Katarzyna Kobos

This study aims to bring out the explanatory potential of embodied predictionism versus passive feed-forward model of sensory stimulation in the pursuit of a parsimonious naturalist account of sensation as a salient feature and an end point of conscious experience. Theoretical approaches towards sensory experience are tested against specific scenarios of the absence of observable or palpable qualities including but not limited to the thought-experimental phenomenon of negative synesthesia at the conclusion of the argument. . Predictionism is first explored in its own right only to be found insufficient to do justice to the actual mechanism behind full-blown immediate perception. A case is made for the soundness of predictionism reconciled with the doctrine of embodiment.

In the article herein I address the issue of the non-reductive functionalist stance devised by David Chalmers and advocated by him in his 1995 paper entitled "Absent Qualia, Fading Qualia, Dancing Qualia". I attend to the argument provided in support of the thesis. The argument takes on the guise of neuron-to-silicon-chip switch thought experiment that involves two alternative-end scenarios of phenomenal consciousness, i.e. qualia, either gradually fading away as silicon chips prevail over neurons in the brain or disappearing abruptly with the removal of a single consecutive neuron and its replacement with a silicon chip. I comply with the main thrust of Charmers' account on the origin of phenomenal consciousness to the effect that it is the functional structure of the material bearer of mental faculties rather than the type of material that warrants the emergence of consciousness. Yet I find fault with certain features of Charmers' reasoning. My main criticism refers to the pivotal notion of functional structure that remains an abstract and requires substantiation. The attempt to trace the fact of having sensations and being aware of them back to an entity that is only hinted at and nowhere to be found within the neurophysiological, cognitive or biological domain falls short of a sound explanation. Thus I develop Charmers' line of argument further to specify an adequate and exhaustive characteristic of the said functional structure. I suggest that, apart from the usual aspects attributive of ordinary functional structure which is considered in terms of input, output and the algorithmic operations in-between, "graininess" should also be discerned. A functional structure eligible for inducing conscious sensations should be sufficiently subtle or, in other words, complex