Kate Nicole Hoffman

Although mental disorder categories were originally developed to explain and predict human psychology and behavior, in certain cases, namely, in cases involving animal caregiving and welfare, these categories have been extended to animal minds. This is in tension with the views of the majority of the scientific community, which tends towards skepticism about the utilization of mental health categories in non-human cases. This paper considers the feasibility of applying mental disorder categories to animals, and explores why different fields have drawn different conclusions on the matter. Using a comparison between human obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) and animal stereotypic behavior, and drawing on literature in psychiatry, philosophy of science, animal models, and philosophy of disability, I explore the various considerations relevant to whether and how mental disorders can be attributed to cases of abnormal animal behavior.

Life cycle diagrams are ubiquitous in a variety of scientific materials, ranging from introductory biology textbooks to professional publications. These diagrams typically depict stages of a particular organism’s life connected by arrows, such as, for a frog: egg(s) → embryo → tadpole → tadpole with two legs → tadpole with four legs → young frog → adult frog → egg(s). In this paper, we present a critique of this sort of life cycle diagram, drawing on both metaphysics and epistemology of science. We suggest that these diagrams do not accurately represent an organism’s life stages, its reproduction, or species persistence. These misrepresentations have implications for scientific reasoning, explanatory efficacy, as well as pedagogical efficacy. To address the shortcomings of these diagrams, we propose a new kind of diagram which we call the life spiral diagram. The life spiral diagram more accurately reflects an organism’s life stages, its reproduction, as well as species persistence. Thus, the life spiral diagram better aids scientific reasoning, explanations of life processes, and learning.

An influential heuristic for thinking about climate adaptation asserts that “natural” adaptation strategies are the best ones. This heuristic has been roundly criticized but is difficult to dislodge in the absence of an alternative. We introduce a new heuristic that assesses adaptation strategies by looking at their maturity, power, and commitment. Maturity is the extent to which we understand an adaptation strategy’s effects. Power is the size of the effect an adaptation strategy will have. Commitment is the degree to which an adaptation strategy is difficult to test or reverse.

Nature-based solutions (NbS) have in recent years occupied a central position in conservation and climate discussions among both scientists and policy makers. NbS generally refer to a set of strategies which use nature, or natural objects, to address societal (human) issues while simultaneously supporting the broader environment. This paper examines the concept of NbS to determine whether it is a useful and well-motivated category to guide future climate and conservation efforts. I argue that NbS may in fact be a valuable contribution to environmental thought and policy, but not for the reasons that they are typically thought to be. Specifically: while we have reason to doubt that NbS should be prioritized over other environmental strategies on the grounds that they are uniquely environmentally-friendly or supportive of biodiversity, they may nevertheless have an advantage insofar as they play a vital aesthetic role in developing a healthier relationship between humans and the nonhuman world.

Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder is a mental health condition in which the experience of a traumatic event causes a series of psychiatric and behavioral symptoms such as hypervigilance, insomnia, irritability, aggression, constricted affect, and self-destructive behavior. This paper investigates two case studies to argue that the experience of PTSD is not restricted to humans alone; we have good epistemic reason to hold that some animals can experience genuine PTSD, given our current and best clinical understanding of the disorder in humans. I will use this evidence to argue for two claims. First, because the causal structure of PTSD plausibly requires reference to a traumatic conscious experience in order to explain subsequent behaviors, the fact that animals can have PTSD provides new evidence for animal consciousness. Second, the discovery of PTSD in animals puts pressure on accounts which hold that animal behavior can be fully explained without reference to subjective experience.