Kate Yuan

In this article, we explore how to engage with the work of ethicists facing public allegations of professional sexual misconduct. Rather than disengaging or proceeding as usual, we propose citing their work alongside impartial information about credible allegations. We choose to isolate the work of ethicists as the target of this proposal because ethicists are distinct on two fronts: they are distinct among philosophers because they have moral authority, and distinct among others with moral authority, such as religious leaders and civil rights activists, because their power is reproduced in part through citations. Our approach offers a nuanced perspective on the power conferred through citations. We argue that individual scholars have a moral and intellectual responsibility to cite using this practice, especially when institutional enforcement of justice is lacking.

It has often been argued that charitable donations are not a sufficient response to global poverty; individuals need to address structural injustice. Proponents of the Effective Altruism (EA) movement have raised two main problems with this focus on structural injustice. In this paper, we respond to these concerns. The first problem raised by EA proponents is that focusing on structural injustice absolves individuals of any responsibility other than political ones. In response, we argue that discharging this duty requires more commitment than EA defenders think, and we do so by framing individual responsibility in global structural injustice through the lens of Robin Zheng’s Role-Ideal Model (RIM). The second response given by EA proponents is that a focus on structural injustice does not provide concrete ways for any given individual to discharge such duties. To address this worry, we argue that RIM can be complemented with the Rawlsian account of moral maturation. This new framework makes it clear how individuals can form the right concept of justice and become responsible citizens who act in accordance with RIM.

Pogge’s 2006 framework of global justice can be adapted for individual agents or collective unilateral donations in the same way Singer’s framework has been. I do so by amending Pogge’s institutional principles for international human rights NGOs and by adding two further principles to address challenges that arise when his framework is applied. This adapted framework enjoins donors to make principled philanthropic decisions that prioritize existing and near-term suffering, while also rectifying their part in causing this suffering. It makes Pogge’s negative duty account easier to implement than his previous proposal, and provides well-off individuals with an alternative to Effective Altruism.