Kathryn MacKay

This book argues that virtue ethics should be incorporated into public health ethics. It provides the theoretical foundations for a virtue ethics that is applicable to public health, as well as political institutions more broadly. Ethical analyses of public health policies and practices have been mostly conducted in terms of examining the best consequences or weighing outcomes against liberty, autonomy, justice, and harm. While these debates are important, analyses conducted only in these terms leave a huge range of moral issues under-examined. This book contends that a virtue ethics developed for political institutions such as public health provides the tools for a more robust moral analysis of institutional structures, actions, and responsibilities. First, it presents theoretical arguments for political virtues, explaining how institutions like public health have moral agency and how these institutional agents can, in turn, have (or lack) virtues. It then presents three political virtues that are particularly relevant to public health: justice, civic friendship, and epistemic humility. Each of these virtues is important to what it means for public health to do its work excellently, and each sheds light upon the moral justifiability of past or current public health practice. Public Health Virtue Ethics will appeal to researchers and graduate students working in virtue ethics, bioethics, and public health ethics.

Genomic-based testing in reproduction is expanding, with more tests offered to more people for more indications. These tests are offered in the name of reproductive autonomy. However, ‘reproductive autonomy’ is often interpreted to over-emphasize maximal choice and information, overlooking the role of relationships and structural influences. In this paper, we consider how reproductive autonomy can be conceptualized to be useful for challenges presented by expanded prenatal genomics. After critically examining the epistemological assumptions connecting (genomic) information and autonomy, as well as the ideological pressures these tests potentially intensify, we present and defend a more fitting approach to reproductive autonomy. Our account is characterized by relationality, substantivism, the fulfillment of certain institutional conditions, and the provision of adequate options. By providing deeper philosophical context to the way we understand reproductive autonomy in expanded prenatal genomic testing, our approach nuances how the offer and uptake of prenatal genomic testing should progress.

LANGUAGE NOTE | Document text in English ; abstract also in Chinese. 本文介紹生物倫理學與公共健康倫理學領域，並描述兩者之間的關係；文章尾聲將展望公共健康倫理學論未來既廣泛又多變的方向。本文首先簡介公共健康倫理學的本質，以及如何把其與比之更廣闊的生物倫理學作出區分，因此需要提出公共健康倫理學的定義，以助釐清公共健康倫理的重點。隨後，本文簡述公共健康倫理學文獻的一些最新進展，包括圍繞新冠病毒、大流行病、抗菌素抗藥性、「生活方式」疾病及正義等道德問題。本文同時論及就干預公共健康的「合法範圍」所提出的觀點之間於政治及形而上學的角力。其後本文探討公共健康倫理學所面臨的挑戰，包括其複雜又多元的性質。而且公共健康實踐高度政治化，其政治化的原因是因為公共健康影響整個人口及社區，而很多關於公共健康的決策由政治人物而非公共健康專家所作出。此外，公共健康倫理也因為公共健康的範圍擴展至納入非政府公共健康行動者而面臨進一步的挑戰。本文最後闡述有關公共健康的一些未來方向，包括「公共健康觀」的出現，以作為為人熟知的健康與社會問題的形而上學框架、把該領域的認知和道德基礎去殖民化以涵蓋更廣泛的知識，以及一些包括美德在内的公共健康倫理學的理論發展。筆者建議讀者把文章視為對公共健康倫理學領域的一部分介紹，並鼓勵他們閲讀本文所引用的論文，並以這些論文作為進入所涵蓋主題的大量文獻之門徑。公共健康倫理學是一個相對年輕的領域，而該領域有著巨大的成長及發掘更多新概念的潛力。 This essay begins by introducing the fields of bioethics and public health ethics and describing the relationship between them. It ends with some glimpses into the wide-ranging and discourse-changing directions of the literature on public health ethics. To open, the paper describes the field of public health ethics and how it is differentiated from the wider field of bioethics. This requires a brief description of public health to clarify the nature of public health ethics. The essay then provides a brief overview of a few recent developments in the public health ethics literature, including the moral issues raised by COVID-19 and pandemics, anti-microbial resistance, ‘lifestyle’ diseases and justice. The paper also touches on the political and metaphysical tensions in views on what counts as a ‘legitimate area’ of intervention for public health. The essay then turns to a couple of challenges in the field of public health ethics, specifically the complex and multi-disciplinary nature of the field and the fact that public health practice is a highly political area. Public health is political both in the sense that it affects entire populations or communities and in the sense that many decisions about public health are made by politicians rather than public health experts. A further challenge to public health ethics is the question of what counts as ‘public health’, as the scope has been broadened to include non-governmental public health actors. Finally, the essay describes some future directions for research in public health ethics, including ‘public health view’ becoming a metaphysical framing for familiar health and social issues and decolonising the epistemic and moral foundations of the field to include a wider set of knowledge sources and values. There are also some theoretical developments that integrate virtue into public health ethics. The reader should take this essay as a partial introduction to the field, and they are highly encouraged to read the papers that are cited here and to use those papers as a gateway into the large literature on the topics covered. Public health ethics is a relatively young field, with an enormous potential for growth and new ideas.

Bioethics educators have access to a wide range of teaching approaches, including online strategies which became familiar to many teachers during the pandemic. As teaching contexts continue to evolve, reflection on which approaches best fit our pedagogical aims in bioethics is timely. As a contribution to this reflection, we report our experience incorporating podcasts into our students’ learning in two Australian universities at Masters level. We describe the potential of podcasts to positively impact learning and student experience. We explore them firstly as substitutions for lectures and secondly as supplements or substitutions for readings. Based on our teaching practice, we discuss the use of both bespoke teacher-created podcasts and pre-existing third party podcasts. We suggest that podcasts can engage students effectively in bioethical issues, model philosophical dialogue, facilitate high quality class discussion, and give learners access to both mainstream experts and less powerful voices in an immediate and moving way.

In the ethics of public health, questions of virtue, that is, of what it means for public health to act excellently, have received little attention. This omission needs remedy first because achieving improvements in population-wide health can be in tension with goals like respect for the liberty, self-determination, or non-oppression of various individuals or groups. A virtue-ethics approach is flexible and well-suited for the kind of deliberation required to resolve or mitigate such tension. Public health requires practically wise and careful thinking, which virtue ethics brings with it. Furthermore, too tight a focus on delivering outcomes in determining how public health should act has, in some cases, actually undermined its ability to achieve those consequences. However, the main concern about incorporating virtue into public health in a pluralistic society is likely to be that virtue is generally teleological, and we would surely need some widely agreed upon idea of something like flourishing or the common good for this to work. In this paper, I propose that for public health to express virtue in its work, it must express a commitment to justice as it goes about its business promoting and protecting the health of the population. Justice is both a contributor toward better health for groups in society, and a worthwhile goal in its own right. I will sketch an argument that justice as non-oppression – not merely health equity – is the right telos toward which excellent public health should aim in a pluralist society.

This thesis aims to determine whether international gestational surrogacy contracts are exploitative, and whether they should be prohibited. I chose a group of women working as surrogates at Kaival Maternity Home and Surgical Hospital, in Anand, Gujarat, India as a study group. After examining their life circumstances, I argue that these women live in unjust circumstances caused by institutional sexism and poverty. I critically assess arguments launched against surrogacy, organ trade, and prostitution and find that none of these are sufficient for demonstrating that contracts involving the sale of the body are necessarily exploitative. I find that surrogacy is exploitative because of a complex set of social conditions. Further, the contracts are beneficial to both the woman acting as surrogate and to the couple hiring her. I conclude that international gestational surrogacy is exploitative yet mutually beneficial, and prohibiting surrogacy would be harmful unless accompanied by drastic social change.

Genomic testing in prenatal care is rapidly advancing and it is now possible to obtain an entire fetal genome via a blood test administered in early pregnancy. In the pursuit of reproductive autonomy, more tests are being offered to more people, for an ever-increasing range of indications. Health professionals who provide pregnancy care are at the vanguard of prenatal testing, yet their views on the impact of technology advancements remain under-explored. Qualitative interviews with Australian healthcare professionals revealed that they value prenatal testing for its information-giving potential. However, the rationale underpinning testing reveals a tension between professionals’ desire for certainty and patients’ expectation that they will be reassured. Coupled with the greater salience of genomic information over other forms of knowledge in prenatal care, we suggest that the unchecked pursuit of information by way of genomic technologies in prenatal testing may paradoxically constrain reproductive autonomy in practice.

This paper proposes that public health is the sort of institution that has a role in producing structures of virtue in society. This proposal builds upon work that describes how virtues are structured by the practices of institutions, at the collective or whole-of-society level. This work seeks to fill a gap in public health ethics when it comes to virtues. Mainstay moral theories tend to incorporate some role for virtues, but within public health ethics this role has not been fully articulated. Two recent papers have proposed ways in which the virtues might be incorporated: working from a structural account, Rozier suggests that public health could work to instil virtues, like temperance, in the public in order to achieve its health-related goals; Nihlén Fahlquist suggests that compassion is among three virtues that practitioners of public health should cultivate in order to do their work well. In the end, both accounts recommend incorporating virtues at the level of individuals, among the public and among practitioners. I propose a third kind of role for virtue in public health that focuses on structures. Public health activities take place at the population level, and a public health virtue ethics must also be suitably population-focussed.

In the paper “An archeology of corruption in medicine”, Miles Little, Wendy Lipworth, and Ian Kerridge present an account of corruption and describe its prevalent forms in medicine. In presenting an individual-focused account of corruption found within “social entities”, Little et al. argue that these entities are corruptible by nature and that certain individuals are prone to take advantage of the corruptibility of social entities to pursue their own ends. The authors state that this is not preventable, so the way to remedy corruption is via management and, where necessary, punishment. This commentary will briefly lay out the key features and functions of corruption as presented by Little et al., before providing a critical discussion that will focus on whether corruptibility is a necessary feature of social entities. I will propose that it is not a necessary feature, though it may frequently arise where individualistic values are unchecked. Corruption can be prevented within social entities by enhancing structures that direct toward virtue and which promote and reward cooperation instead of competition.

The COVID-19 pandemic has changed the world. The depth and breadth of changes are still unfolding. What is the place of feminist bioethics in this new world? It's important to point out that COVID-19 is only one of a few major catastrophes we are facing as humans. The ongoing and worsening effects of climate change, along with the paltry efforts of politicians to address it, are an urgent concern. Humanitarian crises caused by climate change, by COVID-19, or crises unrelated to either but surely worsened by both, are also...

In the paper “An archeology of corruption in medicine”, Miles Little, Wendy Lipworth, and Ian Kerridge present an account of corruption and describe its prevalent forms in medicine. In presenting an individual-focused account of corruption found within “social entities”, Little et al. argue that these entities are corruptible by nature and that certain individuals are prone to take advantage of the corruptibility of social entities to pursue their own ends. The authors state that this is not preventable, so the way to remedy corruption is via management and, where necessary, punishment. This commentary will briefly lay out the key features and functions of corruption as presented by Little et al., before providing a critical discussion that will focus on whether corruptibility is a necessary feature of social entities. I will propose that it is not a necessary feature, though it may frequently arise where individualistic values are unchecked. Corruption can be prevented within social entities by enhancing structures that direct toward virtue and which promote and reward cooperation instead of competition.

One thousand women. Ten years. Diana Greene Foster’s epic Turnaway Study, and its namesake book, followed a thousand women who sought abortions across the United States for a decade after they were or were not successful in ending unwanted pregnancies to document how their lives changed. The result is a book rich in detail, full of facts about abortion in the United States—and somewhat more generally—that perhaps many of us knew or suspected but few could find in print. These facts include why some women do not realize until the second trimester that they are pregnant, why women seek abortions later in their pregnancies, or...

In this article, I focus on two problematic aspects of British health-promotion campaigns regarding feeding children, particularly regarding breastfeeding and obesity. The first of these is that health-promotion campaigns around “lifestyle” issues dehumanize mothers with their imagery or text, stemming from the ongoing undervaluing and objectification of mothers and women. Public health-promotion instrumentalizes mothers as necessary components in achieving its aims, while at the same time undermining their agency as persons and interlocutors by tying “mother” to particular images. This has a double effect: first, it excludes mothers who do not fit the campaign picture of a mother; second, it encloses those who do fit the picture into an objectified image of motherhood that is defined by and subject to the dominant white, heteropatriarchal gaze. The second problem is that campaigns place unjustified demands on mothers, which stem from a misinterpretation of the maternal duty to benefit. I argue that nutrition-related health concerns regarding children are improperly framed as individual failures of maternal duty, rather than as failures of a system to function correctly. These arguments ultimately support shifting the focus of responsibility for issues around childhood nutrition away from mothers and back toward policymakers.

A few years ago, the New York City Department of Health introduced a public health campaign entitled “Cut Your Portions, Cut Your Risk”, a series of posters in which images of food in increasingly large portion sizes appear. In one example, three packets of french fries are featured; in another, cheeseburgers are shown. In a red box in each, the text, in large, all-capital letters in English and Spanish, reads “Portions have grown,” and, below this, in all capitals, “so has obesity, which can lead to many health problems” or “so has type 2 diabetes, which can lead to amputations.” Beneath the food, the posters admonish, again in all-capital...

This paper imagines what the liberatory possibilities of (full) ectogenesis are, insofar as it separates woman from female reproductive function. Even before use with human infants, ectogenesis productively disrupts the biological paradigm underlying current gender categories and divisions of labour. I begin by presenting a theory of women’s oppression drawn from the radical feminisms of the 1960s, which sees oppression as deeply rooted in biology. On this view, oppressive social meanings are overlaid upon biology and body, as artefacts of culture and history. I then argue that ectogenesis should be pursued to replace two modes of assisted gestation that can be seen as outgrowths of oppressive assumptions about women's function, ectogenesis should be pursued to replace two modes of assisted gestation. These are gestational surrogacy and uterine transplant, which arise partly from gendered, pronatalist, and geneticist norms. These practices are supported by assumptions about women’s identity and value. Pursuing technologies such as ectogenesis, which weaken the presumed link between biology and gender, is beneficial to (trans-inclusionary radical) feminist aims, as part of a broad project of challenging dominant power relations resting on and maintaining gender categories. By allowing the conceptual separation of female reproductive function from ‘woman’, ectogenesis raises questions about how we determine who counts in this gender identity, and also how we value those who claim the identity ‘woman’. I conclude that ectogenesis has the potential to challenge traditional patriarchal family structures, and thence all other male-dominated structures (of work, education, cultural production), allowing a reimagining of the family and society in more radical ways than we have yet achieved.

In this case discussion, Barnhill and Devine collect and present a significant amount of recent research on the various reasons why people struggle to succeed in weight loss programmes. Specifically, the authors focus on what they call ‘behavioural weight loss interventions’, which are ‘research, clinical or public health efforts to promote individual healthy eating and physical activity behaviours’. As defined, this is a very broad category of interventions and presumably includes all kinds of dieting and weight loss programmes or promotion efforts short of private or independently chosen programmes. The authors argue, in a nutshell, that these clinical, research, and public health interventions have low efficacy, and while they may have some health or other benefits, the balance of evidence presented shows that they harm people in multiple ways.

There have been calls for some time for a new approach to public health in the United Kingdom and beyond. This is consequent on the recognition and acceptance that health problems often have a complex and multi-faceted aetiology. At the same time, policies which utilise insights from research in behavioural economics and psychology have gained prominence on the political agenda. The relationship between the social determinants of health and behavioural science in health policy has not hitherto been explored. Given the on-going presence of strategies based on findings from behavioural science in policy-making on the political agenda, an examination of this is warranted. This paper begins by looking at the place of the SDoH within public health, before outlining, in brief, the recent drive towards utilising behavioural science to formulate law and public policy. We then examine the relationship between this and the SDoH. We argue that behavioural public health policy is, to a certain extent, blind to the social and other determinants of health. In section three, we examine ways in which such policies may perpetuate and/or exacerbate health inequities and social injustices. We argue that problems in this respect may be compounded by assumptions and practices which are built into some behavioural science methodologies. We also argue that incremental individual gains may not be enough. As such, population-level measures are sometimes necessary. In section four we defend this contention, arguing that an equitable and justifiable public health requires such measures.

In this commentary on Brown and colleagues’ paper, entitled ‘Against Moral Responsibilisation of Health: Prudential Responsibility and Health Promotion’, I highlight the tension between individual responsibility—even when this is prudential and not moral—and systemic factors that impact people's health. Brown and colleagues and I agree that individuals are frequently held inappropriately responsible for health-related behaviours or diseases that have become associated with the so-called ‘lifestyle’ diseases. We further agree that health is an instrumental value to people, allowing them to achieve their goals or plans. However, while Brown and colleagues argue that health promotion is justified in providing education campaigns that highlight the pragmatic reasons people have for improving their health-related behaviours, I argue that this amounts to the same inaction on systemic issues as holding individuals morally responsible. Further, without action on systemic issues such as the social determinants of health, some people lack the kinds of future-oriented pragmatic reasons that Brown and colleagues place at the centre of their argument. Rather, for some groups, the pragmatic thing is to enjoy current pleasures even if unhealthy, rather than to forego them for the sake of health in a mythical future.