Katheryn Doran

Long before the revival of interest in the late 20th century in what has come to be called public philosophy G.E. Moore identifi ed and tried to resolve deep tensions between what philosophers say in the study about we do or do not know, and what they say about knowledge outside of the study in the thick of their ordinary lives. Moore’s arguments in defense of commons sense – against philosophical attack – are powerful and rightly still command our attention. In this paper I offer a critique of Joshua Anderson’s (2021) attempt at a vaguely Wittgensteinian makeover of Moore’s (1925/1970) work in “A Defence of Common Sense” in particular, and show that it misses the mark. Anderson argues, in response to Roderick Chisholm’s (1973) reading of Moore as a particularist in The Problem of the Criterion, that Moore is best understood as not being concerned with epistemological matters. I am agnostic about whether Moore is a particularist, and my case against Anderson does not depend on a defense of Chisholm’s view of Moore’s philosophical position. While it is possible that Moore is not concerned with epistemological matters in the papers in question Anderson’s argument that Moore is not is not convincing. And I will show that Anderson’s burden of proof is high. It is not the case that Moore is best understood as not being concerned with epistemological matters, either in the sense that Moore’s writing supports that view, or, more important, that Moore’s case against the skeptic fares better on Anderson’s reading of it.

The chief task of this dissertation is to show that G. E. Moore's work on skepticism, circa 1903-1942, has been undervalued. A careful examination of his arguments and strategies shows that they are more powerful, collectively, than is usually thought. I undertake such an examination in this dissertation. I argue that Moore made a considerable advance in our understanding or the problem of skepticism, and of how to solve it. ;I take Moore's arguments to divide into four interrelated categories. First, I examine Moore's use of common sense in his arguments, and compare this concept with what is normally meant by "common sense". I argue that Moore's appeal to common sense differs from garden variety common sense, but that, nonetheless, the common sense views he articulates serve as the philosophical underpinnings of plain common sense. I also examine the ways in which skepticism runs afoul of common sense. ;Second, I argue that the skeptic is guilty of a peculiar kind of inconsistency in what he asserts and what he implies by his other asserting and non-linguistic behavior. I apply Robert Brandom's theory of the conditions of assertability to explain what goes wrong in "Moore's Paradox" sentences. I argue that proof of such inconsistencies is highly damaging to the skeptic's position. ;Third, I give an analysis of the connections between various kinds of possibility, with a focus on epistemic and logical possibility. I examine Moore's descriptive and normative uses of the expressions "possible", "logically possible", "might have been", and "p is contingent", with an emphasis on how the skeptic conflates kinds of possibility in order to complete key arguments for his position. ;Finally I look to Moore's notorious proofs, and investigate the nature of the burden of proof. I argue that Moore succeeds in shifting the burden of proof to the skeptic, and in so doing, more than salvages his position from what looks, to some, like defeat.

Critical Thinking is a comprehensive and accessible introduction to the essential skills of good reasoning. The authors provide a thorough treatment of such central topics as deductive and inductive reasoning, logical fallacies, how to recognize and avoid ambiguity, and how to distinguish what is relevant from what is not. Later chapters discuss the application of critical thinking skills to particular topics and tasks, including scientific reasoning, moral reasoning, media analysis, and essay writing. This seventh edition is revised and updated throughout, and includes a new chapter on legal reasoning as well as access to a companion website of additional questions and other useful resources

_Critical Thinking_ is a comprehensive and accessible introduction to the essential skills of good reasoning. The authors provide a thorough treatment of such central topics as deductive and inductive reasoning, logical fallacies, how to recognize and avoid ambiguity, and how to distinguish what is relevant from what is not. Later chapters discuss the application of critical thinking skills to particular topics and tasks, including scientific reasoning, moral reasoning, legal reasoning, media analysis, and essay writing. The book also provides complimentary access to a companion website containing additional questions, flashcards, and other useful critical thinking resources.

William Hughes's Critical Thinking, recently revised and updated by Jonathan Lavery and Katheryn Doran, is a comprehensive and accessible introduction to the essential skills required to make strong arguments. Hughes, Lavery, and Doran give a thorough treatment of such traditional topics as deductive and inductive reasoning, logical fallacies, the importance of inference, how to recognize and avoid ambiguity, and how to assess what is or is not relevant to an argument. The authors also cover less traditional topics such as special concerns to keep in mind when reasoning about ethical matters, and how the nature of a language can affect the structure of an argument. In addition to covering basic concepts for analyzing and assessing arguments, the text also has two chapters that are designed to help students write argumentative essays. Last but not least, Critical Thinking includes a selection of logical paradoxes and puzzles that are as entertaining as they are enlightening. For the sixth edition particular attention has been paid to the needs of American students and instructors