Kateřina Lochmanová

This paper examines the natural philosophy of the German philosopher Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz with regard to his ability to apply theoretical reflections in the contemporary (technological) practice and develop consistent naturalphilosophical system. In addition to textual analysis, the paper is also based on analysis of the historical context. Although Abraham Gottlob Werner is commonly regarded as the founder of so-called philosophical mining, i.e., a geo-physics based on empirical data, Leibniz anticipated several ideas later associated with Werner. However, Leibniz’s Protogaea, in which he applied his metaphysics and geometry to the issue of fossils, is certainly not among the best-known of Leibniz’s works. A consequence, or perhaps cause, of that is that Leibniz is thought of as a “mere” theorist. And yet, the only objection that could be raised against him in this respect is his distrust in the practical judgement of his more experienced colleagues.

Tato studie je volným pokračováním studie Leibniz a první termodynamický zákon (Teorie vědy 46(1):89–114, 2024). Tentokrát však podrobněji analyzuji novověkou diskusi mezi Leibnizem, Newtonem, Clarkem a Descartem, předjímající pozdější úvahy ohledně druhého termodynamického zákona. Přestože se totiž Leibnizův aposteriorní důkaz v neprospěch platnosti druhého termodynamického zákona ukazuje být méně přesvědčivý než jeho apriorní důkaz ve prospěch platnosti prvního, do budoucí formulace druhého termodynamického zákona se přesto promítly oba. Jak ostatně Leibniz sám konstatoval, a v rámci Protogaey také prokázal, fyzika samotná si dokáže vystačit i bez něj.

The article presents the German philosopher G. W. Leibniz as a key precursor of the First Law of Thermodynamics. In this way, Leibniz tried to oppose Newton, who seems to have completely rejected the First Law of Thermodynamics, while at the same time remarkably anticipating the Second. Based on his polemics not only with Newton, from whose Laws of Motion thermodynamics originates, and with his advocate Samuel Clarke, but also with René Descartes, whose conception Leibniz partially followed, Leibnizʼs reasoning turns out to be the most convincing. It is certainly no coincidence that the later founders of thermodynamics frequently acknowledged him.

In the annotated Czech translation of Leibniz’s dialogue Pacidius Philalethi, which was published in 2019, but also in an earlier essay by the same translator on Leibniz’s dialogic way of writing as well as in other interpretations, there is little discussion of the practical implications of his dialogic method. Leibniz’s dialogical argumentation strategy, as he later applied it in his correspondence with Samuel Clarke, is therefore either completely neglected or is referred to as being typical of the time, or alternatively is confused with Zeno’s dialectical method. Thus, the aim of this study is to clarify the practical implications of Leibniz’s application of the dialogic method in his final correspondence with Clarke.

Studie se věnuje otázce po ontologickém statusu ideálního, potažmo fenomenálního prostoru v pojetí Gottfrieda Wilhelma Leibnize. Nejprve bude ujasněno, v jakém smyslu lze podle Leibnize za prostor v pravém slova smyslu považovat primárně pouze prostor ideální, sekundárně však rovněž prostor fenomenální. Posléze se vymezím zejména vůči takovým interpretacím leibnizovského ideálního prostoru, které v něm spatřují předzvěst prostoru kantovského. Leibnizův ideální, matematický prostor zde totiž bude přirovnán spíše k prostoru suárezovskému, případně hobbesovskému, nikoli však kantovskému.

This study deals with a controversy between Leibniz and Clarke concerning the relativity of space. Although substantivalism, i.e. an approach treating space as a substance, is to be indicated as the main target of Leibniz’s attack, it has usually been replaced by Newtonian absolutism instead, as a proper opposition to Leibniz’s relationalism. However, such absolutism has not been defined ontologically, but dynamically, as if the difference between their conceptions consisted of a different approach to the inertiallity of motion. However, this would mean that while Leibniz intended to reduce all motion to an inertial one, Newton reduced it to a noninertial one instead, or that only one of them acknowledged the existence of noninertial motion at all. Nevertheless, none of them actually denied the existence of noninertial motion, and although all motion indeed seemed noninertial to Newton, Leibniz never responded to such a challenge in the course of their correspondence.

V rámci tohoto příspěvku se pokusím zpochybnit dosavadní mainstreamovou interpretaci Leibnizovy metafyziky prostoru, jak ji představil v dopisech anglickému učenci Samuelu Clarkovi. Přestože bývá Leibnizova metafyzika prostoru právě na základě jeho korespondence s Clarkem obvykle považována za ostrý protipól metafyziky Clarkovy, respektive Newtonovy, v rámci tohoto příspěvku poukážu na to, že při zvážení Leibnizovy geometrie zvané „analysis situs“ se taková interpretace stává neudržitelnou. Leibnize nelze považovat za zastánce typicky relačního pojetí prostoru.