•  327
    Instrumental Rationality in the Social Sciences
    Philosophy of the Social Sciences (1): 46-68. 2023.
    This paper draws some bold conclusions from modest premises. My topic is an old one, the Neohumean view of practical rationality. First, I show that this view consists of two independent claims, instrumentalism and subjectivism. Most critics run these together. Instrumentalism is entailed by many theories beyond Neohumeanism, viz. by any theory that says rational actions maximize something. Second, I give a new argument against instrumentalism, using simple counterexamples. This argument systema…Read more
  •  264
    Brilliance Beliefs, Not Mindsets, Explain Inverse Gender Gaps in Psychology and Philosophy
    with Heather Maranges, Maxine Iannuccilli, Ulf Hlobil, and Kristen Dunfield
    Sex Roles: A Journal of Research 89. 2023.
    Understanding academic gender gaps is difficult because gender-imbalanced fields differ across many features, limiting researchers’ ability to systematically study candidate causes. In the present preregistered research, we isolate two potential explanations—brilliance beliefs and fixed versus growth intelligence mindsets—by comparing two fields that have inverse gender gaps and historic and topical overlap: philosophy and psychology. Many more men than women study philosophy and vice versa in p…Read more
  •  311
    What Determines Feelings of Belonging and Majoring in an Academic Field? Isolating Factors by Comparing Psychology and Philosophy
    with Heather Maranges, Maxine Iannuccilli, Ulf Hlobil, and Kristen Dunfield
    Current Research in Behavioral Sciences 4 100097. 2023.
    Feelings of belonging are integral in people’s choice of what career to pursue. Women and men are disproportionately represented across careers, starting with academic training. The present research focuses on two fields that are similar in their history and subject matter but feature inverse gender gaps—psychology (more women than men) and philosophy (more men than women)—to investigate how theorized explanations for academic gender gaps contribute to feelings of belonging. Specifically, we sim…Read more
  •  182
    Review: Metaphysical Animals, by Mac Cumhaill & Wiseman (review)
    Zeitschrift Für Ethik Und Moralphilosophie 5 (2). 2022.
    Mac Cumhaill and Wiseman’s book about the formative years of four influential female philosophers is well-researched and timely, appearing shortly after Lipscomb’s (2022) on the same topic. They describe the lives of Elizabeth Anscombe, Philippa Foot, Mary Midgley and Iris Murdoch from 1938 to 1956, that is, from the last pre-war term at Oxford, where all four took a BA, to the term in which Anscombe defended her famous objection to "Mr. Truman’s Degree" at Oxford’s general assembly. Using a wid…Read more
  •  281
    There is a common demand that moral theory be 'practical', voiced both in- and outside of philosophy. Neo-Humeans, Kantian constitutivists and Aristotelian naturalists have all advocated the idea that my knowledge that I ought to do something must lead me to actually do it—an idea sometimes called the “practicality requirement” for moral theory. Some university administrators apply this idea in practice, when they force students who violate the code of conduct to complete classes in moral theo…Read more
  •  723
    Automation, Basic Income and Merit
    In Keith Breen & Jean-Philippe Deranty (eds.), Whither Work? The Politics and Ethics of Contemporary Work, Routledge. 2021.
    A recent wave of academic and popular publications say that utopia is within reach: Automation will progress to such an extent and include so many high-skill tasks that much human work will soon become superfluous. The gains from this highly automated economy, authors suggest, could be used to fund a universal basic income (UBI). Today's employees would live off the robots' products and spend their days on intrinsically valuable pursuits. I argue that this prediction is unlikely to come true. Hi…Read more
  •  640
    Life and Other Basic Rights in Anscombe
    In Roger Teichmann (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Elizabeth Anscombe, Oxford University Press. 2022.
    Following Elizabeth Anscombe, rights exist within practices. A right consists in a bundle of possible and impossible moves within the relevant social 'game', e.g. the practice of private property. What becomes of basic rights on such a social-constructivist conception? Metaphysically, basic rights do not differ from other rights. The right not to be murdered, however, enjoys a transcendental status within Anscombe's moral philosophy, and this construction might extend to other basic rights: Sinc…Read more
  •  608
    Virtues for the Imperfect
    with Ulf Hlobil
    Journal of Value Inquiry 53 (4): 605-625. 2018.
    We suggest a new neo-Aristotelian account of right action: An action A is right for an agent S in a situation C just in case it is possible for A in C to result from a good practical inference. A practical inference is good if people must have a disposition to make such practical inferences where a society is to flourish. One advantage of this account is that it applies to non-ideal agents. It thus blocks the right-but-not-virtuous objection to virtue ethics. Our account furthermore suggests a n…Read more
  •  1747
    Do the Virtues Make You Happy?
    with Ulf Hlobil
    Philosophical Inquiries 7 (2): 181-202. 2019.
    We answer the title question with a qualified “No.” We arrive at this answer by spelling out what the proper place of the concept 'happiness' is in a neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics: (1) Happiness in the sense of personal well-being has only a loose relation to virtue; it doesn't deserve any prominent place in virtue ethics. (2) Happiness in the sense of flourishing is impossible without virtue, but that doesn't imply that individual actions should aim at flourishing. (3) Instead, flourishing set…Read more
  •  38
    While many of Elizabeth Anscombe’s philosophical views are well-known (e.g. her views on practical knowledge or consequentialism), little has been written on her philosophical method, i.e., on her way of doing philosophy. This is unfortunate, for two reasons: First, the failure to understand Anscombe’s method is a major stumbling block for many of her readers. Second, and more importantly, we can still learn a lot from Anscombe’s way of doing philosophy: Her view differs considerably from curren…Read more
  •  248
    Review: No Morality, No Self, by James Doyle (review)
    Ethics 130 (1): 102-106. 2019.
    James Doyle’s book is provocative and timely. It is an important contribution to the current wave of Anscombe scholarship, and it offers valuable insights into general metaethical ques­tions, such as: In what senses might morality be “unintelligible”? Or: To what extent does a divine law ethics rest on practical reason? Here, I do not want to summarize the many ad­mirable features of Doyle’s book. I will instead focus on his two main theses, of which I re­main unconvinced.
  •  447
    Beyond Frontier Town: Do Early Modern Theories of Property Apply to Capitalist Economies?
    Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 22 (4): 909-923. 2019.
    The theories of Locke, Hume and Kant dominate contemporary philosophical discourse on property rights. This is particularly true of applied ethics, where they are used to settle issues from biotech patents to managerial obligations. Within these theories, however, the usual criticisms of private property aren’t even as much as intelligible. Locke, Hume and Kant, I argue, develop claims about property on a model economy that I call “Frontier Town.” They and contemporary authors then apply these c…Read more
  •  3246
    Peter Geach's Ethics
    In Hähnel Martin (ed.), Aristotelian Naturalism: A Research Companion, Springer. pp. 183-193. 2020.
    Geach is best known for his contributions to theoretical philosophy: Most of his more than one hundred papers and a dozen books are on logic, philosophy of language and metaphysics. But he also made significant contributions to ethics. Particularly influential were a series of short metaethics papers, which are small masterpieces, both in terms of philosophical content and style. In usually less than ten pages, Geach delivers sharp analyses and powerful objections against influential schools…Read more
  •  122
    On Anscombe’s Philosophical Method
    with Ulf Hlobil
    Klēsis Revue Philosophique 35 180-198. 2016.
    While many of Elizabeth Anscombe’s philosophical views are well-known (e.g. her views on practical knowledge or consequentialism), little has been written on her philosophical method, i.e., on her way of doing philosophy. This is unfortunate, for two reasons: First, the failure to understand Anscombe’s method is a major stumbling block for many of her readers. Second, and more importantly, we can still learn a lot from Anscombe’s way of doing philosophy: Her view differs considerably from curren…Read more
  •  365
    G. E. M. Anscombe: Aufsätze (edited book)
    with Ulf Hlobil
    Suhrkamp. 2014.
    Die Wittgenstein-Schülerin Elizabeth Anscombe zählt zu den einflussreichsten Philosophinnen des 20. Jahrhunderts. Mit der Monographie Absicht begründete sie die analytische Handlungstheorie, viele ihrer Abhandlungen gelten als Klassiker, aber nur wenige liegen bislang in deutscher Übersetzung vor. Der vorliegende Band füllt diese Lücke: Er versammelt zwölf von Anscombes wichtigsten Aufsätzen, die thematisch von der praktischen Philosophie über die Metaphysik und die Philosophie des Geistes bis h…Read more
  •  726
    Do Rights Exist by Convention or by Nature?
    Topoi 35 (1): 313-325. 2016.
    I argue that all rights exist by convention. According to my definition, a right exists by convention just in case its justification appeals to the rules of a socially shared pattern of acting. I show that our usual justifications for rights are circular, that a right fulfills my criterion if all possible justifications for it are circular, and that all existing philosophical justifications for rights are circular or fail. We find three non-circular alternatives in the literature, viz. justifica…Read more
  •  684
    Foot Without Achilles’ Heel
    with Ulf Hlobil
    Philosophia 47 (5): 1501-1515. 2019.
    It is often assumed that neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics postulates an obligation to be a good human being and that it derives further obligations from this idea. The paper argues that this assumption is false, at least for Philippa Foot’s view. Our argument blocks a widespread objection to Foot’s view, and it shows how virtue ethics in general can neutralize such worries.
  •  2330
    What Is Conventionalism about Moral Rights and Duties?
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (1): 15-28. 2019.
    A powerful objection against moral conventionalism says that it gives the wrong reasons for individual rights and duties. The reason why I must not break my promise to you, for example, should lie in the damage to you—rather than to the practice of promising or to all other participants in that practice. Common targets of this objection include the theories of Hobbes, Gauthier, Hooker, Binmore, and Rawls. I argue that the conventionalism of these theories is superficial; genuinely conventionalis…Read more
  •  1319
    Authority and Interest in the Theory of Right
    In David Plunkett, Scott Shapiro & Kevin Toh (eds.), Legal Norms, Moral Norms: New Essays on Metaethics and Jurisprudence, Oxford University Press. pp. 315-334. 2019.
    I suggest a new role for authority and interest in the theory of right: Rights can be explicated as sets of prohibitions, permissions and commands, and they must be justified by interests. I argue as follows: (1) The two dominant theories of right—“Will Theory” and “Interest Theory”—have certain standard problems. (2) These problems are systematic: Will Theory’s criterion of the ability to enforce a duty is either false or empty outside of its original legal context, whereas Interest Theory …Read more
  •  1653
    Anscombe on the Sources of Normativity
    Journal of Value Inquiry 51 (1): 141-163. 2017.
    Anscombe is usually seen as a critic of “Modern Moral Philosophy.” I attempt a systematic reconstruction and a defense of Anscombe’s positive theory. Anscombe’s metaethics is a hybrid of social constructivism and Aristotelian naturalism. Her three main claims are the following: (1) We cannot trace all duties back to one moral principle; there is more than one source of normativity. (2) Whether I have a certain duty will often be determined by the social practices of my community. For insta…Read more