Kathleen Stock

This chapter examines to what extent it is true that fiction is a problematic source of information about empirical matters. This is done via a comparison with what are often thought of as paradigmatic sources of empirical knowledge, at least in well-formed cases: historical texts. The focus of the discussion is on _testimony_—roughly, the conveying of information to a hearer with the aim of being believed, partly on the speaker’s say-so—as it occurs in both historical and fictional _texts_. The chapter concludes that despite appearances, in many typical cases fiction can be a relatively solid source of information about the world, so that indignant responses to occasions of inaccuracy in fiction may not be misplaced after all.

Philosophical aesthetics has increasingly turned towards empirical evidence to settle long-standing questions. Yet, surprisingly, given philosophers’ tendencies to cautious critical analysis, the use of such evidence is not always inspected as scrupulously as it could be. In this paper, Stock presents a case study illustrating what she takes to be one instance of the misuse of empirical evidence in a current debate within aesthetics: that of the so-called ‘paradox of fiction’. In some relatively recent literature, there has been a shift towards the citing of sub-personal events as a means of attempting to address this problem. In particular, those neurological or other physiological events that accompany imaginative responses to fictional entities are often cited. Yet, Stock argues, there are often flaws in the way empirical evidence is used to support this sort of account.

This chapter considers the phenomenon of free indirect style, and what imaginative response it calls for from the reader who encounters it in a fiction. Two ‘single voice’ theories of free indirect style are discussed: one which argues that we should hear FIS only as implying the voice of a character whose experience is being evoked, and another (that of Goldie) which argues that we should hear FIS only as implying the voice of a narrator describing the experience of a character. This chapter argues instead that the reader is called upon both to imagine from the inside the experience of a character, and that a narrator reports that experience; and that there is nothing incoherent or imaginatively challenging about this. Along the way, the chapter considers the relevance of this view to Goldie’s discussion of autobiographical memory ‘integrating’ ‘external and internal perspectives’ in _The Mess Inside._.

Recently a new approach to the imagination has emerged, sometimes labelled the ‘cognitive theory’ of imagination. It is rooted in cognitive psychology, and presented as able to do much that other approaches cannot. In particular, it is said to offer new solutions to problems in aesthetics. In this paper, I’ll examine to what extent this is true. I will argue that, despite the way it is often presented, the theory does not attract any special credibility in virtue of its model of explanation; and, more seriously, that the case for two of its central tenets remains underdeveloped. I shall also argue that the purported explanatory benefits brought to one traditional problem in aesthetics by the theory are in fact limited. The threat to ‘traditional’ philosophy of imagination remains unproven.

Philosophers on Music: Experience, Meaning, and Work presents significant new contributions to central issues in the philosophy of music, written by leading philosophers working in the analytic tradition. The issues tackled include: the question of what sort of thing a work of music is; the nature of the relation between a musical work and versions of it; the nature of musical expression and its contribution to musical experience; the relation of music to metaphor; the nature of musical irony; the musical status of electro-sonic art; and the nature of musical rhythm. Aestheticians, musicologists, music practitioners, and those interested in philosophy generally will find the papers in this volume rewarding reading.

It has seemed to some compelling that construing imagining in relation to fictional events as imagining being aware of those events provides a good explanation of our emotional responses to them. Call this ‘the argument from affective response’. Versions of this argument have been advanced by Kendall Walton and Jerrold Levinson. A more localised version of it, with respect to pornography, is that construing imagining in relation to events represented in pornography as imagining being aware of them provides a good explanation of subsequent arousal. Compelling as this may seem, I argue that it is false. I start by making some distinctions between different kinds of imagining de se, and then focus on the claim that there is a connection between emotional engagement with fiction and implicitly imagining de se, making it more precise in the light of various plausible considerations. I then turn to the case of pornography, examining and rejecting three possible arguments for a necessary connection between imagining, from the inside, being aware of represented events, and being aroused by them. Since versions of these arguments might equally be applied to affective response to fiction more generally, I take it that I have thereby gone at least part way to undermining the argument from affective response.

This entry considers the question “What is objectification?” After preliminary remarks about different methodological approaches, several possible answers, or groups of answers, are introduced, separated out in terms of broad themes. Each is situated in relation to historical and more contemporary authors. These themes are: objectification as instrumentalization; objectification as reduction to the body; objectification as negation of subjectivity or agency; objectification as naturalization. Objectification is considered in relation to both sexual and racial contexts. Finally, these themes are discussed in relation to the wider category of “mind suppression,” and its relation to objectification in the familiar context of imagery.

I trace a brief history of philosophical discussion of the concept WOMAN and identify two key points at which, I argue, things went badly wrong. The first was where when it was agreed that the concept WOMAN must identify a social not biological kind. The second was where it was decided that the concept WOMAN faced a legitimate challenge of being insufficiently “inclusive”, understood in a certain way. I’ll argue that both of these moves are only intelligible, if at all, in the context of an anti-naturalist picture drawn from either post-structuralism or radical feminism. They become incoherent when adopted by methodological naturalists, who – especially when concerned to track oppression and discrimination – have no good reason to deny that WOMAN refers to a pre-given, biological kind.

I defend an account of sexual orientation, understood as a reflexive disposition to be sexually attracted to people of a particular biological Sex or Sexes. An orientation is identified in terms of two aspects: the Sex of the subject who has the disposition, and whether that Sex is the same as, or different to, the Sex to which the subject is disposed to be attracted. I explore this account in some detail and defend it from several challenges. In doing so, I provide a theoretical framework that justifies our continued reference to Sex-directed sexual orientation as an important means of classifying human subjects.

In order for true beliefs acquired from reading fiction to count as knowledge proper, they must survive ‘the challenge from luck’. That is, it must be established that such beliefs are neither luckily true, nor luckily believed by readers. The author considers three kinds of true belief a reader may, she assumes, get from reading fiction: a) those based on testimony about empirical facts; b) those based on ‘true in passing’ sentences; and c) those beliefs about counterfactuals one may get from reading a ‘didactic’ fiction. The first group escape the challenge from luck relatively easily, she argues. However, things turn out to be more complicated with the second group. The author examines Mitchell Green’s suggestion, effectively, that knowledge of fictional genre may see off the challenge from luck here, but rejects this in the form presented by Green, adapting it substantially to offer beliefs of this kind a more promising escape route. The author finishes by following Green’s lead once again, and discussing the category of ‘didactic’ fiction, as he calls it. She argues that any true beliefs about counterfactuals gained from such fictions are likely to be lucky. The author concludes however that things are much more promising for any true beliefs gained about oneself as a result of engaging with what Green calls an ‘interrogative’ fiction.

The claim that the functions of art liable to change over time appears to suggest that any attempt to define art in terms of a limited set of functions will fail. Robert Stecker has offered a functionalist definition which seeks to accommodate this criticism by making the functions which are relevant to an artwork's status those which are 'standard or correctly recognized' for some art form. I argue that Stecker does not offer a clear enough distinction between the 'standard or correctly recognized' and the accidental functions of an art form; that his account of the 'standard or correctly recognized' functions of an art form does not exhaust important artistic functions; and that his proposed definition is neither necessary nor sufficient for an object to count as an artwork. For these reasons I suggest that Stecker's functionalist account of art should be rejected.

A popular approach to defining fictive utterance says that, necessarily, it is intended to produce imagining. I shall argue that this is not falsified by the fact that some fictive utterances are intended to be believed, or are non-accidentally true. That this is so becomes apparent given a proper understanding of the relation of what one imagines to one's belief set. In light of this understanding, I shall then argue that being intended to produce imagining is sufficient for fictive utterance as well

This chapter defends a theory of objectification, conceiving of it as a species of what aestheticians have called ‘seeing‐as’, and more specifically, a kind of seeing‐as which to some degree is insensitive to the mind or mental aspects. An advantage of this view is that it covers both sexual and racial objectification, and can also explain how photographic images can objectify their subjects: namely, by encouraging the viewer to view in a way insensitive to the mind or mental aspects of the subject. It also explains in what context objectification to can be harmless. This view is discussed in relation to several others.

Philosophers on Music: Experience, Meaning, and Work presents significant new contributions to central issues in the philosophy of music, written by leading philosophers working in the analytic tradition. The issues tackled include: the question of what sort of thing a work of music is; the nature of the relation between a musical work and versions of it; the nature of musical expression and its contribution to musical experience; the relation of music to metaphor; the nature of musical irony; the musical status of electro-sonic art; and the nature of musical rhythm. Aestheticians, musicologists, music practitioners, and those interested in philosophy generally will find the papers in this volume rewarding reading.

This chapter considers the phenomenon of free indirect style, and what imaginative response it calls for from the reader who encounters it in a fiction. Two ‘single voice’ theories of free indirect style are discussed: one which argues that we should hear FIS only as implying the voice of a character whose experience is being evoked, and another which argues that we should hear FIS only as implying the voice of a narrator describing the experience of a character. This chapter argues instead that the reader is called upon both to imagine from the inside the experience of a character, and that a narrator reports that experience; and that there is nothing incoherent or imaginatively challenging about this. Along the way, the chapter considers the relevance of this view to Goldie’s discussion of autobiographical memory ‘integrating’ ‘external and internal perspectives’ in The Mess Inside.