Katherine Ward

The aim of this book is to argue for a standpoint approach to phenomenology grounded in the idea that social oppression and marginalization can, in some cases, result in privileged insight. However, the aim of phenomenology is to uncover what is shared and essential to our being—what conditions support in general and for all human beings the kind of being that we share. The classical phenomenological methodologies reflect this focus on the “universal” by systematically eliminating specificity as a means of identifying what is common to all. In this chapter, I present the methodological “problem” of introducing standpoint to the phenomenological project. I also present an example from the work of the critical phenomenologists, Alia Al-Saji, whose insights are drawn from the specificity of her experience—they occur because of and not in spite of their social specificity. Yet her work also uncovers something that structures experience more generally. I start with this example to show that such an approach must somehow be possible. The rest of the book will be an exploration of how this is possible and why it is a crucial contribution to the phenomenological project.

In this chapter, I discuss the revelatory experience of art and “wonder.” Heidegger argues that the work of art opens a world to its audience in a way that allows the audience to contemplate it. There is always an opacity to art works—a medium that both attracts its audience and keeps them at a remove, which inspires a mood of wonder that allows the consideration of the structure of the world of human experience itself. In this way, art can reveal conditions for human experience through a distanced captivation that allows for phenomenological inquiry. I argue, further, that art which grows out of specific social situations and identities can offer insight into shared background conditions of human experience—these art works are revelatory because of not in spite of a socially specific starting point. Feminist art provides one example. I also use the work of Eva Hesse to make this point—exploring the way her understanding and depiction of existential absurdity was shaped by her experiences as a Jewish woman and also her chronic and terminal illness.

In this chapter, I present some background on standpoint epistemology, highlighting in particular three of its key commitments: the thesis of situated knowledge, the achievement thesis, and the thesis of inverted privilege. This chapter articulates these theses in detail and presents an argument for their plausibility before showing how these might be harnessed for a project of standpoint phenomenology. I use Helen Ngo’s work to show how social location can affect one’s ability to interpret and understand phenomenological concepts. In the example I present, Ngo does not uncover a new condition underlying experience, but she draws on her own experience of racism to offer a better way of interpreting and understanding the concepts of habit and sedimentation developed by Merleau-Ponty. In the chapters that follow, I will expand on the idea of standpoint by introducing three methodologies that harness the power of being an outsider-within to produce novel insights into the structures of and relation between Dasein and the world.

In this chapter, I layout the methodology of breakdown that Heidegger uses (but doesn’t clearly explain) in Being and Time. When something breaks down (e.g. a piece of equipment, a relationship, a person), you catch a glimpse of the reason for the failure—a condition or the conditions that ought to be met for one to experience something as what it is. A piece of equipment, for example, can fail in many ways—revealing the many conditions that must be met for one to experience equipment as equipment. I then show how Frantz Fanon’s work on the historico-racial schema implicitly deploys this methodology by utilizing his experience of corporeal malediction to revise Merleau-Ponty’s concept of the body schema. Corporeal malediction describes experiencing an inhibited body schema due to racist myths and stereotypes. It is a breakdown that is essentially tied to social identity and represents a revision of an already existing phenomenological concept. Fanon’s own status as what Patricia Hill Collins calls an “outsider within” puts him in a position to compare his own insight with those that have issued from the dominant perspective in order to achieve a privileged insight into the phenomenological discipline itself and its flaws and lacunas.

This chapter explores two problems that any phenomenological methodology must address. The first problem is one of distortion, which can occur when one tries to take an experience as an “object” of reflection. The second problem arises as a result of the way many essential aspects of experience are necessarily concealed within that experience. I trace this to the centrality of intentional experience and the foundation of intentional experience on the foreground/background relationship. Much of what shapes human experience serves as background to what is foreground and must remain concealed in the sense of not becoming an explicit object of thought. Attempts to directly interrogate conditions of experience will fail to capture these essential but necessarily hidden features. I discuss these two problems and their origin, because the three methodologies I present have been shaped by and in response to these obstacles.

This chapter examines a phenomenological methodology built around the experience of signs—equipment that, unlike most equipment, remains conspicuous in use and draws explicit attention to certain relations within the environment. I present the methodology of sign that Heidegger develops (although not clearly) in Being and Time by connecting it to his earlier explicit methodology of formal indication. I then show how Sara Ahmed uses this methodology to uncover something new about signs themselves and how they situate us within the world. Although Ahmed uncovers something that is a feature common for all, I show that her discovery is rooted in her particular standpoint. It is her identity as a lesbian that enabled this phenomenological discovery—affecting her interests, access to, and interpretation of her experience. It developed out of an achievement, and it constitutes a privileged insight into the phenomena. Her work thus provides a key illustration of how Heidegger’s methodology of signs can be deployed in a standpoint approach to phenomenology.

We discuss how writing assignments that center students’ personal experience can help to promote inclusive pedagogy and significant learning. These assignments lend themselves to less formal, more colloquial language that allow students to do the hard work of understanding, analyzing, and assessing complex philosophical content without also having to navigate a specialized form of academic writing—a struggle for many first generation and ESL students. Inviting students to make connections between philosophical content and their own lives rewards diversity of experience, which can encourage students from underrepresented backgrounds to see their lived experience as relevant to philosophy and assure them that they belong, and can succeed, in philosophy. Significant learning is promoted for all students by addressing the key learning goals of integration, the human dimension, and caring and by helping build classroom community. We present the prompts, our reflections, and conclude by addressing potential worries.

This book introduces a standpoint approach to phenomenology and reconceives the phenomenological project as not an individual but a communal endeavor—one that, importantly, requires insight from across the spectrum of human experience and especially experiences of those who have traditionally been absent from the discipline. To develop this approach, the book draws on the feminist tradition of standpoint epistemology. The book borrows two of standpoint epistemology’s key theses—that of situated knowledge (what we know is shaped and often limited by our social location) and inverted privilege (epistemological advantage can in some contexts be inversely related to one’s social location). In standpoint phenomenology, these develop into the thesis of situated phenomenology and inverted phenomenological privilege respectively. This book presents three specific methodologies that support the standpoint approach to phenomenology: the methodologies of breakdown, sign, and wonder. All have their origins in the classical phenomenological work of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty. Though these methods are used by these phenomenologists, they are not explicitly articulated or explained in any detail. The book lays out how and why these methodologies can be used to reveal the conditions supporting human existence and then highlights the role each might play in a standpoint approach to phenomenology.

Distinguishing between normal and non-normal cases of perception and motricity is a key part of Merleau-Ponty’s methodology in Phenomenology of Perception. Many feminist philosophers and disability scholars have criticized this use of the normal/nonnormal binary and the presumptions behind it. Others have embraced his methodology and noted its consonance with contemporary feminist, disability, and philosophy of race scholarship. In this paper, I present my own interpretation of what Merleau-Ponty means by “normal”. I draw on Rosemarie Garland-Thomson’s concept of “fit” and also draw attention to the broader existential-phenomenological framework within which Merleau-Ponty is working. This re-framing of the term does two things. First, it provides a clear picture of the hidden methodology at work in Phenomenology of Perception. Second, it offers the possibility of grounding the concept of “fit” in an existential-phenomenological conception of the self.

In this article, I examine the phenomenological methodology at work in Fanon's revision of the body schema. I argue that he implicitly utilizes a methodology I call standpoint phenomenology and show how this methodology emphasizes experiences that are not “universal” but specific to certain social groups in order to uncover shared ontological structures of experience. Fanon's work illustrates two key theses of standpoint phenomenology: (1) the thesis of situated phenomenology and (2) the thesis of inverted phenomenological privilege. I also draw a deep connection between classical and standpoint phenomenology by showing that it is the phenomenological analysis of breakdown experiences (e.g., corporeal malediction) that enables a standpoint approach to phenomenology. This breakdown methodology is explicitly developed by Heidegger and utilized implicitly by Merleau‐Ponty. If I am right, standpoint phenomenology is both a natural development of and a considerable advance on the traditional methodology. This article, then, provides a better understanding of Fanon's place in the phenomenological tradition and, more broadly, makes explicit a new methodology for advancing phenomenological research.

Historizing is the way Dasein takes up possibilities and roles to project itself into the future. It is why we experience continuity throughout our lives, and it is the basis for historicality – our sense of a more general continuity of “history.” In Being and Time,Heidegger identifies both inauthentic and authentic modes of historizing that give rise, respectively, to inauthentic and authentic modes of histori-cality. He focuses on historizing at the individual level but gestures at a communal form of historizing. In this paper, I develop the concept of co-historizing in both its authentic and inauthentic modes. I argue that Heidegger’s unarticulated concept of inauthentic co-historizing is what necessitated the planned (but unfinished) second half of Being and Time – the “phenomenological destruction of the history of ontol-ogy.” I consider what it means to take responsibility for our destiny as a people and specifically as a community of philosophers.