Katherin Rogers

Suppose God is perfectly good, perfectly rational, and perfectly free. Must He be able to do other than He does? Mark Johnston and Timothy O’Connor hold that God must have libertarian freedom. The challenge, then, is to defend divine goodness and rationality. But on the Neoplatonic view of divine freedom—God, existing independently, wills with aseity—divine goodness and rationality are not threatened. God knows and does the best. It begs the question to hold that God, being infinitely good, cannot add goodness to the world. The Neoplatonic claim is that a god who failed to create would not be infinitely good. The Neoplatonic view also supports the doctrine of divine simplicity. True, one must allow that ours is the best world. And one must address the “modal collapse.” But these projects are doable and worth the effort to preserve divine goodness, rationality, and simplicity.

Anselm of Canterbury holds that in order to be free and responsible, a created agent must be able to choose _a se_, from himself, and this requires that he confront genuinely open options such that it is entirely up to him which option he pursues. Katherin Rogers shows that the Anselmian theory subscribes to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP). In the recent literature, the main challenge to this principle originates with Harry Frankfurt, who challenges PAP by offering counterexamples in which a “controller” sees to it that an agent does not actually confront open options. Yet, as Frankfurt supposes, even a libertarian ought to judge that the agent is free and responsible. This challenge has evoked extensive debate in the last several decades. The Anselmian version of PAP is immune to these Frankfurt-style counterexamples, and his argument can be adapted by other species of libertarian.

Classical theism holds that God is the _Creator omnium_ — the absolute source of all that has ontological status. Boethius, following Augustine, holds that God is the cause of everything apparently including the choice to sin. Johannes Scotus Eriugena proposes, in an undeveloped and provocative way, that God does not know or cause evil at all. Anselm agrees, but offers an analysis of how God causes every _thing_ and every positive property, leaving only the nothing of evil to originate with created agents.

Anselm grants that divine foreknowledge does introduce a sort of necessity regarding a future free choice, but it is a ‘consequent’ necessity, which follows from the choice actually being made by the agent. Anselm is the first philosopher to explicitly propose the theory of four-dimensionalism; God is outside of time, but present to all times, such that all times are equally real. God sees all times ‘at once’ and so the agent making the free choice tomorrow is the cause of God's foreknowledge today.

I try to reconcile libertarian free will for created agents with a qualified understanding of divine providence. Divine providence is not absolute, since created agents have some say in how things go in the universe. But God has a great deal of providential control because, being eternal, He sees, and can act upon, all the moments of time including (what is to us) the future. An isotemporalist (eternalist, four-dimensionalist) analysis of time, on which all times are equally real, can make sense of this. But if reality is “already” all there for God, how can He act upon it to achieve His objectives? Two analogies help to answer this question; the Time Traveler and the Master Painter.

Anselm of Canterbury is the first Christian philosopher, perhaps the first philosopher, to offer a systematic analysis of libertarian freedom. His work prefigures that of Robert Kane, and looking at the two philosophers together is helpful in understanding and appreciating the work of each of them. In this paper I show how Anselm adopts a view of choice that foreshadows Kane’s doctrine of ‘plural voluntary control.’ Kane proposes this doctrine as an attempt to answer the ‘luck’ problem. Alfred Mele criticizes this approach, arguing that, unless the agent’s competing desires ultimately originate with the agent himself, he cannotbe considered autonomous. It is true that on both Kane’s and Anselm’s analysis, agents have only a limited area of autonomy. However, an appreciation of theradical implications of this limited autonomy in Anselm’s system shows that plural voluntary control gives the agent significant freedom.

St. Anselm of Canterbury is well known for his "ontological" argument, but his importance as a thinker does not begin and end with the first few pages of the Proslogion. Underlying his work is a consistent metaphysics and epistemology. ;Recently some scholars, notably F. S. Schmitt, the editor of Anselm's Opera Omnia, have argued that Anselm breaks with his Platonic predecessor Augustine to foreshadow the more Aristotelian Aquinas. In looking at the Divine Ideas and their relationship to God, to creation and to human ideas, I argue that Anselm did not abandon Augustine's form of Platonism. ;Anselm believes that there are Divine Ideas of absolute qualities , of genera and species, and even of individuals. These Ideas are one in the Word, the Second Person of the Trinity. ;Anselm accepts the doctrine of participation. Creation is a reflection of God, and God is really in creation. Schmitt argues that Anselm sees God as only an efficient cause in the Thomistic sense, but his arguments fail. On the problem of universals, Anselm is an "extreme" realist, but this does not mean what most historians of medieval philosophy take it to mean. As to individuation, Anselm holds that individuals in a species are distinguished by their peculiar properties. Like Augustine, Anselm believes that there are seminal reasons, however he is not interested in the role the angels play in creation. ;Anselm believes that all knowledge comes through divine illumination. Some scholars attempt to fit Anselm into the Thomistic mold, even to the extent of claiming that Anselm accepts a doctrine of abstraction. The evidence is all to the contrary, however. Through his epistemology Anselm shows himself to be a monist. Ontologically the universe is a continuum. Creation is a reflection of God's Ideas and human ideas are a reflection of creation. This enables Anselm to see God as the guarantor of human knowledge. ;Anselm's metaphysics and epistemology are quite different from those of most contemporary philosophers, and hence should be studied to gain perspective. Moreover, they are intrinsically interesting and even compelling

The Doctrine of Divine Simplicity is central to traditional classical theism, but there are different ways to spell out the doctrine, and different ways to solve the problems it generates. Two key problems are: How can a simple God do and know many different things? And, could a simple God have done other than He has done? If so, that would seem to entail multiplicity-God’s nature plus the divine aspects that could have been otherwise. Anselm of Canterbury, working within the Augustinian/Neoplatonic tradition, provides careful and coherent answers to these questions: A simple, eternal, God can do and know a vast multiplicity of things in one timeless act in which doing and knowing are the same. And, being perfectly good, this simple God inevitably, though freely, does the best.

Anselm of Canterbury, as a classical theist, does not hold that there is a moral, or value, order independent of God. What is good, indeed what is necessary and possible, depends on the will of God. But Anselm’s development of this claim does not succumb to the problems entailed by divine-command theory. One such problem addresses the question of whether or not the moral order is available to reason, bracketing Scripture and Church teaching. Anselm holds that to be just is to conform to God’s will. Nevertheless Anselm proposes a eudaimonistic ethical theory that allows reason to assess moral principles. And Anselm holds that the non-believer recognizes justice, even before he can appreciate the more general category of “good.”

William Hasker and I disagree over whether or not appealing to a particular understanding of divine eternity can reconcile divine foreknowledge with libertarian human freedom. Hasker argues that if God had foreknowledge of a particular future choice, that choice cannot be free with libertarian freedom. I hold, to the contrary, that, given a certain theory of time—the view that all times exist equally—it is possible to reconcile divine foreknowledge with libertarian freedom. In a recent article, “Can Eternity be Saved? A Comment on Stump and Rogers”, Hasker makes it clear that one of the fundamental disagreements between us lies in what each of us takes to be required for libertarian free will. In the present paper I outline the version of libertarianism that I find plausible, then explain how a libertarian free choice can be foreknown by God. Then I will explain why Hasker finds this reconciliation unacceptable since it fails to do justice to what he takes to be required for libertarian freedom. Finally, I will argue that Hasker is wrong to insist upon his analysis of free will.

The doctrine of divine simplicity (DDS) is an important aspect of the classical theism of philosophers like Augustine, Anselm, and Thomas Aquinas. Recently the doctrine has been defended in a Thomist mode using the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction. I argue that this approach entails problems which can be avoided by taking Anselm’s more Neoplatonic line. This does involve accepting some controversial claims: for example, that time is isotemporal and that God inevitably does the best. The most difficult problem involves trying to reconcile created libertarian free will with the Anselmian DDS. But for those attracted to DDS the Anselmian approach is worth considering.

Some analytic philosophers of religion argue that theists should embrace the hypothesis of the multiverse to address the problem of evil and make the concept of a “best possible creation” plausible. I discuss what classical theists, such as Augustine, Anselm, and Aquinas, might make of the multiverse hypothesis including issues such as: the principle of plenitude, what a classical theist multiverse could look like, and how a classical theist multiverse could deal with the problem of evil and the question of a best possible creation.

In Christ and the Cosmos Keith Ward hopes to “reformulate” the conciliar statements of the Trinity and Incarnation since they cannot serve our post-Enlightenment, scientific age. I dispute Ward’s motivation, noting that the differences in perspective to which he points may not be as radical as he supposes. And his “reformulation” has worrisome consequences. I am especially concerned at his point that Jesus, while very special and perfectly good, is only human. This undermines free will theodicy, and, much more troubling, makes global Christian practice for two millennia idolatry.

Hugh McCann argues that God wills human sin, that humans are nonetheless significantly free, and that his position provides a satisfying theodicy of sin. I defend an Anselmian view: Although God causes the existence of all that exists, He does not produce sin. Human beings are the ultimate sources of their sinning, which sinning should not happen. McCann rejoins that my position is incoherent and that my criticisms are not well taken. I respond, clarifying Anselm’s understanding of human freedom, revisiting and defending my previous criticisms, and arguing that in practice McCann’s position is a poor fit for the Christian life.