Katherine Valde

The timing of the origin of flowering plants (Angiosperm) is hotly debated. It has been suggested that the disagreement between the fossil record of angiosperm origin strongly conflicts with the origin estimates generated by molecular clocks. I argue that this conflict reveals lessons about whether or under what conditions scientific disagreement is likely to bear fruit. Specifically, I point to issues of evidence quality and social epistemic structures which deserve more attention in understanding the productivity of disagreement.

This paper draws an analogy between the value-free ideal (VFI) found in the domains of science and law, and argues that appreciating the similarities between these misplaced ideals mutually reinforces the arguments against the VFI in each domain, and can open up new conceptual space within debates about the proper role(s) of values within the practices of science and law alike. Although a jurisprudential philosophy of science is not mutually exclusive with the development of a political philosophy of science, we believe philosophers of science would do well to consider drawing on law and jurisprudence, as opposed to moral and political philosophy, in thinking about ways forward within these debates.

There is a growing recognition among many scientists and philosophers that metaphysical presuppositions guide scientific research. These ontological claims, in turn, prescribe a particular methodology for how to go about investigating and explaining those kinds of things. There is thus what I call a move from metaphysics to methods. Using cancer research as a case study, I defend the existence of this move, and I argue for an “agnostic” attitude towards the metaphysical presuppositions guiding cancer research. I defend this agnosticism on two grounds: first, the underdetermination of metaphysical frameworks by empirical research, and second, on the ground of inductive risk, namely that when it comes to cancer research, there are more than just epistemic consequences for making the wrong metaphysical choice. I conclude that one should instead allow for a pluralism of metaphysical frameworks to guide cancer research.

This article examines the challenges and pressures liberal arts programs are currently facing, as well as their responses to them. We argue that while liberal arts programs do in fact develop transferable skills that promote ‘work-place readiness,’ these skills are best understood as derivative goods of a liberal arts education and not the value of the education itself. Further, we argue that valuing the liberal arts for these derivative goods may be self-defeating—insofar as a liberal arts education is constituted by a certain set of social norms, values, practices. Like friendship, therefore, a liberal arts education has instrumental value; however, pursuing a liberal arts education for the instrumental value may diminish (and may even preclude) the realization of these derivative goods and values.

“I knew you were trouble when you walked in,” sings Taylor Swift in her song I Knew You Were Trouble (IKYWT). But what, exactly, does Swift know? And how does she know it? This paper considers three possible interpretations. The first interpretation considers whether Swift is simply profiling or stereotyping her would-be suiter. The second interpretation considers whether Swift is actually making a self-knowledge claim--where what is claiming to know is something about herself. Finally, the third interpretation considers whether we should take Swift at face-value. When Swift says she "knew you were trouble when you walked in," she meant it. Indeed, women and other minorities are socially conditioned to be attenuated to body language and other non-verbal cues that help keep them safe. Swift's claim, therefore, may not simply be a morally problematic instance or stereotyping, or a claim about her self-knowledge (which is somewhat unsupported by the lyrics); rather, Swift's claim to know you were trouble helps reveal shortcomings in popular contemporary accounts of epistemology. Shortcomings that can be corrected by thinking about claims like the one Swift makes here.

There is a growing recognition among many scientists and philosophers that metaphysical presuppositions guide scientific research. These ontological claims, in turn, prescribe a particular methodology for how to go about investigating and explaining those kinds of things. There is thus what I call a move from metaphysics to methods. Using cancer research as a case study, I defend the existence of this move, and I argue for an “agnostic” attitude towards the metaphysical presuppositions guiding cancer research. I defend this agnosticism on two grounds: first, the underdetermination of metaphysical frameworks by empirical research, and second, on the ground of inductive risk, namely that when it comes to cancer research, there are more than just epistemic consequences for making the wrong metaphysical choice. I conclude that one should instead allow for a pluralism of metaphysical frameworks to guide cancer research.

The timing of the origin of flowering plants (Angiosperm) is hotly debated. It has been suggested that the disagreement between the fossil record of angiosperm origin strongly conflicts with the origin estimates generated by molecular clocks. I argue that this conflict reveals lessons about whether or under what conditions scientific disagreement is likely to bear fruit. Specifically, I point to issues of evidence quality and social epistemic structures which deserve more attention in understanding the productivity of disagreement.