Kathleen A. Creel

Scientific hedges are communicative devices used to qualify and weaken scientific claims. Gregor Betz has argued—unconvincingly, we think—that hedging can rescue the value-free ideal for science. Nevertheless, Betz is onto something when he suggests there are political principles that recommend scientists hedge public-facing claims. In this article, we recast this suggestion using the notion of public justification. We formulate and reject a Rawlsian argument that locates the justification for hedging in its ability to forge consensus. On our alternative proposal, hedging is often justified because it renders scientific claims as publicly accessible reasons.

Mistakes are inevitable, but fortunately human mistakes are typically heterogenous. Using the same machine learning model for high stakes decisions creates consistency while amplifying the weaknesses, biases, and idiosyncrasies of the original model. When the same person re-encounters the same model or models trained on the same dataset, she might be wrongly rejected again and again. Thus algorithmic monoculture could lead to consistent ill-treatment of individual people by homogenizing the decision outcomes they experience. Is it wrong to allow the quirks of an algorithmic system to consistently exclude a small number of people from consequential opportunities? This paper will argue that consistent and arbitrary exclusion is often unfair, even when it is divorced from group-based bias or discrimination.