Katarina Pitasse Fragoso

Amartya Sen has argued that poverty means much more than lacking income: it means that a person falls short of securing a basic level of capabilities. His main justification for this claim is that we need to look at what is important in a person's life (what a person's actual functionings are, and what alternative outcomes could be achieved), rather than just at what a person has. In this article, I argue that, although Sen's conceptualisation expands our understanding of poverty, it can limit us when evaluating what is wrong with poverty. Conceptualising poverty in a diverse and unequal society rather requires a broader perspective, one capable of including an explicitly relational approach, group-based analysis, and a socio-structural lens. Otherwise, we miss the fundamental role played by systematic oppression in the context of poverty. In developing these ideas, my aim is to update the picture of poverty as capability deprivation.

ver the last few years, there has been an increase in discussions advocating in-cash programmes as a way to alleviate poverty. Indeed, this represents a leap forward in comparison to in-kind programmes. However, little progress, at least in developing countries, has been achieved in answering the question of how the state should transfer the means of redressing deprivation to those who are living in poverty. This article addresses this issue by challenging anti-poverty programmes through a social-egalitarian framework. My main argument starts from the perspective that in-cash transfers are a necessary but not sufficient mechanism for poverty alleviation. I acknowledge that cash alone does not guarantee the poor an equally active role in influencing the public-policy decisions that affect their lives. I then suggest a participatory device to complement the cash-transfer proposal in order to give institutiona.

Deliberative scholars have suggested that citizens should be able to exchange arguments in public forums. A key element in this exchange is the rational mode of communication, which means speaking through objective argumentation. However, some feminists argue that this mode of communication may create or intensify epistemic injustices. Furthermore, we should not assume that everyone is equally equipped to take part in deliberation. Certain groups, such as Indigenous peoples, for instance, who may not be versed in rational forms of argumentation, may not be listened to or involved sufficiently in the deliberative process. Therefore, it seems we need an alternative mode of communication, such as storytelling, which is a first-person or collective narrative. Given this, how should we pursue this goal? This article aims to answer this question by analysing a local conflict involving an Indigenous tribe and a neighbouring community in Brazil and exploring the underlying testimonial and hermeneutical injustices. I argue that storytelling has an important normative and institutional role in public deliberation and show that its applied version could overcome epistemic injustices and lead to better public policies.

In this chapter, we provide a normative analysis of the relational dimension of poverty, that is, an account that is concerned with certain patterns of social and political relations amongst poor and non-poor individuals. While a relational dimension of poverty has been increasingly acknowledged in the literature, many share an underdeveloped notion of what exactly this means. One plausible way to develop it is by analysing the inferior social position held by poverty-stricken individuals in terms of an increased risk of being dominated by others and of a systematic lack of esteem. In this understanding, the agency of an impoverished individual is undermined at both the individual and institutional level, divesting those in poverty of the full capacity to make important decisions affecting their lives. In this vein, first, we will argue that this understanding hints at the possibility of recognising the agency of impoverished individuals by rethinking the way we design public policies to alleviate poverty. Second, that a deliberative strategy is a promising way for redressing the relational dimension of poverty by considering the poor as full citizens with power to make important decisions, capable of speaking by and for themselves and of making joint decisions with policy-makers on what should be done to alleviate poverty.

Measurements of poverty generally rely upon assessments made of the situation of the household. Children are currently omitted from direct measurements of poverty: their situation is assessed indirectly by taking the household as the unit of analysis. According to these assessments, when family income or levels of deprivation are below a given poverty line, every member is considered poor. In this chapter, I argue that poverty should not only be measured using such a general assessment. A measurement of poverty should consider children as being part of the population and take into account individual differences in levels of deprivation, varying needs and interests. I will argue, first, that measurements of poverty should take universal and individual approach in order to include representative groups and to reflect intra-household distributions of deprivation that especially affect children. Second, not only should children’s individual conditions be measured, but their voices should be included in the assessment as well. Based on this idea, my ambition is to provide two philosophical arguments to justify why we should consider the situation of children in measurements of poverty. I suggest, finally, some recommendations for and directions towards a participative child-based measurement with storytelling.

Cities are large and densely populated areas, a fact that can influence how individuals relate to each other. However, the intensity and dynamism of cities make them a site for particular kinds of divisions, which may produce inequalities. This is visible through residential segregation, which is the territorial division of groups into largely homogeneous areas correlated with socio-economic disparities and individuals’ negative perceptions of otherness. At the very least, residential segregation delimits what some can get from cities in terms of accessing resources and respectful treatment. According to Elizabeth Anderson, it is necessary from a normative perspective to remedy residential segregation with integration. Drawing on her approach, I put forward a relational egalitarian diagnosis, as well as an integrationist project, to help foster mutual respect between city dwellers. In order to operationalise this normative demand, but in a way distinct from Anderson’s project, I explore what is lost when integration focuses only on physical changes, overlooking role divisions in cities and a fair participatory process for achieving equality.