper argues that the question of practical knowledge can be raised not only about some cases of “know-how” attributions, but also about some cas…Read more
  •  118
    The Subject's Point of View
    Oxford University Press. 2008.
    Descartes's philosophy has had a considerable influence on the modern conception of the mind, but many think that this influence has been largely negative. The main project of The Subject's Point of View is to argue that discarding certain elements of the Cartesian conception would be much more difficult than critics seem to allow, since it is tied to our understanding of basic notions, including the criteria for what makes someone a person, or one of us. The crucial feature of the Cartesian vie…Read more
  •  365
    Independent intentional objects
    In Tadeusz Czarnecki, Katarzyna Kijanija-Placek, Olga Poller & Jan Wolenski (eds.), The Analytical Way, College Publications. 2010.
    Intentionality is customarily characterised as the mind’s direction upon its objects. This characterisation allows for a number of different conceptions of intentionality, depending on what we believe about the nature of the objects or the nature of the direction. Different conceptions of intentionality may result in classifying sensory experience as intentional and nonintentional in different ways. In the first part of this paper, I present a certain view or variety of intentionality which is b…Read more
  • Bölcselet és Analízis
    with Imre Orthmayr
    . 2003.
  •  330
    What is externalism?
    Philosophical Studies 112 (3): 187-208. 2003.
    The content of the externalist thesis about the mind depends crucially on how we define the distinction between the internal and the external. According to the usual understanding, the boundary between the internal and the external is the skull or the skin of the subject. In this paper I argue that the usual understanding is inadequate, and that only the new understanding of the external/internal distinction I suggest helps us to understand the issue of the compatibility of externalism and privi…Read more
  •  109
  • Elhunyt David Lewis
    Magyar Filozofiai Szemle 1. 2001.
  •  582
    Which Causes of an Experience are also Objects of the Experience?
    with Tomasz Budek
    In Berit Brogaard (ed.), Does Perception Have Content?, Oxford University Press. pp. 351-370. 2014.
    It is part of the phenomenology of perceptual experiences that objects seem to be presented to us. The first guide to objects is their perceptual presence. Further reflection shows that we take the objects of our perceptual experiences to be among the causes of our experiences. However, not all causes of the experience are also objects of the experience. This raises the question indicated in the title of this paper. We argue that taking phenomenal presence as the guide to the objects of percepti…Read more
  •  148
    Time, tense, truth
    Synthese 160 (2). 2008.
    Abstract: A theory of time is a theory of the nature of temporal reality, and temporal reality determines the truth-value of temporal sentences. Therefore it is reasonable to ask how a theory of time can account for the way the truth of temporal sentences is determined. This poses certain challenges for both the A theory and the B theory of time. In this paper, I outline an account of temporal sentences. The key feature of the account is that the primary bearers of truth-values are not utterance…Read more
  •  188
    Not every feeling is intentional
    European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 5 (2). 2009.
  •  451
    Belief May Not Be a Necessary Condition for Knowledge
    Erkenntnis 80 (1): 185-200. 2015.
    Most discussions in epistemology assume that believing that p is a necessary condition for knowing that p. In this paper, I will present some considerations that put this view into doubt. The candidate cases for knowledge without belief are the kind of cases that are usually used to argue for the so-called ‘extended mind’ thesis
  •  624
    Semantic internalism and externalism
    In Ernest Lepore & Barry C. Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language, Oxford University Press. pp. 323. 2006.
    Abstract: This paper introduces and analyses the doctrine of externalism about semantic content; discusses the Twin Earth argument for externalism and the assumptions behind it, and examines the question of whether externalism about content is compatible with a privileged knowledge of meanings and mental contents
  •  11
    Foreword
    European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 2 (1): 5-6. 2006.
  •  12
    Metaphysics: A Guide and Anthology (edited book)
    with Tim Crane
    Oxford University Press. 2004.
    A complete and self-contained introduction to metaphysics, this anthology provides an extensive and varied collection of fifty-four of the best classical and contemporary readings on the subject. The readings are organized into ten sections: God, idealism and realism, being, universals and particulars, necessity and contingency, causation, space and time, identity, mind and body, and freewill and determinism. It features a substantial general introduction and detailed section introductions that …Read more
  •  85
    The Unity of Descartes's Thought
    History of Philosophy Quarterly 22 (1). 2005.
    Abstract: On several occasions (see e.g. Principles I/48) Descartes claims that sensations, emotions, imagination and sensory perceptions belong neither to the mind or to the body alone, but rather to their union. This seems to conflict with Descartes’s definition of “thought” given elsewhere, which classifies the same events as modes of a thinking substance, and hence depending for their existence only on minds. In this paper I offer an interpretation, which, I hope, will restore the coherence …Read more
  •  1253
    Phenomenal intentionality without compromise
    The Monist 91 (2): 273-93. 2008.
    In recent years, several philosophers have defended the idea of phenomenal intentionality : the intrinsic directedness of certain conscious mental events which is inseparable from these events’ phenomenal character. On this conception, phenomenology is usually conceived as narrow, that is, as supervening on the internal states of subjects, and hence phenomenal intentionality is a form of narrow intentionality. However, defenders of this idea usually maintain that there is another kind of, extern…Read more