Katerina Bantinaki

Abstract:In Book X of the Republic, Plato develops a structured criticism of the images of painting in order to denigrate, by means of analogy, the cognitive value of poetry. Yet Plato persistently employs verbal images at points of utmost importance with regard to his philosophical aims. In the face of Plato’s critique of the image, his methodic use of images can seem paradoxical: critique and method point in opposing directions with regard to the cognitive value of the image. The aim of this article is to promote a moderate cognitivist stance on Plato’s use of verbal images, using to this end the understanding that contemporary philosophy affords us. Operating through the lens of the metaphor of “philosophical paintings,” which they deem as apt and instructive, the authors (a) trace in Book X’s critique of painting the specific properties of the verbal images that can allow a cognitive function in the context of philosophical instruction, (b) examine and refute a pertinent objection to this moderate cognitivist stance, and (c) argue for the overall consistency between the critique of Book X and Plato’s use of verbal images, drawing on evidence in Plato’s practice that he acknowledges the risk of the image’s allure and is proactive in relation to this risk.

A specific type of collaboration has become prevalent in contemporary art: in this type of collaboration—henceforth, commissioning—an artist assigns the production of the work of art to skilled craftsmen or unskilled workers, directing their labor through instructions or blueprints. Commissioning has been accepted by the art world as a legitimate mode of artistic production—legitimate in the sense that it does not undermine the authenticity of the work as a creation of the artist, even if she has not laid a hand for its production. Moreover, commissioning seems to be regarded as irrelevant to the nature of the work of art—specifically, to its artistic properties—and, thus, to its proper appreciation, as is..

Philosophical Perspectives on Art is a collection of sixteen articles on the philosophy of art that Stephen Davies published between 1984 and 2006. The book consists of two parts that focus, in turn, on the nature of art and on meaning and interpretation. Although there is unavoidably some overlap between the different chapters, the book is remarkable in its scope, engaging with all the central questions in the philosophy of art in a thorough, coherent and far-reaching manner.The category of art that is under analysis in the first part, is, as Davies explains, one that crosses the boundaries between the natural and the humanly invented and, further, escapes the confines of Western fine art to encompass, for instance, folk or pre-18th century Western art, as well as the art production of non-Western cultures.An all-inclusive category of art, however, sets two challenges for a comprehensive theory of art: on the one hand, with such a wide and varied token …

The focus of this paper is on E. H. Gombrich's claim that pictorial perception is a case of illusion. My aim is to point out that, on the one hand, the interpretation of this claim that is widely accepted in pictorial theory is not supported by Gombrich's analysis of pictorial perception; and, on the other hand, that the interpretation of the claim that I see as more compatible with Gombrich's analysis is not consistent with relevant facts about our relation to pictures. However, I will argue, Gombrich's elaboration of the claim of illusion is significant to the extent that it highlights important aspects of the system of pictorial representation.

The aim in this chapter is to provide an intelligible conception of the notion of twofoldness that Richard Wollheim has used in his account of seeing‐in in order to describe the phenomenological character of pictorial seeing or pictorial experience. To this end, it draws on Aristotle's doctrine of the unity of matter and form in compound substances as this is expounded mainly in his _Metaphysics_. It then explains how Aristotle's account of this unity may give us a way to think of the complex content of a twofold act of pictorial perception, in a way that allows us to account for properties that Wollheim attributed to pictorial experience, and further, to resolve objections raised to the idea that pictorial seeing is twofold.